How The CIA Continues To Promote Islamic Terrorism

US officials: ‘Dirty’ Mideast intel partly to blame for CIA weapons landing in the wrong hands

By Lucas Tomlinson
Published June 27, 2016

Weapons supplied by the CIA for Syrian rebel training routinely end up in the wrong hands,” partly because of corruption among those rebels but also due to corrupt Jordanian intelligence teams, multiple U.S. officials close to the CIA program told Fox News on Monday.

The officials said Jordanian intelligence services aim to use the Islamic State terror group to push back on growing Iranian influence in the region. “Every Middle Eastern intelligence service is dirty,” one official told Fox News.

“Jordan’s biggest enemy is anything Shia,” an official said.

The New York Times broke the story. A CIA spokesman reached by Fox News wouldn’t comment.
Iran’s population is 90-95 percent dominated by the Shia branch of Islam. Iran has been accused of funding Shia rebels across the Middle East, starting other flashpoints in the region outside Syria including Yemen, drawing a Sunni-led coalition led by Saudi Arabia to use military force to stop the rebels known as Houthis.

Iran and its proxy force in Lebanon, Hezbollah, have supported the Syrian government since the start of its civil war five years ago. Iran has helped move Shia groups from as far away as Afghanistan into Syria to help shore up the embattled regime of Bashar al-Assad whose Alawite sect is an offshoot of Shia Islam. Russia has also deployed military forces since late last year to help Assad’s military.
Despite pledges of support and backing from Jordan’s King Abdullah II, there was concern among officials in the Jordanian Armed Forces and their intelligence agency that lending too much outward support against ISIS could increase instability inside Jordan, as some inside the kingdom saw ISIS in a more sympathetic light, one U.S. official said. “There is a chance the more we push JAF [Jordan Armed Forces] into the fight, the more we could actually be undermining Jordan’s security.”
The official suggested that a recent Russian airstrike killing U.S.-backed rebels in southern Syria, near the border with Jordan, might have been tipped off by Jordanian intelligence, but lacked concrete proof.

“I think it is safe to say that there are JAF members that correspond with Da’esh [ISIS] and the attack on [U.S.-backed rebel base al-Tanf] is likely a warning for JAF to take a step back. Senior leaders most certainly know there are sympathizers in the ranks who will want to push or cancel any future missions against Da’esh,” he said.

Many in the region see ISIS, a Sunni group, as standing up against Shia influencers, the official summarized.

While neither official reached by Fox News could confirm that U.S.-supplied arms have wound up on the black market, one said that a “majority” of U.S.-supplied weapons was sold or gifted to other rebel groups fighting the Assad regime, including Islamist groups with questionable human rights records.

The New York Times reported that President Obama authorized the covert action against the Assad regime in April 2013, a fact not disputed by those close to the program. The aid to rebel groups by the CIA helped tip the scales in the favor of the rebel forces, which drew Russia to intervene in late September, according to officials.

The Pentagon runs a separate “train and equip” mission mostly out of Turkey that has been by all accounts a failure. The former head of U.S. Central Command told lawmakers in September that only “four of five” U.S.-trained rebels remained.

Adding to the problems establishing a fighting force to counter the Assad regime or ISIS, Russia has been accused of “deliberately” bombing U.S.-backed rebels since Russian jets and helicopter gunships arrived late last year.

Earlier this month, Russian Su-34 attack jets bombed Pentagon and CIA-backed rebels despite calls from the U.S. military to halt the bombing. Russia bombed the rebels in southern Syria twice, the second time after a call from the U.S. military to the Russians was ignored.

The U.S. military had sent jets to the area where the Russians were bombing, but left the area to refuel when the Russians returned to continue striking U.S.-backed forces, Fox News was told.

Russia Takes Opportunity To Make More Nuclear Allies (Daniel 7:7)


Russia signs nuclear deals with traditional U.S. allies in Middle East

The Russian government has signed major nuclear cooperation agreements with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan since the start of this year, increasing its influence among traditional U.S. allies in the region.

In June, Russia closed a major deal on nuclear cooperation between Russia and Saudi Arabia. Since the end of the last decade the Saudis have been implementing plans to construct as many as 16 commercial nuclear power plants. The Saudis have signed agreements with other nuclear nations, including the United States, France, China and Argentina, to help construct the reactors.
Russia is now expected to play a sizable role in operating the nuclear plants, which are still to be built.

The Saudis have indicated that a nuclear program will free up oil reserves to be used almost exclusively for foreign sales that generate hard currency earnings.

In February, Russia and Egypt secured a preliminary deal in which Russia signaled its willingness to assist Egypt in building its first nuclear power plant. The agreement was announced during President Vladimir Putin’s February visit to Cairo, during which he also solidified Russia’s overall political and trade relationships with his Egyptian counterpart, President Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi.

Current plans call for the power plant to be built near the northern Egyptian city of El Dabaa. Russia, which has extensive experience with nuclear energy, has offered to provide training and nuclear-related research for Egyptian engineers.

Shortly thereafter, the Jordanian Atomic Energy Commission and Russia’s Rosatom, the state-run nuclear energy corporation, agreed on a plan for the construction of Jordan’s first nuclear power plant. Under the agreement two nuclear reactors of 1000 megawatts each would be built.

Should We Be Surprised? (Daniel 8:3)

Muqtada al-Sadr

After the fall of Saddam, Muqtada al-Sadr, a charismatic Iraqi cleric who comes from a powerful clerical dynasty, emerged as one of the country’s most talked-about Shi’a leaders. Al-Sadr is the son of Grand Ayatollah Muhammad al-Sadr, who was killed in 1999 by agents presumed to be working for Saddam Hussein, thus becoming one of the major symbols of Shi’a resistance to the former regime. Al-Sadr — who was believed to be around 30 years old [though some sources claim he is in his early 20s] — lived in the holy Shi’a city of Al-Najaf. The controversy regarding his age was most likely started by opponents of al-Sadr trying to undermine his legitimacy. Al-Sadr was one of the most vocal critics of the U.S. occupation of Iraq. The leader of the Sadriyun Movement [Sadriun Movement], he insisted US troops should leave the country immediately and that Iraqis be given an opportunity to create an Islamic state if they choose.
On 18 July 2003 al-Sadr used a Friday sermon in Al-Najaf to denounce as “puppets” the members of Iraq’s new U.S.-appointed Governing Council. He also announced his own plans to form a militia. Al-Sadr announced his new government during his sermon at Friday prayers in Al-Kufah on 10 October 2003. Muqtada al-Sadr announced his intention to form an Islamic state in Iraq by establishing a shadow government there, complete with ministries. Fighting broke out in Karbala on 13 October 2003 when al-Sadr’s men attacked supporters of moderate Shi’ite Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani near the Imam Hussein shrine.
The cleric challenged coalition forces after they closed his “Al-Hawzah” newspaper on charges of incitement and arrested an al-Sadr aide on charges relating to the al-Khoi killing. The situation escalated when it was revealed that an Iraqi judge had also issued a warrant for al-Sadr’s arrest in al-Khoi’s assassination outside the Imam Ali Mosque in Al-Najaf. 
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) spokesman Dan Senor publicly revealed 05 April 2004 that an Iraqi judge has issued an arrest warrant for Shi’ite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr in connection with the 10 April 2003 murder of Shi’ite Grand Ayatollah Abd al-Majid al-Khoi at a mosque in Najaf. Senor also announced that Iraqi police had arrested Mustafa al-Yacoubi in connection with the same murder of Ayatollah Abdul Majid al-Khoei and one of his aides.
Qom-based Iraqi-born cleric Kazim al-Husseini al-Haeri with the administration of eastern Baghdad, according to “The New York Times” on 26 April. Al-Haeri reportedly issued a religious edict in early April that was distributed among Shia clerics in Iraq that calls on them “to seize the first possible opportunity to fill the power vacuum in the administration of Iraqi cities.” “We hereby inform you that Mr. Muqtada al-Sadr is our deputy and representative in all fatwa affairs,” Haeri’s decree adds. “His position is my position.” Thousands of people chanted their support for Muqtada al-Sadr as they went to hear him at the Friday prayers at a Najaf mosque.
Al-Haeri once had a close relationship with the Shia Al-Da’wah al-Islamiyah party, but split with the group because al-Haeri was excessively pro-Iranian and called for the party to respect the guidance of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Beirut’s “Al-Mustaqbal” reported on 24 April. Al-Haeri is an advocate of Vilayat-i Faqih (Guardianship of the Supreme Jurisconsult), on which Iran’s theocracy is based. Al-Haeri’s involvement in Iraqi politics could have a profound impact. He is the point at which the Sadriyun (as supporters of al-Sadr are known), SCIRI, and Da’wah converge. 
Since then, the 68-year-old al-Haeri renounced his relationship with al-Sadr. “Mr. al-Sadr used to be our representative…but that was on condition of obedience to and coordination with our office in Al-Najaf,” al-Haeri said in comments posted on his website, AP reported on 5 September. Al-Sadr “does not coordinate with our office, so his agency became void,” according to the website, which added that al-Sadr “does not seek our advice in his stances, so we cannot endorse what he does.” According to a 5 September report in “The New York Times,” al-Haeri withdrew his support for al-Sadr after Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani informed senior clerics in Qom that the Imam al-Mahdi Army caused some of the battle damage at the Imam Ali shrine in Al-Najaf.
By early 2004 Sadr’s followers had elevated him to the rank of hujjat al-Islam (a “Sign of Islam,” or a “Proof of Islam,” the third rank from the top in the Shi’i clerical hierarchy). He wrapped himself in a white funeral shroud, showing he is ready for death.
Thousands of Iraqis in Baghdad and the Shi’ite-populated cities of Al-Kut, Karbala, and Al-Najaf took to the streets in support of al-Sadr, while the cleric’s outlawed Imam Al-Mahdi Army established control over government buildings and police stations in a direct challenge to coalition authority. 
Former Iranian President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani praised al-Sadr’s actions as “heroic” during his Friday prayer sermon in Tehran on 9 April. “Contrary to these terrorist groups in Iraq, there are powerful bodies which contribute to the security of that nation…among them is the Mahdi Army, made up of enthusiastic, heroic young people,” Reuters quoted Rafsanjani as saying. However, Iranian Grand Ayatollah Hussein Ali Montazeri criticized the Al-Mahdi Army in comments faxed to Reuters, saying: “Imam Mahdi would never be content to initiate disunity, division, and factionalism in his name.” 
Muqtada al-Sadr has resided in Iran since 2007, where he was said to be working on his religious studies, with the reported intention of acquiring the status of Ayatollah. Sadr was frequently rumored to be returning to Iraq; as with the Hidden Imam, past reports of his imminent return have not come to pass. Sadr is often referred to as paranoid and distrustful, even of those in his inner circle, and has a known tendency to replace those he thinks have become too powerful and thereby pose a threat to his authority. Sadr maintains close financial and political ties to Iran.

Antichrist Spreads His Influence (Revelation 13)

Official sources expect Muqtada al-Sadr’s visit Jordan

[3/23/2015 1:25:30 PM]
AMMONNEWS – Diaa Al-deen Talafha – Official sources told Ammon that expected that the leader of Sadrist movement in Iraq , Muqtada al-Sadr will visit the Kingdom in the coming days.
The source did not specify a date for the visit, saying only emphasizing that it “over the coming days.”
The visit comes, “that has” days after the visit of the President of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, Ammar Al-Hakim to the Jordan , where met with King.

Jordan May Become The Next Nuclear Horn Of Prophecy (Daniel 8)

The Middle East’s Next Nuclear Power?
Kazakhistan Nuclear Missiles

It may not be the one you’re thinking about.
January 28, 2015
The Kingdom of Jordan has for more than a decade watched near-continuous turmoil swirl around its borders—an American invasion of Iraq on one side, an Israeli war with Lebanon on another, and a Syrian civil war to the north that has seen ISIL flourish. For much of that decade, while Jordan absorbed refugees and was targeted by terror, it largely escaped the first-hand effects of war itself. Wednesday’s news that the Kingdom was prepared to trade a terrorist involved in the worst terrorist attack in Jordanian history to free one of its pilots captured by ISIL after his F-16 crashed in December, represents a new chapter in Jordan’s perpetual struggle against the militants on its borders. Over all of these regional challenges has hung another dark cloud—the fear, uncertainty, and tension that’s sprung from Iran’s secret nascent nuclear program.

And yet even as Western attention has focused all around Jordan—and especially on the nuclear negotiations with Iran—in a little-noticed series of moves, the Kingdom’s been edging closer to going nuclear itself. In fact, the Kingdom of Jordan, Washington’s most reliable Arab partner, is the latest Middle Eastern state considering nuclear energy that is refusing to relinquish its right to enrich.
That “right to enrich” uranium has proved to be one of the key sticking points in the Iran nuclear talks and was at the top of the list of why Washington and Tehran missed and subsequently extended their late November deadline to reach an agreement regulating the theocracy’s nuclear program.

To prevent proliferation, the US has long held that Middle Eastern states seeking nuclear energy must forego the right to enrich nuclear material. The principle of no-enrichment has underpinned the so-called “gold standard” of US-bilateral nuclear agreements. While this standard does not uniformly apply outside the region—Washington’s 2014 Agreement on Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation with Hanoi included no such stipulation—in its December 2009 agreement with the US, the United Arab Emirates acquiesced to forego enrichment and reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel.

Jordan and Washington have been discussing nuclear cooperation for some time, but the conversation gained urgency following the 2011 Egyptian revolution—and the subsequent and repeated destruction of the Sinai natural gas pipeline—when the Kingdom lost its most consistent source of energy. In 2013, these disruptions resulted in a $2 billion, or nearly 20 percent, budget deficit.
Over the past four years, the Kingdom has increasingly focused on nuclear energy, in particular the construction of two 1000-megawatt power plants, to fill this gap. By 2030, Jordanian officials estimate nuclear power will provide 30 percent of the state’s electricity.

Amman’s proposed nuclear facilities have met with opposition both at home and abroad. Washington’s stated opposition to the program revolves around enrichment. Jordan’s resolve to maintain this right has stymied efforts to reach a “123 agreement” governing US international nuclear cooperation. The Kingdom, which has no oil, has significant deposits of uranium ore—reportedly 35,000 tons or enough to last Jordan 100 years—and is hoping to commercially exploit the resource.
Israel, too, has taken issue with Jordan’s nuclear ambitions, primarily due to concerns about safety. One of Jordan’s proposed nuclear plants, at least initially, was slated to be built in the Jordan River Valley, a major earthquake fault line. According to a US diplomatic cable disclosed by WIKILEAKS, Israel highlighted these apprehensions during a meeting with their Jordanian counterparts in 2009—two years before the Fukushima Daiichi catastrophe—only to have the Jordanian officials respond by citing Japan as an earthquake-prone country that builds safe nuclear reactors.
The biggest opposition to Jordan’s nuclear project, however, is domestic. It’s not difficult to see why. To start, one of the proposed plants is slated to be built in the heartland of the Bani Sakr, Jordan’s largest tribe. A charismatic young parliamentarian named Hind al Fayez—who hails from the tribe and happens to be married to a prominent local environmental activist—has adopted the no nukes agenda as her cause celebre. In May 2012, she spearheaded a successful vote in parliament to suspend the program.

Among other concerns, Al Fayez questions how a state with such little water will be able to cool a reactor situated more than 200 miles from the shoreline, and whether Jordan has sufficient human capital (i.e., enough nuclear physicists) to safely operate the facilities. She has also expressed dismay with the $10 billion price tag, a sum roughly equivalent to Jordan’s total 2013 annual budget.
Refuting the critics is Jordan’s Atomic Energy Commission Chair Khaled Toukan, who holds a Ph.D in Nuclear Engineering from Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Toukan is an impressive government advocate for the project.

No access to water, Toukan says, no problem. Like the three nuclear power plants in Palo Verde, Arizona, Jordan will use wastewater from the nearby Khirbat al Samra sewage treatment plant to cool the blistering reactors. The second reactor, closer to the port of Aqaba, will utilize water pumped from the Red Sea—easing Jordan’s water crisis through desalinization.
A dearth of local nuclear technicians? Not for long, says Toukan. The Kingdom is building a research and training reactor, recently established an undergraduate nuclear engineering program, and has sixty-one nationals currently enrolled in graduate programs in nuclear engineering and related fields abroad. As for the financing challenge, according to Toukan, Russia—which is presently slated to build the reactors—will fund and own 49.9 percent, leaving Government of Jordan to finance the remaining and controlling share.

While Toukan’s answers are authoritative, they have not yet succeeded in convincing Jordanian skeptics. Perhaps that’s because serious safety problems emerged at Palo Verde in 2013. Or maybe Toukan’s unsubstantiated 2014 claims before parliament—that radiation leaks from the Israeli nuclear reactor at Dimona were resulting in increased incidences of cancer in the Kingdom—have further soured Jordanians on nuclear energy. It’s also possible that heightened fears of terrorism fueled by the recent territorial gains by the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq or ISIS, are dampening enthusiasm for the project.

Last year, Hind Al Fayez said “They’ll build that plant over my dead body.” A year on, her hostility toward the program has not noticeably diminished.

To be sure, Jordan needs energy. Indeed, the requirement is so acute that months ago the palace ignored significant domestic disapproval and signed up to a 15-year $15 billion deal to procure natural gas from Israel. (Amman has temporarily frozen negotiations as Israel deals with anti-trust concerns in its offshore gas sector). While important, however, the agreement is insufficient to meet the Kingdom’s requirements in the decades to come.

In the face of continued foreign and domestic opposition, it isn’t clear that Jordan will actually proceed with the nuclear option. Today the Atomic Energy Commission is calling nuclear power “a strategic choice,” but with nearly a million Syrian refugees in the Kingdom, a stumbling economy, a rising threat of terrorism on the home front, and with a downed Jordanian pilot currently held captive by ISIL, King Abdullah could punt, delaying a decision—and avoiding confrontation with Washington—for the indefinite future. Given the ongoing challenges, for the time being at least, no nukes should be a no-brainer for the Kingdom.

David Schenker is director of the Program on Arab Politics at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. From 2002-2006, he served as Levant director in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.