Preparing For World War 3 (Revelation 15)

World War 3: India-Pakistan Nuclear War In The Near Future Is PossibleWORLD WAR 3: INDIA-PAKISTAN NUCLEAR WAR IN THE NEAR FUTURE IS POSSIBLE

Could India and Pakistan really go to nuclear war? After all, both countries have long been nuclear powers, a restraint that encloses the lives of a combined 1.4 billion people. Both the nations have roughly 120-130 nuclear warheads each and enough delivery systems to deploy these warheads.


India has a clearly larger military with access to more defence reserves, budgets and resources than Pakistan.


Pakistan has historically had US and China support them in all three wars fought in 1965, 1971 and 1999. US will most likely either take a neutral stand or try to get the UN involved to arbitrate. India can always expect support from Russia and Israel in getting appropriate weapons and intel to combat the enemy. Also, India will have a strategic geographic advantage of having an Ally in Afghanistan.


India is one of the fastest growing economies in the world in the last decade. India’s economic stability will help them sustain the cost of war for much longer than Pakistan.


India has been a stable democracy pretty much since the independence and partition. Unlike Pakistan, there has never been a tug of war between the Government, Military and the Intelligence Agency.


India has a policy of “No First Attack” if the situation ever boils down to a Nuclear War.
At the end, there is no immediate threat, but along with a strong Indian response guaranteed in the event of cross-border terror adventurism, factors like non-state actors and the rising pitch of rhetoric can lead to disaster.

Prelude To A Nuclear Storm (Revelation 8)

Agni-11Storm in a teacup

The writer is a foreign policy expert based in Washington, DC
Last month, Indian-American scholar Vipin Narang stirred a storm by casting doubt on the sanctity of India’s No-First-Use (NFU) pledge on nuclear weapons and positing the possibility of Indian pre-emptive strikes against Pakistan. Since, the Pakistani state and several experts have pointed to the Indian hypocrisy of claiming an NFU that they no longer plan to honour.
I would have usually dismissed the response as business as usual. Worryingly, there is more, it seems. In the past few weeks, I have heard regular references to Narang’s comments in Pakistani policy circles, and even discussions suggesting that Pakistan must consider its implications seriously. The talk continues.
I am alarmed because I found some of these conversations to be strikingly similar to what I heard a decade ago when the Indian army floated its Cold Start doctrine — a Pakistan-specific limited war strategy conceived by the Indian army after the 2001-02 crisis with Pakistan.
In that crisis, India not only discovered that its nuclear weapons have no bearing on the ability of terrorists to strike inside India, but also that its ability to leverage its superior conventional might was neutralised by Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent. Cold Start offered India an option to wage limited war that would punish Pakistan selectively, without bringing Pakistani nuclear use in response into play.
In 2007, three years after Cold Start was floated, I, along with several other scholars, analysed this Indian doctrine threadbare. The question posed to me was why Pakistan had not reacted to the doctrine in any visible way. I argued that Pakistan hadn’t and wouldn’t because Cold Start did not alter the military’s Order of Battle, or its ability to neutralise India’s conventional aggression, given that its short lines of communication and forward bases already secured it against such an Indian adventure. I was wrong.

The state has never believed in the sanctity of the Indian NFU.

Pakistan reacted, in fact overreacted, by developing a fresh tactical nuclear weapon capability. Most objective analysts agree that Cold Start is simply not executable, and even if it were, Pakistan’s conventional forces could easily tackle it. Moreover, the Nasr missile defies decades of experience during the Cold War that confirms the exorbitant risks attached to fielding battlefield nuclear weapons.
For now, Nasr has offered the latest reason for the world to question the dangers posed by Pakistan’s nuclear programme.
The NFU saga is also a storm in a teacup, no more. Vipin Narang is a well-respected Indian-American scholar who neither speaks for the Indian establishment, nor claims to have any clout over it. He made these remarks while speaking on a conference panel that specifically focused on envisioning hypothetical scenarios that entailed nuclear weapons use.
As scholars often do in such gatherings, Narang went for a counterintuitive scenario rather than the run-of-the-mill one that would have envisioned a Pakistani first use, probably of its tactical nuclear weapon against invading Indian conventional forces. Basing his observations on the statements of senior Indian ex-officials, he posited Indian pre-emptive strikes against Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. Narang clearly wished to provoke an analytical debate on the sanctity of India’s NFU.
But he wasn’t claiming anything had happened in the days preceding his talk that had made such an Indian first-use likelier than before.
I am not arguing that the concern about India’s loosening NFU is made up. Indeed, this has been an ongoing debate in India and several serious voices have hinted that the posture may not be as sacrosanct after all. It is also true that a country’s shift from NFU to first-use is no trivial development. Under certain contexts, it could require the rival to consider significant changes in force planning, postures, deployment protocols, etc.
Luckily, this isn’t the case for Pakistan.
The reality is that the Pakistani nuclear est­a­bl­­ishment and experts alike have never believed in the sanctity of the Indian NFU to begin with. No Pakistani nuclear or conventional choices assume a credible Indian NFU; in fact, all discount it.
This isn’t surprising. After all, even though an NFU directly impacts force requirements and postures, at its heart, it is a declaratory commitment that can never be fully verified. When rivals are as mutually distrusting as India and Pakistan, scepticism about such declarations is only natural.
But this also implies that Pakistan needn’t worry about an Indian shift away from the NFU, much less a fanciful scenario (according to Narang himself) of an Indian pre-emptive strike. This is the time to exhibit the psychological security that behooves a nuclear power confident of its capability. To the contrary, reacting to an independent scholar’s academic analysis in this manner suggests exactly the opposite.
The development of Nasr has already shown the kind of decisions such insecurity can produce. Pakistan must not fall in this trap again.
The writer is a foreign policy expert based in Washington, DC

India Ready To Play Nuclear Hardball (Revelation 8)

india-test-fires-supersonic-land-attack-cruise-missile-1446905094-9954Nuclear scholars infer India may be jettisoning no-first-use of nukes against Pakistan
Chidanand Rajghatta | TNN |
WASHINGTON: Nuclear doctrines have come a long way from the time Ronald Reagan declared in 1984 that ”a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.” Forced to counter Pakistan’s persistent use of terrorism under a nuclear cover and the slippery slope that introduced to the region, India may be re-interpreting its no-first-use of nuclear weapons policy to allow pre-emptive strikes against its neighbor, the nuclear pundits community is deducing, based among other things on cryptic statements from the Indian establishment.
The purported evolution of India’s nuclear doctrine towards pre-emptive first use is primarily based on throwaway remarks made by former defense minister Manohar Parrikar last November wondering why New Delhi should bind itself to a no-first use policy, instead of saying more cryptically that it is a responsible nuclear power and will not use nuclear weapons irresponsibly. Those remarks (which Parrikar immediately clarified were his personal views), taken together with a more deliberative narration in former Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon’s memoir that ”There is a potential gray area as to when India would use nuclear weapons first’‘ against a nuclear-armed adversary, has led some nuclear scholars to infer that New Delhi is moving its nuclear doctrine in a new direction.
Some of the conjecture was articulated by Vipin Narang, an MIT nuclear proliferation scholar, at a Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference in Washington DC, attracting attention of domain experts across the world. Outlining developments in the subcontinent that had led India to conceive of its Cold Start doctrine (a punitive conventional strike) only to have it countered by Pakistan’s development of tactical battlefield nuclear weapons, Narang said it looked increasingly likely that India may abandon its no-first use police and launch a preemptive strike if it believed Pakistan was going to use any kind of nuclear weapons first.
”India’s opening salvo may not be conventional strikes trying to pick off just Nasr batteries in the theatre, but a full ‘comprehensive counterforce strike’ that attempts to completely disarm Pakistan of its nuclear weapons so that India does not have to engage in iterative tit-for-tat exchanges and expose its own cities to nuclear destruction,” Narang said. ”There is increasing evidence that India will not allow Pakistan to go first.”
Narang’s presentation caught the attention of nuclear pundits and geo-political scholars both in the subcontinent and the U.S, and on Friday, the New York Times highlighted it with the additional speculation that India could be emboldened to evolve its posture by President Trump’s softer stance on nuclear proliferation.
”This (allowing a pre-emptive strike against Pakistan) would not formally change India’s nuclear doctrine, which bars it from launching a first strike, but would loosen its interpretation to deem pre-emptive strikes as defensive,” the paper said. ”It would also change India’s likely targets, in the event of a war, to make a nuclear exchange more winnable and, therefore, more thinkable.”
Narang’s inference about a possible change in India’s nuclear posture vis-a-vis Pakistan brought a more visceral reaction from Islamabad.
”For Pakistan, these disclosures do not come as a surprise since Indian NFU is really a sham and political rhetoric. Besides, no responsible defence planners any where would accept political assertions from the opponent, especially since these are non-verifiable. By spilling the beans, Narang has only validated Pakistan’s deterrence policy,” former Pakistani diplomat and nuclear negotiator Zamir Akram wrote, outlining and rationalizing Pakistan full-spectrum deterrence, including a second-strike capability, while warning that ”for every move there is a counter move.”

India Becomes A Nuckear Threat

This first strike, however, will not be aimed at urban centres and conventional targets but against Islamabad’s nuclear arsenal. The strategic assessment is in clear contrast to New Delhi’s ‘no-first strike’ policy of 2003.
“There is increasing evidence that India will not allow Pakistan to go first,” Vipin Narang, a nuclear strategist from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, said at a conference on nuclear policy hosted by Carnegie, a think tank, on Monday, according to the Hindustan Times.
India would launch “a full ‘comprehensive counterforce strike’ that attempts to completely disarm Pakistan of its nuclear weapons,” Dr Narang said.
He explained that policy-makers in New Delhi decided to go for the nuclear option to ensure that “India does not have to engage in iterative tit-for-tat exchanges and expose its own cities to nuclear destruction”.
New Delhi declared the ‘no-first strike’ policy, undertaking not to start a nuclear war in a neighbourhood packed with nuclear actors such as China and Pakistan.
Narang said he was not basing the assessment on fringe extreme voices such as those of Bharat Karnad or retired Indian Army officers frustrated by the lack of resolve they believe their government had shown in multiple provocations.
This assessment, he said, was based on what he learned from no less than a former Strategic Forces Command C-in-C Lt Gen B.S. Nagal and from the highly respected and influential former National Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon.
“We may be witnessing … a ‘decoupling’ of Indian nuclear strategy between China and Pakistan. The force requirements India needs to credibly threaten assured retaliation against China may allow it to pursue more aggressive strategies — such as escalation dominance or a ‘splendid first strike’— against Pakistan,” Dr Narang said.
The MIT expert argued that the conventional wisdom that a nuclear war in South Asia could start with a terrorist attack from Pakistan may no longer be valid.
Relations between the neighbours are at the lowest ebb since the attack on Indian military base of Uri in occupied Kashmir last year. Following the attack, India claimed to have carried out ‘surgical strikes’ against militant launch pads in Kashmir, which were denied by the government, as well as the military.
However, in February, both countries extended a bilateral pact, dealing with reducing the risk of nuclear weapon-related accidents including a war, for a period of five years.

India Will Change Its No First Nuke Policy (Revelation 8)

India may abandon its ‘no first use’ nuclear policy: Expert

During the 2017 Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference, Narang said, “There is increasing evidence that India will not allow Pakistan to go first”.
The remarks by Vipin Narang, an expert on South Asian nuclear strategy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, before a Washington audience was though a negation of India’s stated policy of ‘no first use’.
During the 2017 Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference, Narang said, “There is increasing evidence that India will not allow Pakistan to go first”.
But, he pointed out, India’s preemptive strike may not be conventional strikes and would also be aimed at Pakistan’s missiles launchers for tactical battlefield nuclear warheads.
“India’s opening salvo may not be conventional strikes trying to pick off just Nasr batteries in the theatre, but a full ‘comprehensive counterforce strike’ that attempts to completely disarm Pakistan of its nuclear weapons so that India does not have to engage in iterative tit-for-tat exchanges and expose its own cities to nuclear destruction,” Narang said.
He said this thinking surfaces not from fringe extreme voices or retired Indian Army officers frustrated by the lack of resolve they believe their government has shown in multiple provocations, but from no less than a former Commander of India’s Strategic Forces, Lt Gen BS Nagal.
It also comes perhaps more importantly and authoritatively, from the highly-respected and influential former national security adviser Shivshankar Menon in his 2016 book ‘Choices: Inside the Making of Indian Foreign Policy’, the nuclear strategist said.
“So our conventional understanding of South Asia’s nuclear dynamics and who, in fact, might use nuclear weapons first and in what mode may need a hard rethink given these emerging authoritative voices in India who are not content to cede the nuclear initiative to Pakistan,” he said, adding that this would mark a major shift in Indian strategy if implemented.
Sameer Lalwani, senior associate and deputy director South Asia at the Stimson Center, an American think-tank, said Narang’s remarks challenged the conventional wisdom of South Asia’s strategic stability problem.

The Thin Threshold For Nuclear War (Rev 15)

Nuclear weapons aren’t just for the worst case scenario

Recent reports suggest that Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump insistently asked an anonymous foreign-policy expert why the United States should not use nuclear weapons more readily. This has led to a chorus of voices decrying the way in which Trump is reported to have spoken about the nuclear option, with many insisting the United States should only ever employ nuclear weapons in retaliation after an opponent has used them first.

It is certainly right that such terrible weapons should only be used in extreme circumstances (a point of view Trump appears to have expressed earlier this year), but the conventional wisdom is wrong in suggesting the United States should under no circumstances be the first to use nuclear arms.
This controversy is not merely another spark of the campaign season, for, according to newsreports, President Barack Obama himself is considering implementing a “no-first-use” pledge regarding nuclear weapons — that is, a promise never to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Such a pledge would be exceedingly unwise.

Nuclear weapons are horrible instruments of destruction, but they are also associated with the longest period of major-power peace in human history. And they only work because potentially ambitious states believe their use is plausible enough that starting a war or escalating one against a nuclear-armed state or its allies would just be too risky to countenance. The point of reserving the right to use nuclear weapons first (which, it must be emphasized, is different from a policy of preemption or heavy reliance on them) is not to convey a madman’s itchy trigger finger on the button. Rather, its purpose is to communicate clearly to any potential aggressor that attacking one’s vital interests too harshly or successfully — even without resorting to nuclear weapons — risks prompting a devastating nuclear response, something that, at scale, is far more costly than any realistic gains.
A no-first-use pledge would undermine this pacifying logic. If the policy were believed, then it would make the world safe for conventional war. Since potential aggressors would write the risk of nuclear use down to zero, they would feel they could safely start and wage fierce conventional wars.
Conventional wars can be small, quick, and decisive, which is why they can also be appealing — just ask Napoleon, James Polk, Otto von Bismarck, or Moshe Dayan. But they can also escalate dramatically and unpredictably, especially when major powers are involved. Thus, the most likely route to nuclear use is via a nasty conventional war, as happened in World War II. In such circumstances, high-minded pledges made in peacetime may well seem foolish or too burdensome.
A believable no-first-use pledge would likely raise, rather than diminish, the likelihood of nuclear weapons being used by lightening the shadow of nuclear weapons over the decision-making of potential combatants. Better for everyone to think as carefully and clearly as possible about nuclear weapons before a war is underway.

Alternatively, if the no-first-use pledge were not believed, what would the point of such a promise be other than diplomatic window dressing?

It is for these reasons that the United States has never adopted a no-first-use policy. During the Cold War, the United States relied on its nuclear deterrent to compensate for perceived Soviet and Warsaw Pact conventional advantages in Europe. But even in the post-Cold War period of American military supremacy, when Washington sought to diminish its strategic reliance on nuclear weapons, it judged the future was too uncertain to dispense with the reserved right to go first. While other countries such as China and India have declared no-first-use policies (though there is a great deal of skepticism about how reliable Beijing’s pledge is), Washington and the allies that depend on its nuclear umbrella have always recognized that a no-first-use pledge by the United States would be unwise because of the breadth of defense commitments it has assumed. If the U.S. nuclear arsenal were solely designed to deter conventional attacks on the continental United States, a no-first-use pledge might have more merit, as launching such an assault would be incredibly difficult. But Washington also seeks to deter attacks on its allies in areas like Eastern Europe and East Asia, where U.S. conventional superiority is far less assured.

The main reason why a no-first-use pledge does not make sense for Washington, then, is the reality that the United States cannot always expect to maintain the military upper hand everywhere, and a no-first-use pledge is not the kind of commitment a nation can turn on and off without damage to its credibility and reputation.

But can anyone plausibly challenge the United States in a conventional war in the near to medium term? The answer is yes; China might well be able to. Russia and North Korea are also very dangerous to the United States and its allies in their own ways, and Moscow could plausibly hope to take on the United States conventionally if it could localize a conflict in its “near abroad” and keep it short, but neither can reasonably expect to challenge the United States in a serious, prolonged conventional war and hope to prevail.

But China at some point in the not-too-distant future might. A range of authoritative sources are showing that the conventional military balance of power between the United States and China with respect to points of contention in East Asia such as Taiwan and the South and East China Seas is, at the very least, becoming increasingly competitive. Beijing is fielding more and more highly capable forces in the Western Pacific that present a growing challenge to America’s ability to effectively project military power in the region.

The days are therefore passing when the United States could easily swipe away any effort by the People’s Liberation Army at power projection in the Western Pacific. Instead, any future fight in the region between the United States and its allies on the one hand and China on the other would be hard and nasty. And the trend lines are not moving in a good direction. Indeed, within a decade, China might be in a position where it could reasonably expect to confront a U.S. ally or partner in the Western Pacific and hope to prevail if the conflict remained relatively limited.

If the United States adds to this a credible guarantee that it would not use nuclear weapons first, it would strengthen China’s confidence that it could wage a short, sharp conventional war and gain from it, just as such confidence is rising and becoming more plausible to decision-makers in Beijing already contemplating the use of force in the region. According to a recent Reuters report, for instance, influential voices in the Chinese military establishment are already pushing for firmer security policies and even military action in the South China Sea — and this at a time when the United States still enjoys the conventional upper hand. These voices are likely to seem more credible and appealing in the councils of power in Beijing as Chinese military advantages grow, and they would only be emboldened by a U.S. statement that it will not use nuclear weapons first. A no-first-use pledge would therefore increase the chances of war in Asia.

Indeed, rather than excluding the possibility of American nuclear first use, Washington should be emphasizing it. This does not mean the United States should ever use its nuclear weapons lightly. Rather, Beijing should simply understand that, even if it is able to gain conventional military advantages in the Western Pacific, Washington is prepared to seriously consider using nuclear weapons first to vindicate its own vital interests and those of its allies — for instance with respect to their territorial integrity. More than that, Beijing should understand clearly that if it pushes forward with its military buildup, it will spur the United States to rely even more on its nuclear forces to compensate — and, if that is not enough, the real possibility that U.S. allies will be impelled to pursue nuclear arsenals of their own.

Communicating all this to Beijing does not require any Strangelovian contortions. But it does require the United States to firmly and consistently say (or otherwise communicate) that it is prepared to use nuclear weapons first if truly pressed; to build the forces, such as a next-generation standoff cruise missile and intercontinental ballistic missile, useful in making such a declaration credible; and to exercise and deploy its forces in ways that show Beijing its earnestness about such a declaration.
Such a policy is more likely to contribute to peace and stability than a no-first-use pledge. China is very unlikely to turn away from its effort to achieve military dominance in East Asia and the Western Pacific based on appeals to goodwill or competitions in moral preening. What might actually work is persuading Beijing that succeeding in this effort is likely to backfire by resulting in little to no gain and a more menacing and dangerous set of opposing militaries. Does China want a U.S. defense posture for Asia that relies more on nuclear weapons? A proliferated Asia-Pacific? Washington must make Beijing understand that if it continues its military buildup, those are very real probabilities.
A no-first-use pledge would suggest to Beijing just the opposite — that continuing to build up, and perhaps even using, its military power may not be sufficiently dangerous or costly after all. That would be far worse for Asia and America than a perhaps unfashionable reminder that there will be a grim nuclear risk if Beijing ever seeks to capitalize on its growing conventional military strength.

More Iranian Lies (Dan 8:4)

ayatollahkhameneiKhamenei says Iran nuclear weapons are U.S. “myth”

Sun Apr 19, 2015 12:44pm EDT
By Sam Wilkin

(Reuters) – Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei told military commanders on Sunday the United States had created the “myth” of nuclear weapons to portray Iran as a threat, hardening his rhetoric before nuclear negotiations resume this week.

Khamenei, the highest authority in Iran, has supported the nuclear talks but continues to express deep mistrust of the United States.

“They created the myth of nuclear weapons so they could say the Islamic Republic is a source of threat. No, the source of threat is America itself, with its unrestrained, destabilising interventions,” Khamenei said in a televised address to a hall of several hundred military commanders.

“The other side is methodically and shamelessly threatening us militarily … even if they did not make these overt threats, we would have to be prepared,” he said.

Political leaders in Iran and the United States have to contend with domestic constituencies sceptical about the outcome of the talks.

Khamenei’s comments did not appear to suggest he has withdrawn his cautious support for the diplomatic process.

Iran and six world powers including the United States reached a framework accord on Iran’s disputed nuclear programme this month and will resume negotiations in Vienna this week, aiming to reach a final deal by the end of June.

The framework accord is a step towards a settlement that would allay Western fears that Iran could build an atomic bomb, with economic sanctions on Tehran being lifted in return.

Despite significant progress, the two sides still disagree on several issues, including how quickly international sanctions would be lifted under a final deal.


Earlier this month, Khamenei insisted that all sanctions be lifted immediately on a deal being reached, a condition the U.S. State Department dismissed. He warned of Washington’s “devilish” intentions, even as he reaffirmed his support for Iran’s negotiating team.

The deputy commander of the powerful Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) on Sunday rejected any inspections of military sites as a “national humiliation”, highlighting another area of difference between the two sides.

“This subject is treasonous and selling out the country, and if anyone speaks of it we will respond with hot lead,” Hossein Salami said, in comments cited by state news agency IRNA.

Republican U.S. Senator Bob Corker, the co-author of legislation that would allow Congress to review any final nuclear deal with Iran, told CNN on Sunday that lifting of sanctions must be phased to ensure Iran’s compliance and include broad inspection capabilities for military sites.

Senator Marco Rubio, a Republican 2016 presidential candidate, said the agreement thus far leaves too much infrastructure in place for Iran to develop a nuclear weapon.

He told the CBS program “Face the Nation” that U.S. and international sanctions must remain in place, with a warning of U.S. military action if certain thresholds are crossed.

“We don’t want that to happen, but risk of a nuclear Iran is so great that that option must be on the table,” Rubio said.

\Khamenei also criticised U.S. support for a Saudi-led offensive in Yemen, where a coalition of Arab countries is bombing Iran-allied Houthi rebels who seized the capital Sanaa last year and took control of other parts of the country.

“Today these tragic events are happening in Yemen and the Americans are supporting the oppressor,” he said.

The four-week old campaign, in which Iran and Western countries have backed opposite sides, began during the last round of nuclear talks. Growing civilian casualties and Western suspicions that Iran is arming the Houthis have added to tensions. (Additional reporting by David Lawder in Washington; Editing by Gareth Jones)

Iran Is Just Saving Face For Her People (Daniel 8:4)


Congress Will Not Derail Nuclear Talks, Iran Says

NBC News

Republicans and some Democrats in Congress had pressured Obama to allow legislative oversight of the nuclear negotiations.
“That is an issue related to their domestic affairs. We are dealing with the American government,” Afkham said at a news conference carried by state television.
The development injects a new element of uncertainty into the delicate final stages of negotiations between major powers and Iran aimed at curbing Tehran’s nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief.
Secretary of State John Kerry — in Germany for a meeting of Group of Seven foreign ministers — said he was “confident” a deal could be reached.
“Looming large is the challenge of finishing the negotiation with Iran over the course of the next two and a half months,” he said. “We are confident about our ability for the President to negotiate an agreement, and to do so with the ability to make the world safer.”
Meanwhile, Israel’s Intelligence Minister said his country was pleased by the news the White House would accept a Senate compromise on the Iran deal.
“We are certainly happy this morning,” Yuval Steinitz said on Wednesday. “This is an achievement for Israeli policy,” citing a March 3 speech by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to Congress in which he argued against a then-emerging framework agreement with Tehran on curbing its nuclear program.
Steinitz said the compromise bill would be “a very important element in preventing a bad deal,” or at least in improving the April 2 blueprint that world powers charted with Iran.
The bill requires the Obama administration to send the text of any final agreement with Iran to Congress as soon as it is completed, and blocks Obama’s ability to waive many U.S. sanctions on Tehran while Congress reviews the deal. It allows a final vote on whether to lift sanctions imposed by Congress in exchange for Iran dismantling its nuclear capabilities.
It also requires that the White House send Congress regular, detailed reports on a range of issues including Iran’s support for terrorism, ballistic missiles and nuclear program.
Iran says its nuclear program is peaceful, but it has never welcomed intrusive inspections and has in the past kept some nuclear sites secret.

Iran Is The First Nuclear Horn (Daniel 8:3)

Iran's Nuclear Program

Iran’s Nuclear Program

Don’t ignore threat Iran poses to global security

For months, President Barack Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry have repeated a mantra about nuclear negotiations with Iran: “no deal is better then a bad deal.” But when Obama is asking rhetorically “what’s the alternative,” he contradicts the mantra, indicating that the U.S. seeks an agreement at any cost.
An examination of Iran’s nuclear record shows that the ayatollahs changed their conduct only on two occasions. In 2003, they suspended the military nuclear project because of U.S. invasion of Iraq and the fear of an American strike; and in 2013, they agreed to negotiate because of stringent sanctions imposed by Congress and European powers.
Asking “what’s the alternative,” Obama practically gives up the two leverages over Iran — a credible military deterrent and debilitating sanctions. He leads the ayatollahs to conclude that Washington is more eager than Tehran to reach an agreement.
The emerging deal creates a 12-month “breakout” period, should Iran race to the bomb, enough time for the U.S to respond. But, this assumption is predicated on U.S. intelligence being able to detect such “breakout,” an ability challenged by a Pentagon study. Stating that “U.S. intelligence is neither organized nor equipped to detect development of nuclear weapons,” it concludes that “the detection abilities in cases like Iran are inadequate or nonexistent.” This conclusion removes the rug from under the basis of the agreement. Indeed, the woeful U.S. record in detecting development of nuclear weapons by Pakistan, North Korea and Syria clearly refutes the assumption.
In addition, a “sunset clause” in the agreement would allow Iran, “legally,” to develop nuclear weapons. The administration’s claim that an Iranian violation would result in reimposition of sanctions is unrealistic. Having spent billions of dollars in Iran, are big corporations likely to sacrifice their investments?
The emerging deal is flawed not only due to its contents, but also because of its omissions. No reference is made to Iran’s “nuclear weaponization” program, as well as to its development of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), which only serve nuclear weapons.
The Iranians cite India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear weapons as reasons for their decision to go nuclear. But this analogy is deceptive: neither India nor Pakistan developed ICBMs; both use nuclear weapons only as a means of mutual deterrence.
Also, the agreement does not require Iran to desist from threatening its Arab neighbors, to stop financial support of and involvement in worldwide terrorism, to avoid calling for Israel’s annihilation, and to remove the battle cry of the Islamic regime — “Death to America.”
The net result of the agreement would be to institutionalize Iran’s status as a nuclear threshold state. It would not lead the Ayatollahs to tone down their revolutionary zeal; just the opposite: a nuclear umbrella would embolden their aggressiveness.
This will adversely affect U.S. national security. Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Egypt are determined to acquire or develop their own nuclear deterrent. This would destroy a major pillar of U.S. foreign policy: preventing nuclear proliferation in the Middle East.
A nuclear threshold Iran would also be able to prevent a future decline in oil prices. While Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies ignored Iranian demands to lower production and keep prices high, they are unlikely to dare ignore similar threats by a nuclear Iran.

The First Horn Is About To Be Shattered (Daniel 8:7)

Iran’s Khamenei, suffering from cancer, rumored to be in critical condition

March 5, 2015
Report citing Western intelligence said Khamenei’s doctors give him just two years to live

The Center for Preserving and Publishing the Works of Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei/AFP\

Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is rumored to have been hospitalized in critical condition according to Arabic media reports, just days after a report by Le Figaro stated that doctors had given Khamenei only two years to live.

The report can not be immediately verified but Le Figaro, citing Western intelligence officials, reported Wednesday that the 76-year-old leader, is suffering from stage four prostate cancer which has spread to other parts of his body.

The 75-year-old cleric, who has ruled since the death in 1989 of the Islamic republic’s founder Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini underwent prostate surgery in September which official Iranian news said had been successful.

As Iran’s supreme guide, Khamenei has the final word on all matters of state and his authority far exceeds that of the country’s elected politicians, including President Hassan Rouhani.

Khamenei’s powers include direct control of the regime’s media apparatus — through state television and radio — and thus he would have personally taken the decision to publicize his surgery.

Speculation about the leader’s health has previously circled during periods of public silence from him but in recent weeks he has made numerous speeches and public appearances.

Before being appointed as head of state 25 years ago, Khamenei served as president for almost eight years during the Iran-Iraq war.

In 1981, he survived an assassination attempt which left his right arm paralyzed.

Khamenei’s powers in military matters are particularly important, as he can pronounce peace or declare war by mobilising the armed forces of which he is effectively commander-in-chief.

Iran’s Assembly of Experts, comprised of 86 religious figures elected by the people, is responsible for appointing the supreme leader and monitoring his actions.

The head of state is granted an indefinite term but the assembly has the power to dismiss him.
(with AFP)