Ayatollah Khamenei Accuses WH of ‘Lying,’ Being ‘Deceptive,’ and Having ‘Devilish’ Intentions
5:42 PM, Apr 9, 2015
BY THOMAS JOSCELYN
According to the Middle East Forum “The Quran allows Muslims to have a declared agenda, and a secret agenda (Jihad, slaughter, and mayhem) during time of weakness, this is called Taqiyya.” To put it in simpler words, it is the “art” of deception, or more correctly, of deceiving non-Muslim infidels.
While negotiations with the P5+1 are ongoing, last Monday (February 2, 2015) Iran’s military launched a satellite into space called Safir-e Fajr. According to the Iranian Arabic-language Al-Alam TV, the Fajr satellite was successfully placed 450 kilometers above earth. Iran’s “moderate” President Rouhani proudly noted “Our scientists have entered a new phase for conquering space. We will continue on this path.” The Iranian Defense Minister General Hossein Dehgan added that the 21-meter, 26 ton launcher named Safir–Fajr shows “the ability of Iran to build satellite launchers.”
This new development should elevate the Obama administration’s concerns, if not cause full-fledged alarm over the Islamic Republic development of satellite technology that could have military purposes, including the continued development of long-range ballistic missiles, capable of carrying nuclear warheads that could reach American soil. But in typical taqiyya form, Iran has denied having a military role for its space program and its nuclear program.
The Obama administration, instead, is concerned about the upcoming address of Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to the U.S. Congress and the American people. Netanyahu, the White House fears, might reveal Iran’s deception, which might compel the administration to re-think the current P5+1 negotiation with Iran, and perhaps justify the Mark Kirk (R-IL)-Robert Menendez (D-NJ) bill to impose sanctions on Iran. President Obama maintains now that he refuses to “set artificial deadlines” to the negotiations with Iran, but he also conceded in a press conference that “we are not going to have talks forever.” The New York Times reported (May 19, 2009) that Obama told Netanyahu during his White House visit, “We’re not going to create a situation in which talks become an excuse for inaction while Iran proceeds with developing a nuclear –and deploying – a nuclear weapon.”
After two deadlines following the interim agreement have expired, and a third will expire this summer, President Obama’s words sound rather hollow. In his threat to veto the Kirk-Menendez bill, he sounds more like Iran’s defense attorney than being committed to preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear bomb. All the while, Iran is proceeding with spinning centrifuges.
According to the Times of Israel (January 31, 2015) which quoted Israel TV Channel 10, the deal taking shape between Washington and Tehran “would allow Iran to continue enriching uranium in over 7000 centrifuges. It quoted an unnamed Jerusalem source saying “The terms of the deal would leave Iran closer than was thought to nuclear weapons, mere months from producing enough material for a bomb.” The same article suggested that the U.S. has agreed to 80% of Iran’s demands.
The existential threat to Israel from a nuclear Iran has prompted PM Netanyahu to accept Speaker John Boehner’s invitation to address U.S. Congress in early March. Netanyahu feels that he has no choice but to speak out against the imminent deal with Iran. Sources close to Netanyahu suggest that Netanyahu’s address will praise Obama’s efforts rather than criticize him, and it will not be a partisan speech, or focus too much on the proposed sanctions by the U.S. Congress. It would simply address the dangers of the deal currently concocted between the P5+1 and Iran. In his address to the U.S. Congress, Netanyahu should chronicle Iran’s deception and taqiyya tactics in its efforts to acquire nuclear weapons.
The Canadian Centre for Treaty Compliance has chronicled Iran’s deception on its nuclear program. In 2002, the dissident group, National Council of Resistance in Iran (NCRI) announced the location of two nuclear sites in Iran; a nuclear fuel production facility in Natanz, and heavy water facility in Arak. On September 12, 2003, the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) Board of Governors Resolution called on Iran to ensure no further failures to report, and demanded not to introduce nuclear material into its pilot enrichment cascade in Natanz.
September 24, 2005, Resolution: GOV/2005/87 finds that Iran’s many failures and breaches of its obligation to comply with NPT Safeguards Agreement , as detailed in GOV/2003/75, constitute non-compliance in the context of Article XII.C of the Agency’s (IAEA) Stature; finds also that the history of concealment of Iran’s nuclear activities has given rise to…
On January 10, 2006, Iran broke the IAEA seal at Natanz. John Bolton, U.S. ambassador to the UN reported that the “Iranians reverted to form by breaking IAEA seal at the Natanz enrichment facility and resuming ‘research work.’” In its September, 2008 report, the IAEA said that the document describes experimentation in connection with symmetrical initiation of a hemispherical high explosive charge suitable for an implosion type nuclear device.
The New York Times reported (November 16, 2009) that the “International inspectors who gained access to Iran’s newly revealed underground nuclear enrichment plant voiced strong suspicions in a report that Iran was concealing other atomic facilities.” Iran however, will not allow inspectors access to military sites, nor will it allow inspectors to interview key nuclear scientists.
On February 19, 2010, the Washington Post revealed that U.N. nuclear inspectors, citing evidence of an apparent ongoing effort by Iran to obtain new technologies, publicly suggested for the first time that Iran is actively seeking to develop a weapons capability. On August 30, 2012, the IAEA released a report showing a major expansion of Iranian enrichment activities. The report said that Iran has more than doubled the number of centrifuges at the underground facility at Fordow, from 1,064 centrifuges in May to 2,140 centrifuges in August.
The Chicago Tribune (November 7, 2014) quoted nuclear expert David Albright of the Institute for Science and International Security as saying “…it will be difficult if not impossible for Western inspectors to accomplish these goals without knowing exactly how far Iran’s scientists have advanced in nuclear weapons research.” Albright added, “If Iran gets a deal without disclosing the past military dimensions of its program, it would continue to be able to say that there was never any military nuclear program, and it was justified in denying inspectors to military sites. That creates a dangerous precedent: The Iranians could leverage that agreement to bar inspectors from suspected nuclear sites in Iran, simply calling them military sites.”
On November 25, 2009, President Obama seemed to have had much less trust in Iran’s aims regarding its nuclear program. At a news conference at the conclusion of a G-20 Pittsburgh, PA summit he stated, “Iran’s action raised doubts about its promise to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes only.” This was said in the context of Iran’s clandestinely building an underground plant (near Qom) to make nuclear fuel that could be used to build a nuclear bomb. Asked about the use of military force against Iran, Obama said, “I have always said that we do not rule out any option when it comes to U.S. security interests.”
The Iranians have now figured out that the Obama administration’s eagerness to strike a deal with them overrides most other considerations. Their taqiyya tactics of deceiving the IAEA and the P5+1, including the U.S. notwithstanding, Tehran’s arrogant defiance in insisting that it will continue to build up its nuclear program, as well as its space launchers, makes it clear that the Obama administration might ultimately accept a nuclear Iran.
1984 memo released by National Archives shows civil servants decided not to research possible consequences of nuclear war
Owen Bowcott | The Guardian
Monday 29 December 2014 19.01 EST
Officials were more interested in monitoring the activities of campaigners opposed to cruise missiles, documents released by the National Archives in Kew reveal.
A confidential file on “Nuclear winter – global atmospheric consequences of nuclear war” shows that civil servants in the department’s emergency planning section, F6, decided they did not need to research the disputed phenomenon.
An internal memo in December 1984 records: “It was agreed with F6 that no assessment of the [nuclear winter] theory would be carried out by the branch and as such our interest is limited to general reading which could not be regarded as following the subject in any depth.”
The theory predicted that multiple exchanges of nuclear warheads would result in firestorms generating massive black smoke clouds that would rise into the stratosphere, blocking out sunlight and depressing temperatures at ground level around the Earth for months if not years. It had gained popular currency with the release of the US television film The Day After in 1983 and the BBC’s Threads in 1984, both of which dramatised the consequences of a nuclear conflict.
After newspaper reports that American scientists had confirmed the hypothesis, MPs who sought advice were provided with a briefing note informing them: “The government believes that the outbreak of war is extremely unlikely and our policy of deterrence is aimed at keeping it that way.”
Another Home Office memo records: “This theme has been taken up with enthusiasm by the anti-nuclear movement, which has tended to present the nuclear winter … as accepted scientific fact ignoring important qualifications expressed even by scientists working on the theory. Unfortunately such a presentation has been generally accepted by the public.”
Closer attention was paid to anti-nuclear activists. “CND is planning to … recapture its earlier momentum by major campaigns against cruise and Trident in 1985,” the Home Office files note. ”The main focus of its protest activity will switch to RAF Molesworth and will involve increased willingness to use tactics of civil disobedience to disrupt construction work at the site.”
Faslane Peace camp, according to one memo, “is reported to be bankrupt”. CND itself, the Home Office, concluded, “is no mere front organisation and there is no evidence of Soviet funding”.
The Greenham Common women, it was said, received support from CND and other organisations, “although some are clearly uncomfortable about their strident all-female attitude”.
Anti-nuclear groups were under surveillance. “Data is now collected on demonstrations and incidents by anti-nuclear groups at MoD establishments,” the file states.
In the battle for public sympathy, pro-nuclear groups received official help. “Continued government support – both financial and through the provision of nuclear PR material – will be necessary,” one report records. “Co-ordination of [their] activities … is best left, in general, to the groups themselves although periodic advice and encouragement from ministers will continue to be valuable.”
Architectural drawings of DIY nuclear blast-proof shelters were commissioned for the latest edition of the Protect and Survive pamphlets. They suggested householders excavate holes in their living rooms and build “igloo shelters”; the components cost £554 – about £1,500 in today’s money.
Preparations for BBC emergency broadcasting in the event of a war came up against the realisation that it would be difficult to protect transmitters against the destructive effects of electromagnetic pulses caused by nuclear explosions.
“The primary purpose of broadcasting to the outside world after a nuclear attack,” one letter remarked, “would presumably be to let the world know that organised society still existed in the UK.”
The corporation’s World Service submitted a plan to provide a 24-hour, worldwide service from six sites that would have to be nuclear “hardened”. It included rations for “10,000 man days” and protective clothing. The estimated cost was £15.8m (about £44m now).
“Our immediate reaction is that these proposals are based on a much too ambitious specification which we simply cannot afford,” a Foreign Office official responded.
A separate memorandum was headed: “Spontaneous evacuation of civil population in a future war.” A weary civil servant observed: “Another hare, the breakdown of public morale in a war emergency and consequent flight from the capital, was let loose.
“This is a hoary subject in the civil defence planning world (as opposed to the real world) on a footing with others such as ‘will staff turn up for duty on the day?’
“No one doubts the need to maintain a war effort … If the public is not with the war effort then the war would be loseable without a single nuclear weapon being exploded on England’s green and pleasant land.
“The guts of the matter is that in a war emergency a task of the police would be to ensure that, as it does in peacetime (eg peak holiday weekends), that the country does not come to a grinding halt through traffic congestion howsoever caused.”