File photo of Israeli Air Force McDonnell Douglas F-15I Ra’am. Photo by Tech. Sgt. Kevin Gruenwald, USAF.
File photo of Israeli Air Force McDonnell Douglas F-15I Ra’am. Photo by Tech. Sgt. Kevin Gruenwald, USAF.
By Hazem Balousha
Israeli warplanes bombed several Hamas sites in three areas in the Gaza Strip on Saturday morning, but no injuries were reported.
After the strikes, balls of flame shot into the air, leaving dark smoke drifting over the territory.
The Israeli bombing was in response to a Palestinian rocket fired from the Gaza Strip at dawn toward the city of Ashkelon — for the first time since the May war last year.
No Palestinian group took responsibility for the rocket attack.
Some Israeli reports, quoting Israeli officials, said that Islamic Jihad fired the rocket in response to the killings of three Palestinians in Jenin.
On Friday morning, Israeli forces shot dead three Palestinians in the northern West Bank city of Jenin. One of the victims belonged to Al-Qassam Brigades, the military wing of Hamas.
Local analysts believe that the missile fired from Gaza was in response to the killings in Jenin, while some believe that the missile was to engage Israel with the Gaza Strip.
Israel bombed a military site belonging to the military wing of Hamas, some watchtowers in eastern Gaza City, as well as in Beit Lahia in the northern Gaza Strip, causing damage.
In a statement after the bombing, the Israeli army said: “In response to the rocket fired by Hamas toward Israeli civilians overnight, IDF aircraft struck a weapons manufacturing site and three other Hamas military posts in Gaza.”
Hamas spokesman Hazem Qassem said the air raids, in the southeast of Gaza City, “are an extension of the aggression against Palestinian territory in Jerusalem and the occupied West Bank,” after the killing of three Palestinians on Friday.
Twelve Palestinians were also wounded in that same incident during an Israeli army raid in Jenin, a stronghold of armed Palestinian factions in the West Bank.
The men were killed when Israeli forces opened fire on their vehicle, the Palestinian news agency Wafa said.
Also on Friday, an Israeli observation balloon crashed and fell in the northern Gaza Strip.
The Israeli military said that it investigated the incident, but said that the balloon was not downed by Palestinian militants.
Hamas seized the cameras installed on the balloon. Israel confirmed that there was no fear of information leaking, but it lowered all other balloons deployed along the Gaza border.
The Gaza Strip has witnessed a limited escalation in different periods since the last war.
Mukhaimar Abu Saada, a professor of political science at Al-Azhar University in Cairo, said that the shell fired from Gaza was within the framework of messages exchanged between Israel and Hamas.
“Apparently, Hamas wanted to tell Israel that continuing to target Palestinians in the West Bank might lead to an escalation in the Gaza Strip as well,” Abu Saada said to Arab News.
“I do not think that we are facing a major escalation in this period. There will be messages, some of which will be by fire, and some through mediators, although all possibilities exist based on developments on the ground,” he said.
In April, Israeli warplanes also hit Gaza after Palestinian armed groups fired rockets from the territory.
That exchange came after nearly a month of deadly violence focused on Israeli-annexed east Jerusalem’s flashpoint Al-Aqsa Mosque compound, the third holiest site in Islam.
The impoverished Hamas-controlled Gaza coastal enclave of 2.3 million people has been under an Israeli blockade since 2007.
Last year, Israel and Hamas fought an 11-day war triggered in part by unrest over the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound.
Israel occupied the West Bank and East Jerusalem in the 1967 Six-Day War. It later annexed East Jerusalem in a move never recognized by most of the international community
After three armed Palestinian terror suspects were shot and killed by soldiers from a Golani reconnaissance battalion during clashes in the Jenin area overnight between Thursday and Friday, Hamas on Friday urged its followers to escalate their “acts of resistance.”
IDF forces were on operations to find and confiscate illegal weapons and arrests terror suspects. Most of the arrest raids were in Jenin, the hometown of several Palestinian assailants who took part in a recent string of attacks that killed at least 19 Israelis.
As the soldiers approached their first target destination, Palestinians released a heavy volley of gunfire as well as throwing explosives at them. The troops shot back.People look at a damaged vehicle from which three Palestinians fired at IDF Golani troops on maneuvers in Jenin, June 17, 2022
On route to the second destination, Golani soldiers spotted a suspicious vehicle at the side of the road, from which shots were fired at the troops. The soldiers engaged, fatally shooting the occupants of the car who had fired at them. When the vehicle was searched, soldiers found two M-16 rifles, a homemade Carlo machine gun, magazines of bullets, and a bulletproof vest.
Footage disseminated on social media showed a Mazda car riddled with bullet holes and stained with blood. The Palestinian Health Ministry reported that three Palestinians had been inside. All three were evacuated to a local hospital, where medical staff declared them dead.
The terrorists’ bodies were taken out of the hospital and paraded through the streets. A few hundred people began a spontaneous demonstration, after mosques began calling on local residents to take to the streets “because of the shahids’ deaths.”
During the clashes that developed in response to the IDF’s search for illegal guns, eight residents of the Jenin area were injured.
Hamas spokesman Fawzi Barhoum said Friday in an interview to Hamas’ Al Aqsa TV that “The blood of the shahids in Jenin is new proof of the occupation’s crimes. This should be a reason to escalate the acts of resistance, and we should force the enemy to pay for its crimes.”
“The killing of three Jenin residents is a crime perpetrated in the framework of Israeli aggression against the Palestinian people and their land. Total resistance, primarily armed resistance, is the only option that can defend our people and win the battle against the enemy,” Barhoum said.
The Palestinian Authority in Ramallah condemned what it called the “execution” and called it an attempt by Israel to “export the political crises in its coalition to the Palestinian area and solve them at the expense of Palestinians’ blood as an inseparable part of the official Israeli policy, which aims to blow up the situation.”
Senior Research Fellow, Center for National Defense
Peter researches and develops Heritage’s policy on weapons of mass destruction and counter proliferation.Russian President Vladimir Putin attends the State Awarding Ceremony at the Grand Kremlin Palace, June,12,2022, in Moscow, Russia.Contributor / Getty Images
Russia has nearly a 10:1 advantage over the United States and NATO in non-strategic (i.e., low-yield and short-range) nuclear weapons (NSNWs).
The United States and NATO must consider Russia’s use of tactical nuclear weapons in the Ukraine crisis a real possibility.
With Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine, now is a good time to take note of a little-spoken-of, but glaring, imbalance between America’s and Russia’s nuclear arsenals—and how it could affect stability in Europe and the interests of the United States and those of its European allies and partners.
If asked, many Americans and Europeans probably believe that the United States and Russia are pretty evenly matched in terms of the number of nuclear weapons both sides have in their arsenals. While their beliefs are entirely understandable, they are not completely correct.
Under the 2010 bilateral New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty—also known as New START—the United States and Russia have a similar number of deployed strategic (i.e., high-yield and long-range) nuclear weapons: 1,550 deployed nuclear warheads each. But not all of Washington’s or Moscow’s nuclear weapons are covered by New START.
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Indeed, Russia has nearly a 10:1 advantage over the United States and NATO in non-strategic (i.e., low-yield and short-range) nuclear weapons (NSNWs).
While capable of significant destruction, these tactical nuclear weapons are lower in yield—or explosive power—and are meant for use on the battlefield against military installations or troop and equipment concentrations as opposed for use against counterforce or countervalue targets such as ICBM missile fields, command and control nodes, and or population centers (e.g., cities).
It is believed that Russia can deploy these weapons on multiple tactical systems including dual-capable short-range or theater ballistic missiles, torpedoes, and anti-ship missiles. Indeed, it is expected that Russia’s new hypersonic weapons may be dual-capable (i.e., conventional or nuclear armed) as well.
Major nuclear weapons states, including Russia, have said that a nuclear war could never be won and therefore should never be fought. However, there are deep concerns among policy makers and security analysts outside Russia about whether Moscow fully embraces that idea or if it is just convenient diplomatic rhetoric.
Also of increasing concern is a Russian military doctrine associated with battlefield nuclear weapons known as “escalate to deescalate.” This topic is of particularly interest right now with the war in Ukraine ongoing since late February 2022. According to the 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR):
“Russia considers the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to be the principal threats to its contemporary geopolitical ambitions. Russian strategy and doctrine emphasize the potential coercive and military uses of nuclear weapons. It mistakenly assesses that the threat of nuclear escalation or actual first use of nuclear weapons would serve to “de-escalate” a conflict on terms favorable to Russia. These mistaken perceptions increase the prospect for dangerous miscalculation and escalation.”
The NPR further asserts that:
“Moscow threatens and exercises limited nuclear first use, suggesting a mistaken expectation that coercive nuclear threats or limited first use could paralyze the United States and NATO and thereby end a conflict on terms favorable to Russia. Some in the United States refer to this as Russia’s “escalate to de-escalate” doctrine. “Deescalation” in this sense follows from Moscow’s mistaken assumption of Western capitulation on terms favorable to Moscow.”
Though the Russians seemingly refute the existence of this doctrine by its American name at least, some sources assert that the policy may actually have been developed in the late 1990s, when now-Russian President Vladimir Putin was chairman of the Russian National Security Council under President Boris Yeltsin.
The idea behind escalate to deescalate is that Russia might employ one tactical nuclear weapon (or more) during a conventional conflict with NATO forces for the purposes of preventing a defeat, consolidating territorial gains, or even freezing a conflict in place without the prospect of further fighting.
Indeed, because of the large, nearly 10:1 disparity between the number of Russian and U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, Moscow may think a nuclear response from NATO is not a credible threat due to Russia’s asymmetric advantage. Other factors may also play a role in Russian calculations, including a perception that NATO’s large membership would have difficulty finding a political-military consensus on an appropriate response, including a nuclear option.
An example of the potential use of this Russian nuclear doctrine in a hypothetical scenario might be helpful here:
Moscow attacks one—or all—of the Baltic States with its conventional forces to establish control over some, or all, of these nations’ territory, returning them to Russia’s control as they were in the Soviet era. Invoking Article V, NATO responds with conventional forces to protect and restore the sovereignty of these three allied states.
Concerned about the inferiority of its conventional forces in this fight against the allied powers, Moscow then contemplates exploding a low-yield tactical nuclear weapon somewhere in theater as a warning of Russia’s potential escalation from the conventional to the nuclear domain of warfare, including the potential future use of high-yield, strategic nuclear weapons.
Indeed, Moscow may misperceive that if NATO does not have sufficient tactical nuclear weapon capabilities to respond in kind, it would be inclined to seek de-escalation rather than launch a strategic nuclear weapon at Russia and risk moving further up the escalation ladder—a response that could lead to all-out nuclear war.
Using its tactical nuclear weapon advantage over NATO and having strategic nuclear parity with Washington, Moscow could threaten additional low-yield nuclear strikes unless fighting ends on Russia’s terms. Ideally for Moscow, NATO might decide that there is no good option available to respond and chooses to cease hostilities, locking in Moscow’s ill-gotten gains in the Baltics.
With these political-military calculations in mind, Russia takes a chance on the expected NATO response and explodes a 10-kiloton tactical nuclear weapon near or in the European theater. As a result, nuclear deterrence fails for the first time in history not due to the use of strategic nuclear weapons that so many people are aware of, but the imbalance of battlefield nuclear weapons between NATO and Russia.
While the preceding example addresses a potential attack on NATO, these NSNWs also could play a role in the ongoing war on Ukraine.
Russian forces continue to face incredible resistance from the Ukrainian government, military, and people. Military and other aid from NATO nations and others continue to pour into Ukraine. The Russian military is struggling and taking far greater losses than they likely anticipated. Observers are increasingly concerned that the Kremlin may escalate the war with the use of weapons of mass destruction, including tactical nuclear weapons.
Moscow could certainly decide to move the war in Ukraine from the conventional level to the nuclear level at any time. But under what circumstances might Russia use a tactical nuclear weapon directly against Ukraine—or as part of the conflict—in an effort to determine the outcome of the war in Moscow’s favor?
In late March 2022, shortly after Russia’s latest invasion of Ukraine, Dmitry Medvedev, former Russian president and current deputy chairman of the Russian Security Council, outlined Moscow’s policy on using nuclear weapons. According to a press account, Medvedev said:
“We have a special document on nuclear deterrence. This document clearly indicates the grounds on which the Russian Federation is entitled to use nuclear weapons. There are a few of them, let me remind them to you: number one is the situation, when Russia is struck by a nuclear missile. The second case is any use of other nuclear weapons against Russia or its allies. The third is an attack on a critical infrastructure that will have paralyzed our nuclear deterrent forces. And the fourth case is when an act of aggression is committed against Russia and its allies, which jeopardized the existence of the country itself, even without the use of nuclear weapons, that is, with the use of conventional weapons.”
Medvedev’s explanation on Russian nuclear doctrine is relatively clear, but he failed to note the escalate-to-deescalate doctrine. And that doctrine arguably is what creates the most likely scenario in which Moscow resorts to the use of nuclear weapons in the near future.
The war in Ukraine has not gone well for Russian President Vladimir Putin. What the Kremlin thought would be a fast assault on the capital, Kyiv, followed by the fall of the Ukrainian government, has turned into a difficult situation, which has seen Russian forces losing general officers, troops, and equipment at an alarming rate.
The outcome—once thought to overwhelmingly favor Moscow—remains inconclusive.
This state of affairs does not bode well for the Kremlin. Even authoritarian leaders such as Putin care about public opinion at home and the effect it might have on the regime’s control over the country. Russia needs to achieve some sort of “victory” to justify its military adventurism in Ukraine, especially among the Russian elite and national security establishment.
Losing the war in Ukraine would have repercussions on Russia internationally, too, including significant reputational costs, strained diplomatic relations and likely pariah status in international organizations, economic costs based on a variety of punitive sanctions, and a demoralized, depleted Russian military that may not be able to effectively project power abroad.
In other words, losing the war in Ukraine has the potential to be painful for Putin, Russia, and the Russian people – and this is when, unfortunately, the use of nuclear weapons potentially comes into play for Moscow.
Indeed, Putin might decide to use a NSNW (or more than one) in this yet unproven escalate-to-deescalate plan to advance Russia’s unjust goals of politically subjugating the Ukrainian government and the Ukrainian people and disarming the Ukrainian military.
There is robust debate about the efficiency and effectiveness of using a NSNW on the Ukrainian battlefield to advance Russian goals. There are, however, other options. For example, Russia could explode a low-yield, tactical nuclear weapon for political effect over an unpopulated area, including the waters of the Arctic Ocean.
The point of the use of the NSNW, regardless of where it is exploded, would be to send a clear signal to the United States, NATO, and others who are supporting the Ukrainian political and military resistance that their generous backing must end—immediately.
If these supporters choose otherwise, the risk would be that Moscow might escalate from a single, low-yield nuclear “warning shot” on the battlefield or into an unpopulated area to using low-yield or high-yield theater or intercontinental-range strategic nuclear weapons, targeting populated areas in countries that back Ukraine, especially those that are part of NATO.
The Kremlin might calculate that Ukraine’s main supporters (e.g., the United States and NATO) do not have the political will to risk a wider conventional conflict with Russia or chance the possibility of a move up the nuclear-escalation ladder with Moscow that could result in all-out nuclear war and unspeakable carnage.
Ukraine’s backers—and Ukraine itself— would also have to make some fateful choices on its response.
Using the escalate-to-deescalate nuclear stratagem, Moscow potentially could force any number of advantageous political and military outcomes to the war in Ukraine, including a victory that avoids the deep unpleasantries of a defeat and all that a loss would incur for Moscow domestically and internationally.
Of course, the use of any nuclear weapon— strategic or tactical—in war for the first time since World War II is a troubling idea to contemplate, even one over an unpopulated area for the purposes of political-military signaling. But policymakers, analysts, and observers must understand that Russian political and military policy includes options for the possible use of the 2,000 tactical nuclear weapons in its nuclear arsenal.
Consequently, the United States and NATO must consider Russia’s use of tactical nuclear weapons in the Ukraine crisis a real possibility, especially as the length of the war increases. At this point, the possible use of battlefield nuclear weapons by Russia is arguably a “low risk,” but it is not a “no risk” scenario. It could happen.
As such, the United States and NATO must take the threat of Russian battlefield nuclear weapons very seriously, surveil the movement of Russian nuclear forces intensely, and prepare at the policy and military level for the possibility of a nuclear event, including the making of tough choices that a Russian nuclear event in Ukraine would bring.
Beyond the Ukraine crisis, the United States, NATO, and other European partners must be thinking about Moscow’s advantage in NSNWs and its “escalate to deescalate” doctrine. The significant imbalance and potential willingness to use these weapons could encourage greater Russian risk-taking now and in the future, deeply undermining European security and U.S. and NATO interests.
As we have seen repeatedly—from disinformation campaigns to cyberattacks to military operations overseas (e.g., Syria)—Russia will use every instrument of its national power to achieve its geopolitical goals. This state of affairs means that Russia’s small nukes are a potentially big problem for the United States, NATO, and its partners in Europe.
Quote from Putin: “One irresponsible politician would blurt something out, then another – at a very high level, by the way, at the level of, say, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the top officials there are holding forth on this subject.
And we’re supposed to say nothing? We answer accordingly. As soon as we answer, [everyone] latches onto that: ‘Look, Russia’s issuing threats!’ We are not threatening! But everyone needs to know that we have it and we will use it if necessary to protect our sovereignty.”
Since the end of the Cold War in 1990 and the significant reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the two nuclear superpowers — the US and Russia — the world took its eyes off the existential danger posed by nuclear weapons. The fact that the ‘nuclear taboo’ had never been broken since the first and only use of nuclear weapons by the US against Japan in 1945, reinforced a sense of receding danger from nuclear weapons. This has always been a false assurance. The nuclear danger has increased, not diminished since the end of the Cold War.
The basic contradiction that underlies the doctrine of nuclear deterrence remains unresolved. Nuclear weapons are not weapons of war. The five nuclear weapon states (NWS), parties to Nuclear Non-Proliferation, have recently reiterated, ‘A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.’ And yet, a potential adversary may be deterred from launching a nuclear attack only if the target country can credibly threaten a devastating retaliatory attack. Nuclear deterrence demands both capability and intent to wage nuclear war.
The size of nuclear arsenals have been reduced but the qualitative improvement of both nuclear weapons and their delivery systems has continued apace. Digital technologies are making a big difference in the efficacy of weapons, the accuracy of their delivery to targets and the speed of delivery. But the digitisation of weapons systems is creating new risks and the nuclear risk is now intertwined with cyber risks. Was a glitch in the digital controls of the BrahMos missile responsible for its accidental firing into Pakistani territory on March 9 this year? While this, fortunately, ended without triggering a full-scale war between the two nuclear-armed hostile neighbours, the outcome may well have been more dire in nature. A thorough and transparent probe is unlikely in either country where accountability to the people is a minimal concern. The national security argument is now the most convenient shield against public scrutiny.
Concepts of nuclear deterrence were developed in an era of an essentially binary East-West nuclear confrontation. The major players were the US and the then Soviet Union. The situation is radically different today when there are nine nuclear weapon states with complex political and strategic equations among them. The binary construct is no longer relevant. The US and Russia still have the largest arsenals, over 90% of the global total but China is catching up fast. Neither Moscow nor Washington believe that bilateral arms deals will enhance their security unless China joins the negotiations. In the subcontinent, India is reluctant to engage in nuclear arms control with Pakistan because China is its main adversary. China, on the other hand, has structured its nuclear deterrent with the US in mind. It is only in a multilateral format that these differing threat perceptions can be addressed and reconciled.
Nuclear deterrence is irrelevant in dealing with threats of nuclear terrorism. The miniaturisation of nuclear warheads to the point where they could be launched with a shoulder-fired missile makes such terrorism a realistic threat. If such an attack could be launched from the territory of a friendly country or even from within one’s own borders, how would deterrence work? Nuclear deterrence tacitly assumes that the entities involved are state actors. But what if there are non-state actors? Dealing with this new class of nuclear threats would require an unprecedented level of international trust and collaboration which is unlikely in the current turbulent geopolitical context.
The ongoing Ukraine war has shaken the atmosphere of relative complacency regarding the nuclear threat. Russia has threatened the possible use of nuclear weapons if any outside power tries to intervene. This has brought international attention back to the danger of nuclear war and the questioning of various assurances extended to non-nuclear weapon states in return for their commitment to refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons. This will not play well at the forthcoming 10th Review Conference of the Parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty being convened in New York in August. Russia may have dealt a mortal blow to the global non-proliferation regime.
There is another long-standing dilemma that the Ukraine war has highlighted and this relates to the distinction between theatre or tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) and strategic nuclear weapons. Faced with potential military defeat of its forces in Ukraine, Russia may well employ a TNW to inflict devastating losses on Ukraine forces. Whatever the Russian intent, there is now a fresh debate over the possible use of TNWs without triggering an all-out nuclear war. What are TNWs? No clear definitions exist. Could they be classified in terms of yields? TNWs in the US may have yields ranging from 0.1 to 170 kilotons and Russian TNWs from 0.3 to 100 kilotons. Considering that the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were each about 15 kilotons, devastating entire cities, could a larger yield TNW really be classified as a battlefield weapon? Other definitions point to their range, which may be 300-500 km. But in the India-Pakistan context, a strategic exchange may involve much shorter distances. In the India-Pakistan context, it makes no sense to posit such a distinction. More important is the command and control aspect i.e. that when the use of a nuclear weapon is devolved on a battlefield commander without reference to a central command and control, it may be classified as a TNW, irrespective of yield or range. The distinction is semantic. Once a nuclear weapon of any yield or range has been unleashed by a battlefield commander or a central command, the end result is a catastrophic strategic exchange. As John Mattis, a former US Secretary of Defence, observed, ‘I don’t think there is any such thing as a tactical nuclear weapon. Any nuclear weapon used at any time is a strategic game-changer.’
In the film, War Games (1983), the supercomputer simulating nuclear war games concluded, ‘The only winning move is not to play.’
The author is Former Foreign Secretary and Senior Fellow, Centre for Policy Research. Views are personal
We are again in the age of a global arms race. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (sipri) warned on June 13 that nuclear states “are super busy modernizing their arsenals. Both to extend the versions they have, but also to introduce new kinds. Countries are beginning to adhere more importance to nuclear weapons.” India, Pakistan and North Korea are also in this nuclear arms race. sipri researcher Hans Kristensen, who is also director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists, concluded: “We are living in a new era of nuclear risk.”
While Russia and the United States have the largest nuclear arsenals, China is racing to catch up. With the help of the U.S., Germany is also becoming a formidable nuclear power.
sipri researchers identified some 300 newly built silos for ballistic missiles in China in the last 24 months. “The Chinese increase is the most significant buildup in the world right now in terms of numbers,” said Kristensen. “It’s completely unprecedented by Chinese standards. We don’t know why China is doing this for the simple reason that China doesn’t want to talk about it.”
While Russia has been the most vocal about possible nuclear war, observers are even more concerned about China’s secret nuclear build-up. Meanwhile, Germany is almost celebrated for increasing its nuclear deterrence.
In February, it was announced that Germany will purchase 35 new F-35s from the U.S. “The Air Force plans to base all 35 F-35A to be procured at Büchel Air Base after progress/completion of construction work,” a spokesman for the German Armed Forces’ Federal Office for Infrastructure, Environmental Protection and Services said in Bonn on June 11.
Additionally, starting in 2023, “the nuclear weapons in Büchel are to be replaced by the new B61-12 model,” Deutsche Welle reported. The U.S. is spending about $10 billion to modernize its nuclear bombs in Europe to enable them to be guided to their target with a variable yield ranging from 0.3 to 340 kilotons.
How naive America is to entrust this immense firepower to nations that so recently—and throughout history—have proved to be enemies of the free world! …
Right now, Germany seems to be an ally of the United States. But what if this nation—our archenemy in World Wars i and ii—turned against us in the next war?
Germany claims to be an ally. Yet Europe is sending Russia more money now than it was before the Ukraine invasion! Germany has led all of Europe to refuse to boycott Russian oil and gas. They’re not even taking simple steps to reduce the money they send Russia. Is Germany really acting like an ally, especially one America can trust with the most destructive weapons ever produced?
America trusts Germany, but history screams that it shouldn’t!
The trust America is placing in Germany is absolutely condemned by the Bible. Why? Because it is trusting other nations rather than trusting God.
The Allies pledged to demilitarize Germany after World War ii. But now America is equipping Germany with nuclear weapons capable of starting World War iii. If history’s warning wasn’t chilling enough, the Bible reveals that Germany will use these weapons. Jesus Christ Himself warned that “great tribulation” would afflict our world (Matthew 24:21). This time would be so terrible that no one would survive if He didn’t return to Earth to stop it (verse 22). God is wrathful with His people, and He is using Germany, ancient Assyria, to correct them. “O Assyrian, the rod of mine anger, and the staff in their hand is mine indignation” (Isaiah 10:5). God knows Germany’s warlike tendency and will use it to correct His people. But He is giving mankind a chance to repent today.