Iraqi Shīʿite leaderPrintCiteShareFeedback
Early life and education
Sadr was the son of Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, one of the most prominent religious figures in the Islamic world in the late 20th century. Sadr was greatly influenced by his father’s conservative thoughts and ideas and by those of his father-in-law, Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, founder of the Islamic Daʿwah Party, who in 1980 was executed for his opposition to Iraqi strongman Saddam Hussein.
After completing middle school, Sadr enrolled in the Shiʿi ḥawzah (religious seminary) in Najaf, but he never finished his studies. Sadr’s father was killed in 1999, along with his two elder brothers, reputedly by government agents. His father’s will stipulated that his ḥawzah be put in the hands of Sayyid Kāẓim al-Hāʾirī, an Iraqi religious scholar, but Hāʾirī delegated the administrative and financial affairs of the ḥawzah to Sadr, who became one of al-Hāʾirī’s disciples.
Patron of Shiʿi populism during the Iraq War
Almost immediately after U.S.-led forces toppled Saddam’s regime in 2003 (see Iraq War), Sadr emerged from the shadows and began to open offices in his father’s name (known collectively as the Office of the Martyr Sadr) in Baghdad, Najaf, Karbala, Basra, and other areas. He had immediate success in Madinat al-Thawrah (Revolution City), a poor Baghdad suburb of two million Shiʿis, which he renamed Sadr City in honour of his father. By the end of that year Sadr headed a Shiʿi political movement known as the Sadrist Movement and had attracted millions of Shiʿi followers across Iraq, mainly youth and the poor and downtrodden, to whom he offered a variety of social, educational, and health services. He maintained tight security over the areas he controlled and established a court system based on Sharīʿah (Islamic law).
Sadr was accused of staging the murder of ʿAbd al-Majīd al-Khūʾī, a rival Shiʿi cleric, and a warrant for his arrest was issued but never executed. Sadr concentrated his rhetoric on Iraqi nationalism, especially the removal of U.S. forces from Iraq, and anti-Americanism. His militia, an ill-coordinated collection of thousands of outlaws known as Jaysh al-Mahdī (JAM), or the Mahdī Army, engaged in direct armed clashes with the multinational forces in April and August 2004 and was accused of contributing heavily to the ongoing civil conflict between Shiʿis and Sunnis. Sadr’s critics held JAM responsible for brutal acts of retribution against Sunnis, including kidnapping, killing, torture, and the destruction of mosques and property.
Many Shiʿis regarded Sadr as a hero who opposed the Sunni rebels supporting al-Qaeda and who protected the Shiʿah from Sunni insurgents. In the December 2005 elections, members of Sadr’s movement stood with other Shiʿi parties as part of the United Iraqi Alliance, which won a plurality of seats (128 of 275) in the parliament; 32 seats went to the Sadrists. In the formation of the government, Sadr supported Nouri al-Maliki of the Daʿwah Party for prime minister, but in April 2007 six Sadrist ministers withdrew from Maliki’s cabinet after their demands for a timetable for withdrawal of foreign troops remained unrealized. Also in 2007, possibly to escape increasing pressure from Iraqi security forces and the U.S. military, Sadr moved to Iran, where he entered a theological seminary in Qom while continuing to direct the actions of his followers in Iraq. In August Sadr made another tactical move, which coincided with the U.S. troop surge: he ordered that his militia suspend all activity for six months, during which time he intended to reorganize it in an attempt to restore its credibility. This suspension of all military activity was extended in late February 2008 for another six months, until August. On March 25, however, the Iraqi government launched a military operation against Sadr’s militia in Basra, and intense fighting ensued. The militia fought Iraqi troops to a standstill, and on March 30, following negotiations with government officials, Sadr ordered a cease-fire.Louay Bahry
Pacification and political ascendance
In August 2008 Sadr’s plan to reorganize his militia was realized in the launch of al-Mumahhidūn (“Those Who Pave the Way”), an unarmed wing of JAM that Sadr declared would focus on social and religious programs; only a small specialized portion of the original Mahdī Army was to remain armed. A complete restructuring into a solely social organization, including dissolution of the organization’s remaining armed branch, was made contingent upon the implementation of a timetable for U.S. withdrawal from Iraq. Shortly thereafter Sadr announced the indefinite extension of the cease-fire that had been put in place the previous year.
In 2010, following months of political stalemate after close parliamentary elections left the main factions in Iraq unable to form a government, Sadr paved the way for a resolution by agreeing in negotiations to endorse Maliki for the position of prime minister. The Sadrists secured a number of concessions from Maliki in return for their support, including several posts in the new cabinet. In January 2011, possibly capitalizing on his increased political stature, Sadr unexpectedly returned from exile in Iran to his home city of Najaf.
With the increasing clout of the Sadrist Movement in parliament and the withdrawal of U.S. troops in 2011, Sadr made significant changes to his political strategy. His relationship with Iran, previously one of mutual benefit, soured as the country became the greatest source of foreign interference in Iraqi politics. Although Sadr himself was once an image of Iraqi Shiʿi militancy, he came to see sectarianism as a source of dysfunction and corruption in government and began steering his supporters away from sectarianism. Instead, he chose to increase focus on his message of Iraqi nationalism, one that included Shiʿis, Sunnis, communists, and liberals. Though Sadr was still a critic of the United States, some analysts noted that there was a decrease in the frequency, and a moderation of the tone, of his anti-American rhetoric.
The changes in Sadr’s stance were evident in some of his most notable activities in the years that followed. In 2014, after successful incursions into Iraqi territory by the Sunni insurgent group Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL; also called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria [ISIS]), Sadr reestablished his militia—now known as the Sarāyā al-Salām (“Peace Regiments”)—to fight alongside the Iraqi forces in a U.S.-led international coalition against ISIL. In April 2016 Sadr called on his supporters to launch massive demonstrations, alongside supporters of the Iraqi Communist Party, to demand that members of parliament support the prime minister’s plan to fight corruption and to appoint technocrats to government positions rather than continue the practice of making appointments based on political and sectarian quotas.
In the run-up to the May 2018 parliamentary elections, Sadr formed the Sairoon (“Moving Forward”) alliance. Reflecting his antisectarian stance, it included his newly formed Istiqāmah (“Integrity”) Party, the Iraqi Communist Party, and smaller parties or civil groups, representing an eclectic mix of Shiʿis, Sunnis, secularists, and liberals. Sairoon promised to combat corruption, reform the state, and offer relief for the poor and the working class. It also championed national unity, a commitment seemingly demonstrated by the alliance’s diverse makeup. The alliance captured more seats than any other party or coalition but not nearly enough to secure a majority or dominate the negotiation of a coalition.
Amid coalition talks, Sairoon navigated a rapidly shifting political atmosphere. It initially supported a government led by the incumbent prime minister Haider al-Abadi, whose party came in third in the elections. But, as Iraqis awaited a delayed convening of parliament, they took to the streets to protest corruption and the lack of jobs and basic services, raising the political stakes for the newly elected parliamentarians. When the parliament finally convened several months after the election, it found itself in deadlock on the formation of a government. Protests were amplified and soon became deadly, and in an emergency session of parliament Sairoon withdrew its support for Abadi. Days later Sairoon reached a deal with the opposition, and a government was formed over the following weeks with Adel Abdul Mahdi, a candidate independent of both Sairoon and the opposition, as prime minister.
But Abdul Mahdi faced significant setbacks, and he was unable to fill his cabinet before he was sworn in three weeks after his appointment. When some of the most important posts remained vacant well into 2019, Sadr joined other influential voices who had already been mounting pressure on the government to fill the posts, and he threatened to withdraw his support if those posts were not filled within 10 days. Abdul Mahdi filled three of the four remaining posts within a week’s time.
After fresh protests in October were met with resistance by the government, Sadr called on Sairoon to boycott parliament and urged the government to resign and hold early elections. By January 2020, however, he had withdrawn his support for the anti-government protests. Still, when a new technocratic government was formed in May with Sadr’s tacit support, he continued to press the government for reform and early elections, which were eventually held in October 2021 under a new electoral process. Although still falling short of a majority, Sadr’s movement expanded its representation in parliament while its primary opponents in the election—the pro-Iran Fatah alliance—won a mere 17 seats.The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica