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May 29, 2022 – 7:40 AM News Code : 1261883 Source : IRNALink:
Palestinian Resistance Movement Hamas reportedly test-launched missiles on the eve of Israel’s flag march planned for Sunday.
AhlulBayt News Agency (ABNA): Palestinian Resistance Movement Hamas reportedly test-launched missiles on the eve of Israel’s flag march planned for Sunday.
Israeli media said that Hamas fired eight missiles from the besieged Gaza Strip into the sea, describing the launch as a warning to the regime.
Israel holds the flag march to mark its 1967 capture of Al-Quds’ Old City where Al-Aqsa Mosque, the third holiest site to Muslims, is located.
Different Palestinian groups have already warned Israel against desecration of Al-Aqsa.
The Popular Youth Movement in Al-Quds issued a statement calling on Palestinians to hold “Palestinian Flag Day” march in the city on Sunday.
The Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which is the armed wing of the Fatah Party in the occupied West Bank, has warned of consequences if the Zionist regime desecrates Al-Aqsa Mosque, stressing that they have already prepared their plans for operations against occupiers.
Amid a new wave of popular protests across Iran, the country’s judiciary has hanged at least 26 prisoners in various cities over the past 10 days.
Oslo-based Iran Human Rights reported the spike in executions on Friday, saying that the sudden increase, as several cities in the country are the scene of anti-government protests, shows that the Islamic Republic authorities use the death penalty as a means of creating fear in society.
According to data collected by the right group, at least 26 people, including two women, were executed from May 17 to 27 in 11 Iranian provinces. Seven of the executed men were Baluchi citizens — an ethnic minority making up five percent of the population — and were sentenced to death on “drug-related” charges.
Calling for the abolition of the death penalty, Iran Human Rights Director, Mahmoud Amiri-Moghaddam said, “While most of those executed were charged with crimes such as murder and drug offences, the authorities use the death penalty as a political tool. The executions are carried out with the aim of suppressing dissent.”
The 66-page report, published Tuesday, found Iran executed at least 314 people in 2021, a 28 percent jump from at least 246 in 2020 and the highest figure since 2017. Amnesty said that in Iran “death sentences were disproportionately used against members of ethnic minorities.”
Andrei Kelin said there is a “very strict provision” on the use of such weapons and that Russia will continue to treat the war as a “limited conventional operation”.
He told the BBC: “Tactical nuclear weapons in accordance with the Russian military doctrine is not used in conflicts like that at all.”
Asked about the likelihood of nukes being used, he said: “I don’t think so. We have a very strict provision on the issues of the use of tactical nuclear weapons and it is mainly when the existence of the state is endangered. It has nothing to do with the current operation…
“We will deal with it with conventional operation, limited conventional operation. Perhaps you have noticed that we do not increase the number of our forces over there. We believe it is sufficient to deal with the situation.”
Russia’s ambassador to the UK shared the details in a rare interview.
Tactical nuclear weapons are used at shorter distances as opposed to “strategic” nukes which can be used over a much longer distance.
Analysts believe Russia has around 2,000 tactical nukes – including smaller bombs and missiles – at its disposal, according to the BBC.
Previously, Defence Secretary Ben Wallace said he does not think Putin will use nuclear weapons in his pursuit of Ukraine.
“We should be worried that a state like Russia believes that the rules don’t apply to them, whether that is invading Ukraine or using nerve agent in Salisbury, but fundamentally a deterrent is what it is, a deterrent,” Wallace told Times Radio.
“As much as he might be ambitious for Ukraine, I don’t think he wants to go into that space.”
In the latter half of the 2021, Washington initiated strategic trilateral defence pact with the UK and Australia, colloquially called as AUKUS. AUKUS is a strategic security framework to assist Australia in building nuclear-powered submarines to extend interoperability, mutual benefit, and commonality.[i]
Aside of assisting Australia building nuclear-powered submarines, the core purpose of AUKUS is to contain China’s meteoric rise and its growing naval expansionist desire in Indo-Pacific region in general and particularly in the South China Sea. AUKUS aims to have a surveillance over the sea routes and then maintain strategic dominance in the Indi-Pacific region, particularly in competition with China.[ii] AUKUS reflect the Indo-Pacific ambitions of U.S. and the manifestation of the U.S. Foreign Policy under Biden’s administration, as Antony Blinken stated in his early speech after assuming the office, that China presents America’s the “biggest geopolitical test of the 21st century.”[iii]
AUKUS and repercussion for Nuclear Non-Proliferation
The new Security Pact, AUKUS, has certainly overshadowed the aims of Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad)[iv] by bringing back the geo-strategic and security competition in the Pacific. It has rung the alarm bell in the region as the Pact has the potential to disturb balance of power among the countries influence by AUKUS. China, Russia, and Japan have been more reactive and raised concerns against Australian accusation of nuclear-powered submarines as pact has the potential to jeopardize the nuclear weapon free zone status of Southeast Asia. In response to it, China’s Foreign Minister Spokesperson Zhao Lijian has termed AUKUS as a violation of the Treaty of Rarotonga (1985), which made an assurance to a nuclear-free South-Pacific region.[v] Similarly, many political analysts and nuclear experts are of the view that the trilateral security pact poses grave threat to the nuclear non-proliferation regimes[vi] such as Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). In 1970, NPT was entered into force with a clear objection of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, promoting peaceful use of nuclear energy, and achieving nuclear disarmament.[vii] On the contrary, AUKUS explicitly promotes export of nuclear facilitates for security purposes and promotes nuclear proliferation, horizontally as well as vertically. After the creation of Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG), AUKUS is yet another setback to the global efforts of nuclear non-proliferation.
Nuclear competition between India and Pakistan
Unlike, balance of power among countries in Pacific, India and Pakistan face direct implication of AUKUS, as it may ignite a nuclear-race between India and Pakistan. The geography of India and Pakistan is such that it has always been difficult for both neighbouring yet rival countries to avoid great power competition whether it was the World Wars or Cold War. Although India has had successfully maintained neutrality towards great power competition since its independence in 1947, India non-alignment policy may fad owing to assertive China and geo-strategic showdown in the Pacific.
Other than five nuclear state (the U.S., France, UK, Russia, and China), India is the only non-NPT nuclear state to possess nuclear-powered submarine i.e. INS Arihant, leased by Russia. With time the technology became outdated and India needed an up-gradation to its nuclear-powered submarine program but NPT and other nuclear non-proliferation regimes are the main hurdle for India to modernize its naval defences. After the inception of AUKUS, the tides have turned, as AUKUS is a possible platform for India to bargain for better nuclear technologies to augment its nuclear-powered submarine to secure its strategic interest in Indian Ocean and Pacific region. The point of concern is that the sharing and production of nuclear-powered subs intricately link to nuclear weapons and sharing of sensitive nuclear technologies,[viii] which will be possible through the platform of AUKUS. This has sparked a debate among security and regional experts that AUKUS will disturb the balance of power and rekindle nuclear race in the region. Hirofumi Tosaki, Centre for Disarmament-Centre for Science and Technology, showed distresses by stating that the exemption granted to Australia acquiring nuclear-powered subs will motivate other countries that they too should have such options.[ix]Likewise, Zhao Lijian has also warned that the security pact will undermine the peace and stability of the region.[x]
AUKUS will create avenues for the regional powers to make similar arrangements between like-minded allies, and one such scenario can be possible between China and Pakistan. The security pact will incite China to look for ‘partner in crime’ and China cannot trust any country other than Pakistan. The friendship dates back to 1963 when both nations reached an amicable settlement, and delineation of borders. China is also Pakistan’s biggest trading partner when it comes to the imports of military hardware. Besides, China has been playing an important role in strengthening Pakistan’s defence. China has gifted PNS Tughril (Type 054A/P) and J-10C fighter jet to Pakistan and its collaboration over JF-17 Thunder bear testimony to their long-standing bilateral relationship. Furthermore, cooperation between the navies of the two countries have been unprecedented in the recent years. In 2017, Pakistan signed agreement with China to acquire four Type 54 Guided Missile Frigates, which were the most technically advance Chinese frigates of the modern era.[xi]. Yet transfer of nuclear-powered submarine to Pakistan is not a Chinese agenda so far, but India’s proximity with AUKUS can motivate China to equip Pakistan with nuclear-powered subs to balance with India. In any possible scenario, strengthening Pakistan’s naval force is not a choice for China but its own strategic interest.
Similarly, AUKUS has the potential to entice India to upgrade its nuclear-powered submarine capability as India is a strategic partner to the U.S. and enjoy close partnership with the UK and Australia. According to the regional experts, AUKUS is mostly like to expand and India is the strongest contender among other regional allies such as South Korea or Japan, as India and AUKUS shares a common enemy i.e. China. Moreover, AUKUS without India will not serve the purpose of AUKUS and AUKUS is not only a partnership to develop nuclear-powered submarine for Australia but also a strategic agreement to cooperate over AI in the Pacific. India also will not leave any opportunity to modernize its out-dated nuclear technology and naval capabilities. Moreover, ‘No First Use’ of nuclear weapon policy of India is hallowed and nothing more than a political gimmick as the Western powers are keep on modernizing and equipping India with nuclear arsenals, knowing the fact that India is renowned for nuclear theft and failures. Since 2014, BJP is trying to reverse and update its doctrine of ‘No First Use’, owing to the emerging challenges to its frontiers with Pakistan and China. Being a strategic partner of the U.S., India’s bilateral relations with other members of the AUKUS, i.e. UK and Australia, has touched new heights. Australian High Commissioner in Delhi (India) Barry O’Farrell stated that this century belongs to India and welcomes Indian forces in Exercise Talisman Sabre, a biennial exercise led by the Australian Defence Forces and the U.S. military. Additionally, MILAN 2022,[xii] a multilateral naval exercise, is yet another evidence that the West is building India’s naval expertise and schooling India to operate in high seas, before offering a membership to AUKUS. Owing to the proximity and strategic partnership with the major contenders in South Pacific, India and Pakistan might take a side not by choice but by their geo-strategic compulsion.
Conclusion
Global order is facing a tumultuous times since the economic crisis of 2009, as nothing is certain. Although India is not a member of AUKUS, India is a natural partner to AUKUS. The legitimate security concerns of India in the retrospect of border skirmishes with China and Chinese expansionist policies in the Pacific, AUKUS elite will be forced to cooperate with India over nuclear-powered submarine. India was then a non-NPT member when the U.S. lobbied to make India member of NSG. So, nothing is certain but if India join AUKUS there is a possibility that China will help Pakistan to acquire nuclear-powered submarine which will eventually start a new era of nuclear race in Asia in general and particularly between arch-rivals India and Pakistan.
A nuclear-armed Iran, or even a threshold state, would provide a nuclear umbrella over the entire Iranian-led radical axis, accelerating destabilization in the region.
The May 22 assassination in Tehran of a key Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) officer, who reportedly was busy plotting attacks on Israelis abroad, is a reminder of the fact that the Iranian regime poses a clear and present danger to the security of Israelis, and the wider Middle East.
Seeking regional hegemony, and a great “Shiite revival,” the Islamist regime in Tehran has utilized its IRGC’s Quds Force, an elite, secretive international unit that traffics weapons, funds, and training to Iran’s terrorist proxies in the Middle East, including Hezbollah in Lebanon, armed Shiite militias in Syria and Iraq, and the Houthis in Yemen. Iran is turning these entities into some of the most heavily armed non-state actors in the world, complete with arsenals of surface-to-surface firepower. Hezbollah’s inventory dwarfs the firepower of many standard armies.
The Quds Force actively plots attacks on Israeli targets, as well as threatening moderate Sunni states in the region, among them Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Strategic targets of these countries, such as airports, oil refineries, and military bases come under routine attack.
But an even more significant threat—the most critical of them all—that emanates from Iran has all but vanished from the headlines. One can be forgiven for thinking that the Iranian nuclear program is not the gravest issue currently facing the Middle East (as well as constituting a potential flashpoint with global ramifications).
Yet that is exactly what Iran’s nuclear program is. It has become the elephant in the room: a problem too big to be discussed daily outside of defense establishments, and an issue that is falling between the cracks, subject to neither diplomatic solutions nor military operations. Instead, a creeping nuclear breakout is underway.
A nuclear-armed Iran, or even a threshold state, would provide a nuclear umbrella over the entire Iranian-led radical axis, accelerating destabilization in the region, emboldening Iran and its Islamist partners to step up attacks on Israel and Sunni states, and sparking a regional nuclear arms race in which Sunni states rush to obtain nuclear weapons, refusing to live under an Iranian nuclear shadow without a suitable reply.
With nuclear negotiations between Iran and world powers led by the United States currently stuck, the Iranian nuclear program is hovering in a bizarre twilight zone, in a no-man’s-land that is not subject to regular public discussion or significant international scrutiny.
Meanwhile, Iran is racing ahead. According to a recent statement by Israeli defense minister Benny Gantz, Iran already has 60 kilograms of uranium enriched to the 60 percent level, putting it just weeks away from having enough enriched uranium for its first bomb.
This does not mean that Iran is weeks away from having an operational nuclear weapon. Other aspects of the program, like building a nuclear warhead, learning how to place it on a missile, and completing the process to build a nuclear explosive mechanism appear to be frozen at this time.
These additional processes, collectively known as “the weapons group,” would need another year and a half to two years to reach fruition. But the uranium enrichment process is the most difficult aspect of building the bomb, and Iran’s nuclear scientists have all but mastered it.
Iran is building and installing centrifuges that enrich uranium much faster than its first-generation centrifuges did. Some of these new centrifuges have been placed in a recently built underground hall at the Natanz uranium site. A second site, in Fordow, also hosts advanced centrifuges, known as IR-6 type centrifuges.
According to Iranian state television, in March, the IRGC detected and foiled an Israeli sabotage plot to attack the site at Fordow, which is buried in a mountain.
According to international media reports, Natanz was attacked twice by sabotage operations, once in July 2020, and again in April 2021, with the second reported attack taking out Natanz’s centrifuges. In June, a mysterious blast targeted a centrifuge factory at Karaj, near Tehran.
If Israel is indeed conducting covert operations to attack Iran’s nuclear program, these are having a delaying influence, but Iran can and does bounce back, building back its program with new and improved uranium enrichment facilities.
With talks frozen, it seems that sabotage and Iranian determination are currently the only game in town.
Looking ahead, two main potential scenarios could play out.
The first is that the Biden administration is successful in its ability to revive the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). In light of Iran’s nuclear progress made since the Trump administration’s unilateral exit from the agreement in 2018, and the sunset clauses contained in the JCPOA that all expire between 2025 to 2031, leaving Iran to enrich as much uranium as it wants and to stockpile as much fissile material as it wants, reviving the 2015 deal seems like no more than a temporary reprieve, which does almost nothing to solve the fundamental issues of the Iranian nuclear program.
If an agreement is signed, Iran would fill its war chest with oil trade income, and funds from other international business transactions, and be able to inject its proxies like Hezbollah with new funds, further contributing to the conventional threat to Israel and regional security.
The path to conflict from this scenario seems short.
A second scenario could involve a formal collapse of talks between the United States and Iran. The talks are currently stuck on Iran’s demand to remove the IRGC from Washington’s foreign terror organization list, as well as additional Iranian demands.
This scenario could then develop into several follow-on scenarios.
The first would involve a renewed American maximum pressure campaign, designed to circumvent the diplomatic channel as a mechanism for controlling Iran’s nuclear program and to apply economic and diplomatic pressure, backed by the threat of military force.
However, the ability of the United States to recruit others in the world to this campaign seems limited. It is unclear if Europe would get on board, and it is clear that Russia and China would not (unlike the pre-JCPOA round of sanctions that led to the 2015 deal).
America’s determination to reinstate a military deterrent against Iran is also highly questionable. This is due to its formal decision to prioritize great power competition with Russia and China, and to deprioritize its Middle Eastern commitments, as the Afghanistan withdrawal and Iraqi drawdown demonstrate.
Therefore, a limited American pressure campaign seems more likely a fallout from the collapsed talks, combined with an Israeli military deterrent, and possibly, stepped up Israeli covert action.
This reality would contain no guarantees against an Iranian decision to break out to full nuclear weapons capability, should Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the IRGC, and the Iranian Supreme National Security Council so choose.
It is safe to assume that Israel has marked out red lines for itself on Iranian nuclear progress which, if triggered, would spark an Israeli aerial assault on key sites of the program.
That, in turn, would likely lead to full-scale conflict with Hezbollah in Lebanon, and possibly with Shiite militias in Syria and Iraq, as well as Gazan terror factions.
This appeared to be the scenario drilled in the Chariots of War Israel Defense Forces exercise in May, the largest held by the Israeli military in decades.
Ultimately, Israel’s objective is to keep delaying the nuclear program until a fundamental change in the ideology of the Iran regime occurs, or the regime itself is replaced by a moderate successor.
Skilled diplomacy, a powerful and achievable deterrent capability developed with urgency, and the highly trained personnel to drive a technically skilled defence force will be crucial to Australia’s defence in the uncertain decades ahead.
A big dilemma confronting the incoming defence minister is how to resolve the disconnect between the 2020 defence strategic update, which signalled that Australia might find itself embroiled in a major conflict without the 10 years’ warning time that has long been considered likely, and the 2020 force structure plan which set out a plan to re-equip the Australian Defence Force that would not be delivered for decades.
During the election campaign, Labor’s defence spokesperson, Brendan O’Connor, signed up to the Coalition’s increases to Defence spending, with the March budget increasing it to $48.6 billion and further growth set to take it to $70 billion by 2030. Labor also agreed with the big investments being made in frigates and h nuclear-powered submarines.
The challenge for the new government on defence, though, isn’t about the headline budget figures, or the massive, long-term projects it’ll have to manage. It’s to use the large and growing defence budget to make Australia more secure this decade—over the next 1, 3, 5 and 8 years—not from 2035 and out to 2050 as the new frigates and submarines slowly arrive.
The good news for the new government is that there are things to build on and accelerate—like the work underway to get at least some of the guided weapons our military use produced in Australia so that we aren’t dependent on risky and vulnerable international supply chains. As we’re seeing every day in the war in Ukraine, these essential military supplies are needed in numbers.
The 2020s look to be a dangerous decade for Australia and our region because of an aggressive China under Xi Jinping. And that aggression isn’t just a long way away, in places like the South China Sea and around Taiwan. It’s close to home given China’s growing presence in the South Pacific and the implications of the security deal Solomon Islands Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare has made with Beijing. Unravelling that agreement will be another major challenge for the incoming minister and their counterpart in foreign affairs. It’s a time to gather strength with friends and allies, as in Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s priority dash to the Quad meeting in Tokyo.
Like militaries all over the world, the ADF is watching closely the lessons from Ukraine, right down to footage of model aircraft enthusiasts dropping grenades from small commercial drones and of the Moskva, Russia’s Baltic Sea flagship burning and sinking.
Do the columns of wrecked and rusting hulks of Russian tanks signal the end of armoured vehicles as an effective force? Probably not. Armour was very badly handled by the Russians despite the Ukrainians being badly outnumbered. It needs to be used as part of a system including infantry, artillery and air support, which the Kremlin did not provide, but armour’s vulnerabilities to cheap weapons are undeniable.
The new government will need a comprehensive early briefing from the ADF on all the complex detail of the AUKUS agreement with the US and UK and plans to help Australia obtain eight nuclear-powered submarines.
The navy has said it will ensure the project embraces such high safety standards that it will set a rigorous new benchmark under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, or NPT.
The reactors on both US and UK nuclear-powered submarines use highly enriched, or ‘weapons grade’, uranium that does not need to be replaced for the boat’s 30-year life. Such fuel could be used to make nuclear bombs.
Other nations, including France, use low-enriched uranium in their submarine reactors but they need to be refuelled several times through the life of the submarine. That uranium is not suitable for bombs, but the refuelling process is a complex one that would probably require ongoing help from the provider country.
The submarine enterprise is as massive as it is ambitious.
It is likely to see Australia obtaining an advanced new boat, still being designed, from either the US or the UK.
In the meantime, Australians will find themselves crewing US or UK submarines to gain experience and professional skills.
When its AUKUS allies are satisfied that Australia can meet the highest nuclear-safeguard standards, the RAN may eventually ‘borrow’ a nuclear-powered boat from one of them.
But AUKUS is about much more than submarines.
As defence minister, Peter Dutton chose the big US companies, Raytheon and Lockheed Martin, as industry partners for missile production. The new government must push these companies to start production in Australia by 2025, not allow them to slow-roll things over a decade. And it would be wise to bring in some faster-moving competition through companies like Norway’s Kongsberg and Israeli-Australian partnership Varley Rafael, which would each get production of missiles the ADF have chosen started fast and push our American friends to also get moving quickly.
The new government can push the navy to do what it should have done all along and arm the only new ships Australia is getting into the fleet before 2035, the Arafura-class offshore patrol vessels. These warships are more relevant than ever given the Chinese navy’s push into our near region.
Labor can focus where it traditionally likes to in defence, on local industry. Medium and small Australian firms can provide the military with technologies from artificial intelligence capabilities, cyber systems and armed and unarmed small drones. They can get these new technologies into the hands of our military to use and adapt much faster if they aren’t forced to navigate the labyrinth that is the Defence bureaucracy and procurement system.
It will take a strong prime minister and determined defence minister to break through this internal process logjam, but that can be a satisfying role for a new minister—and it’s one our security environment demands. The MQ-28A Ghost Bat drone also known as the loyal wingman and the investment in large unmanned undersea vessels announced by Dutton during the election campaign are tantalising glimmers of what’s possible.
Delivering new capability to the Australian military over this decade—not just in the mid-2030s—will show taxpayers they are getting something for the billions going into Defence in economically challenging times. And, with Australia’s powerful partners in Washington, Tokyo, Delhi and Seoul, it’ll help deter Beijing from thinking conflict is a quick way to achieve its goals. The Chinese military does respect countervailing military power. So, how novel and fortunate for an Australian defence minister to have the prospect of starting projects and seeing them deliver results to our military while they are still in the job.
While Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has demonstrated that nothing short of a courageous armed defence can stop a violent and autocratic aggressor, war can also be an unnecessary consequence when diplomacy and armed deterrence fail.
But diplomacy remains a crucial first element and a stronger and better resourced Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade is a strategic imperative. The vastly experienced and capable Penny Wong will be influential in cabinet to make that happen. Tone may help, but policy substance still needs to deal with structural realities.
The new government also needs to free up and encourage the ADF to play a much greater role in informing the public about the strategic threats posed by climate change with the strong possibility of competition for resources such as food and water and the likelihood of mass international people movements from areas that become inundated or otherwise uninhabitable. That’s the practical, security side to the new government’s climate agenda.
Difficult decisions which will shape the ADF for decades need to be made soon on armoured vehicles and the future of special forces.
On integrity and accountability, the new government gets the chance to deliver what the overwhelming majority of Australia’s serving military personnel want—accountability for any among them who are proven to have committed unlawful killings in Afghanistan as well as changes to the command chain and the way allegations of misconduct on operations are investigated and handled in the future.
A previous defence minister, Linda Reynolds, undertook to inform the Australian public, through statements to parliament, about the implementation of the Brereton inquiry’s forensic investigation and recommendations. That has not happened. Now those processes can be pursued more publicly with the full backing of the new government, both through the Office of the Special Investigator outside Defence, and through Defence’s internal disciplinary and administrative systems.
This will align Defence with steps to increase integrity and government transparency that look like being a key part of the new parliamentary program of Labor and the independents.
It’ll be symbolic here to have the new defence minister do what Brereton recommended and give periodic statements in parliament updating on progress with implementation and change.
So, inheriting bipartisan structural policy settings and a growing defence budget is a foundation. The next three years, though, will be busy time of delivery and decision for Albanese and his national security committee colleagues.
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