A Closer Look At The Sixth Seal (Revelation 6:12)

Andrew the Prophet, andrewtheprophet, Earthquake, indian point, new jersey, New York, Nuclear, nyc, revelation 6, Sixth Seal

A Look at the Tri-State’s Active Fault Line

Monday, March 14, 2011

By Bob Hennelly

The Ramapo Fault is the longest fault in the Northeast that occasionally makes local headlines when minor tremors cause rock the Tri-State region. It begins in Pennsylvania, crosses the Delaware River and continues through Hunterdon, Somerset, Morris, Passaic and Bergen counties before crossing the Hudson River near Indian Point nuclear facility.

In the past, it has generated occasional activity that generated a 2.6 magnitude quake in New Jersey’s Peakpack/Gladstone area and 3.0 magnitude quake in Mendham.

But the New Jersey-New York region is relatively seismically stable according to Dr. Dave Robinson, Professor of Geography at Rutgers.Although it does have activity.

“There is occasional seismic activity in New Jersey,” said Robinson. “There have been a few quakes locally that have been felt and done a little bit of damage over the time since colonial settlement — some chimneys knocked down in Manhattan with a quake back in the 18th century, but nothing of a significant magnitude.”

Robinson said the Ramapo has on occasion registered a measurable quake but has not caused damage:“The Ramapo fault is associated with geological activities back 200 million years ago, but it’s still a little creaky now and again,”he said.

“More recently, in the 1970s and early 1980s, earthquake risk along the Ramapo Fault received attention because of its proximity to Indian Point,” according to the New Jersey Geological Survey website.

Historically, critics of the Indian Point Nuclear facility in Westchester County, New York, did cite its proximity to the Ramapo fault line as a significant risk.

In 1884, according to the New Jersey Geological Survey website, the  Rampao Fault was blamed for a 5.5 quake that toppled chimneys in New York City and New Jersey that was felt from Maine to Virginia.

“Subsequent investigations have shown the 1884 Earthquake epicenter was actually located in Brooklyn, New York, at least 25 miles from the Ramapo Fault,” according to the New Jersey Geological Survey website.

The wind of God’s wrath starts lashing Gulf Coast (Jeremiah 23)

Hurricane Sally starts lashing Gulf Coast as it churns at sluggish pace



Hurricane Sally is moving toward the Gulf Coast, threatening to bring possible historic flooding and “extreme life-threatening” flash flooding, according to forecasters. The eye of the storm is expected to pass near the coast of southeastern Louisiana on Tuesday before making landfall Tuesday night or Wednesday morning in the hurricane warning area, which stretches from east of Bay St. Louis – a city in Mississippi – to Navarre, Florida.

As of Tuesday morning, the storm was located about 55 miles east of the mouth of the Mississippi River and about 110 miles south of Mobile, Alabama. Maximum sustained winds were 85 mph, with stronger gusts. It was moving northwest at 2 mph.

Hurricane Sally churns in the Gulf of Mexico in this satellite image released by NOAA, September 15, 2020.


The sole purpose for nuclear weapons is about to be lost: Revelation 16

Nuclear Weapons: It’s Time for Sole Purpose | The National Interest

The “sole purpose” of U.S. nuclear weapons should be to deter and—if necessary, retaliate against—a nuclear attack. This would mark a significant change in U.S. nuclear policy, eliminating ambiguity that preserves the option to use nuclear weapons first in response to a conventional attack.

The Democratic Party platform states that Democrats believe that the “sole purpose” of U.S. nuclear weapons should be to deter and—if necessary, retaliate against—a nuclear attack. Presidential candidate Joe Biden has said the same. The sole purpose would mark a significant change in U.S. nuclear policy, eliminating ambiguity that preserves the option to use nuclear weapons first in response to a conventional attack. Adopting the sole purpose is a sensible step that would foreclose an option that no president has ever chosen . . . or ever would. 

Extreme Circumstances 

The U.S. government has long taken the position that it would use nuclear weapons only in “extreme circumstances” in which the vital interests of the United States, its allies or partners were at stake. That formulation leaves ambiguity as to whether an American president might in some cases decide to use nuclear weapons first. Indeed, it explicitly preserves that possibility.

When the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact held large numerical advantages in conventional military forces during the Cold War, U.S. and NATO officials maintained an explicit option for deliberate escalation to nuclear weapons in the event of a conflict where they were losing at the conventional level. That might have contributed to the deterrence of a conventional conflict, but such escalation would have entailed enormous risks: once the nuclear threshold was crossed, where would matters stop? Many analysts question the ability to control escalation once nuclear weapons enter into use. As reported by Fred Kaplan in The Bomb, in 2017, Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis asked a group of senior Pentagon officials if they believed that nuclear war could be controlled; only one thought that it was possible. 

The Obama administration’s 2010 nuclear posture review sought to reduce the number and role of nuclear weapons in U.S. policy. The document stated that “the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT [Non-Proliferation Treaty] and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations.” If such a non-nuclear weapons state attacked America or an American ally or partner with conventional, chemical or biological weapons, this negative security assurance meant that the U.S. military response would not be nuclear. (The review did contain a footnote to the effect that developments in biological weapons might lead Washington to revisit the negative security assurance.)

The 2010 nuclear posture review also stated that the United States would resort to nuclear weapons only in extreme circumstances and that the “fundamental purpose” of U.S. nuclear arms was to deter a nuclear attack on America, its allies or its partners. That language left open the possibility of a nuclear response to a conventional attack by a nuclear weapons state or another country not covered by the negative security assurance. The review added that the United States would “continue to strengthen its conventional capabilities and reduce the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks” with the goal of making deterring nuclear attacks the sole purpose of the U.S. nuclear arsenal.

The Trump administration’s 2018 nuclear posture review reflected continuity with its predecessor in some ways but diverged in others. Instead of reducing the role of nuclear weapons and rejecting new nuclear weapons, the 2018 review called for new “supplemental” nuclear capabilities: a low-yield submarine-launched ballistic missile warhead and low-yield warhead for a sea-launched cruise missile. While reiterating that the United States would use nuclear weapons only in extreme circumstances, the review said that those circumstances included “significant non-nuclear strategic attacks” on U.S., allied and partner civilian populations, U.S. and allied nuclear forces, nuclear command and control systems, or warning and attack assessment capabilities. Many observers believed that the language broadened the circumstances for nuclear use, at least compared to Obama administration policy, particularly given President Donald Trump’s threats, some veiled and others more explicit, to use nuclear weapons. 

The Trump administration’s nuclear posture review did restate the Obama administration’s negative security assurance, though its version reserved an unnecessarily broader right to reconsider the assurance. (The Obama administration’s footnote, which focused solely on developments in the biological weapons field, is more appropriate.) 

Nuke a Nuclear Weapons State? 

The Obama/Trump negative security assurance covers 95 percent of the nations in the world. The possibility of the United States using nuclear weapons relates to just a handful of countries: nuclear weapons states and countries which Washington judges not to be in full compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations (only Iran and Syria are thought of in this context). The countries of greatest relevance boil down to Russia, China and North Korea. 

Of the two major potential adversaries, China has long had a declared policy of no first use of nuclear arms, though some question whether Beijing would abide by this declaration in all scenarios. Russian declaratory policy states that Russia would resort to nuclear weapons only if nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction were used against Russia or a Russian ally, or if there were a conventional attack on Russia that put the existence of the state at stake. 

What scenarios might lead to U.S. consideration of nuclear first use? One could be a conventional NATO-Russia conflict in the Baltic region in which the Russian military attains or is on the verge of attaining victory given its regional advantages. NATO overall has more powerful conventional forces, but marshaling them would take time. In this scenario, would an American president really decide to launch a nuclear attack on Russian forces on a NATO member’s territory or Russia itself? He or she would have to weigh the high probability of nuclear retaliation, including against the U.S. homeland. The president almost certainly would set aside the nuclear option, opting for time to build up American and NATO conventional forces for a counter-offensive.

Another scenario could involve a conflict with China in which the Chinese military, using its large arsenal of conventionally-armed ballistic missiles, pushes back U.S. naval and air forces. How successful a Chinese offensive might be given the spectrum of U.S. conventional capabilities, perhaps augmented by those of U.S. allies, is unclear. However, going nuclear would mean striking China directly. Again, the president would have to consider the very real prospect that Beijing would respond with a nuclear attack against American military bases in the Pacific, such as Guam, or against the United States. Again, he or she almost certainly would look for conventional options, even if they would take time. 

The Trump administration’s nuclear posture review raised another scenario: a significant non-nuclear strategic attack. Say that Russia launched a cyber strike on the U.S. electric power network, bringing down most of the grid from Boston to Washington, DC. That could prove a calamity, but would a U.S. president conclude that using nuclear weapons against the attacker, and then absorbing a nuclear counter-attack, would improve the situation? No, he or she almost certainly would order conventional and cyber counter-strikes, especially if there was the slightest doubt about correctly attributing the attack—a real question in the murky cyber world. 

As for North Korea, if struck first by U.S. nuclear weapons in a conflict, is there any doubt that Kim Jong-un would strike back with his nuclear arms? 

Escalating a conflict by introducing the use of nuclear arms is a scary, if not terrifying, proposition. It entails opening a Pandora’s box of unpredictable and potentially catastrophic consequences—especially when U.S. nuclear weapons would be used against a country that could strike back with its own nuclear arms. 

A Declaratory Policy That Lacks Credibility 

Those opposed to the sole purpose argue that the current ambiguity about U.S. readiness to use nuclear weapons first contributes to the deterrence of adversaries and the assurance of allies. That is a serious argument, but it made far more sense during the Cold War when the choice that might confront U.S. and NATO leaders was to use nuclear weapons or lose the war. Maintaining that ambiguity carries risks. Given the prospect of nuclear escalation once any nuclear weapons are used, and the changes in conventional force balances over the past thirty years, the chance that an American president would choose to use nuclear weapons first is vanishingly small. In virtually every conceivable scenario, he or she would look for other options, since the likely nuclear retaliation for a first-use effort by the United States would inevitably turn a bad situation into something much worse. 

Does it make sense to continue a declaratory policy aimed at deterring adversaries and assuring allies and partners that, on serious examination, neither foes nor friends would find credible? As America’s allies and partners see the U.S. threat to use nuclear weapons first lacking credibility, that could undermine their confidence in the U.S. threat to use nuclear weapons in response to a nuclear attack on them. 

Eliminating the ambiguity by adopting the sole purpose might not provide a huge security bonus, but it would have a positive security impact. Russia likely would not follow, at least not in the near term. However, the change could help defuse the current situation, in which both Washington and Moscow believe that the other seeks to lower the nuclear threshold and thus is adjusting its own nuclear policy accordingly. It is not in the U.S. interest that the Russians believe America might go nuclear first and develop (or further develop) a posture to beat Washington to the nuclear punch. That fosters conditions that could be very dangerous in a conventional crisis or conflict and make nuclear use more likely.

Adopting the sole purpose would send an interesting signal to China. Some analysts question whether Beijing will continue to adhere to a no first use policy, but the Pentagon reports that “China almost certainly keeps the majority of its nuclear force on a peacetime status—with separated launchers, missiles, and warheads,” a posture consistent with that policy. Adoption of the sole purpose could open the path to a strategic security dialogue with Beijing that has eluded Washington for years. It would raise the political costs to China of abandoning its no first use posture. A change in American policy might even help avoid the development of a U.S.-China nuclear standoff somewhat similar to that between Washington and Moscow during the Cold War. 

The adoption of a sole-purpose policy would reduce the ability of a U.S. president to use nuclear weapons for saber-rattling. But giving up the option to rattle a saber that the adversary believes Washington would never draw seems to give up little.

A Nuclear Taboo?

It has been seventy-five years since the United States dropped two atomic bombs on Japan at the conclusion of World War II. Since then, neither America nor any other country has used nuclear arms in anger. Some suggest a taboo against nuclear use has developed. 

The taboo is informal, not fixed by international agreement. It would benefit U.S. and allied security were non-use of nuclear weapons to become a widely accepted and entrenched international norm. The United States has powerful conventional forces, favorable geography and the world’s largest network of allies, so reducing the possibility of nuclear use seems very much in the U.S. interest, reducing one of the few existential threats to America’s existence. Sole purpose would help bolster that norm.

Adopting sole purpose would mark a significant change in U.S. policy. Washington should do so only after consulting with NATO and key allies in the Pacific region. Importantly, the sole purpose would not close the U.S. nuclear umbrella; it would mean that U.S. nuclear weapons would be used in an ally’s defense only after the other side had gone nuclear. Unlike nuclear first use, the threat of nuclear retaliation after a nuclear attack is credible. 

The next U.S. nuclear posture review should, following such consultations, adopt sole purpose as the reason for U.S. nuclear weapons. That would change a dynamic that now has possible adversaries designing potentially dangerous policies and postures in a belief that the United States is lowering its threshold for use of nuclear weapons and could go nuclear first. It would boost the establishment of an international norm against any nuclear weapons use. It could help make Americans safer. And the only cost: abandoning an option that an American president would never use and whose threat has little credibility.

Steven Pifer is a William Perry Research Fellow at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation and a retired U.S. Foreign Service officer.

Image: Reuters

Trump needs to watch what he asks for: Revelation 18:10

Trump says US will retaliate with attacks ‘1000 times greater’ if Iran planned vengeance

Trump threatened Iranian leader Rouhani about report of vengeance, saying, that any attack by Iran in any form will be dealt with attacks of tenfold intensity.

On September 14, the US President Donald Trump vowed that the United States would retaliate with attacks “1000 times greater” in magnitude if Iran planned vengeance for the killing of its top general Qasem Soleimani in January 2020. Taking to his official Twitter handle, Trump threatened Iranian leader Hassan Rouhani, saying, that any attack by Iran in any form will be dealt with attacks of tenfold intensity. Trump’s threats came in the backdrop of the reports of an alleged Iranian plot to assassinate the US ambassador to South Africa, Lana Marks.

Earlier, Iran’s President had warned the US of the consequences of Soleimani’s death, saying, that the Americans weren’t aware of the disaster that they had made. Further, he stated, that the Americans will pay the price for this act, not today, but in time to come. Moreover, Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei had threatened the US of “harsh revenge waiting” and had observed a 3-day of national mourning after an airstrike ordered by US President Trump assassinated the senior commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, who, he called, an international “face of resistance.” The killing of Iran’s elite Quds Force leader had also since exacerbated tensions between Iran and the US, as only last month, Iran reminded the US that “it isn’t over yet” in state-run media reports.

Read: Saudi Coalition Launches Airstrikes On Iran Backed Houthi Barracks And Military Sites

Read: Pro-reform Iranian Religious Leader Dies Aged 83

According to a report by the Washington based news broadcaster Politico, Iran was considering assassination attempts on the US ambassador to avenge the killing of Soleimani. The report cited US government officials saying, on condition of anonymity, that the Iranian embassy in the South African city of Pretoria was involved in a plot to assassinate the US ambassador to South Africa. It said that the intelligence about the vengeance for the Iranian military commander’s death “became more specific in recent weeks”. The officials revealed that Marks has been made aware of the threat. According to Politico’s report, while the American intelligence community wasn’t sure about why the Iranian leader would target Marks, they speculated her ties with Trump’s family for over 23 years as the reason.

[Revolutionary Guard Gen. Qassem Soleimani, center, attends an annual rally commemorating the anniversary of the 1979 Islamic revolution, in Tehran, Iran. Credit: AP]

Key figure to Iranian regime

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards (IRGC)’s elite Quds Force leader Qassem Soleimani was killed on January 3, 2020, after an airstrike at Baghdad International Airport was instructed by Trump. A key figure to the Iranian regime and an integral driver of Iran’s foreign policy strategy known for the creation of the proxy networks from Lebanon to Iraq to Yemen all across the Middle East, Soleimani was an important leader to Iran. US President Donald Trump, however, called  Soleimani a “monster” and accused him of “planning a big attack” immediately after he was killed by a US drone strike.

“He was a monster. And he’s no longer a monster. He’s dead,” Trump said in an AP report, adding, “he was planning a big attack and bad attack for the US”. “I don’t think anyone can complain about it,” Trump said.

Trump accused Soleimani of “travelling with the head of Hezbollah” and killing many. In a statement published by the state-run Iranian Fars news agency, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said that “cruelest people on earth (Trump)” assassinated the “honourable” Iranian commander who “courageously fought against evils and bandits of the world.”

Panic and fear outside the Temple Walls: Revelation 11

Panic and fear in Gaza

Majed Abusalama

For my family, and for the people of Gaza, August has been horrific. Israel bombed the Stri on an almost daily basis, making us feel like we were stuck at the epicentre of a never-ending earthquake. The explosions, at times barely a kilometre from our home, were so loud, my two-year-old niece could not sleep at night. Every time she heard a loud bang she quickly gathered her toys around her, as if to protect them from Israel’s bombs.

Last month was indeed horrific, but it was not extraordinary in any way. Israel’s soldiers, warplanes, drones and gunships have been harassing, intimidating, and killing the people of Gaza regularly, and with impunity, for decades. Israel’s attacks are part of the daily routine in Gaza. To be able to survive, and to lead something that resembles a normal life, us Gazans have no choice but to accept as normal the violence being inflicted on us.

Growing up in Gaza, I always felt a sense of emergency. My family was always prepared for the worst, because the worst could knock on our door at any time, as it did during the attacks on Gaza in 2008, 2009, 2012 and 2014. As a child, I knew that living in fear every single day was not normal. In my heart, I rejected the normalisation of everyday horrors, because I did not want to lose touch with my humanity. Yet I eventually had to come to terms with the situation I was born into and my surroundings.

Now, my niece and thousands of other children living under Israeli siege in Gaza, are growing up with the same fears and the same sense of constant emergency. As they try to sleep through the sounds of bombs, and protect their toys from the horrors that are just outside the door, they are being forced to accept as normal a violent reality that no child should ever even witness.

In recent years, there has barely been a day in which Israel did not bomb, shoot into, or physically invade what is not only one of the most densely populated areas on the planet, but also a place which has been besieged for more than 13 years, with major shortages of the basics required for normal human life.

Israel’s colonial infrastructure controls the sky above us and the land and sea around us, and is even capable of penetrating into our most intimate spaces to show us its power. In Gaza, wherever you look, you see tools of oppression, occupation and urban warfare – border fences, separation walls, armoured trucks, warplanes and checkpoints shape the landscape we live in. Even when you are at home, the whirring sound of military drones remind you that you are imprisoned, and you can be attacked at any moment. I believe Israel makes a conscious effort to constantly remind Gaza Palestinians of its presence.

By making its occupation so visible, and the power it has over us so obvious, it is sending us a message: We will never allow you to be normal people, and live normal lives. To Israel, Gaza is not a place where two million men, women, and children call home, but an ‘enemy entity’.

Excerpted from: ‘When will the world stopignoring what ishappening in Gaza?’


The Iranian nuclear horn continues to grow Daniel 8/4

Iran uranium stockpile more than 10 times limit set in 2015 deal: IAEA

TEHRAN, Oct. 14, 2019 (Xinhua) — Iranian President Hassan Rouhani waves after a press conference in Tehran, Iran, on Oct. 14, 2019. Iranian President Hassan Rouhani said on Monday that his country does not endorse Turkey’s approach to the current issues in northern Syria. (Photo by Ahmad Halabisaz/Xinhua/IANS)

VIENNA (RAHNUMA): The UN’s nuclear watchdog said Friday that Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium now stands at more than ten times the limit set down in the 2015 nuclear deal with world powers.

The limit was set at 300 kilogrammes (661 pounds) of enriched uranium in a particular compound form, which is the equivalent of 202.8 kg of uranium.

Measured against the latter figure, Iran’s stockpile now stands at over 2,105 kg, the report said.

Meanwhile, the watchdog also said that Iran had granted its inspectors access to one of two sites where undeclared nuclear activity may have taken place in the early 2000s.

“Iran provided Agency inspectors access to the location to take environmental samples,” an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report seen by AFP said.

“The samples will be analysed by laboratories that are part of the Agency’s network,” it added.

An inspection at the second site will take place “later in September 2020 on a date already agreed with Iran,” the report said.

Iran announced last week it would allow the IAEA access to the two sites, following a visit to Tehran by IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi.

Iran had denied the agency access earlier this year, prompting the IAEA’s board of governors to pass a resolution in June urging Iran to comply with its requests.

Death of Kashmir girl adds more fuel to the nuclear fire: Revelation 8

Pakistan summons Indian envoy over killing of girl near Kashmir border

Indian security personnel stand guard near the site of a gunfight in a village in the Kawoosa area of central Kashmir’s Budgam district, some 20 kilometers from Srinagar, the summer capital of Indian Kashmir, Sept. 7, 2020. (EPA Photo)

by Anadolu Agency

Sep 15, 2020 12:12 am

Pakistan on Monday summoned a senior Indian diplomat and lodged a protest over “unprovoked” firing along the border of the disputed Kashmir region, which, it claimed, killed a young girl.

“A senior Indian diplomat was summoned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs today to register Pakistan’s strong protest over ceasefire violations by the Indian occupation forces along the Line of Control (LoC) on the night of 13th September 2020,” the Foreign Ministry said in a statement.

The LoC is a de facto border that divides the disputed Himalayan valley between the two nuclear rivals.

Earlier, Pakistan’s army said an 11-year-old girl was killed and four others, including a 75-year-old woman and two young boys, were injured in the firing in Hotspring and Rakhchikri Sectors.

Islamabad claims that New Delhi has committed at least 2,245 cease-fire violations in 2020 so far, which have “martyred” 18 and injured 180 other innocent civilians.

An Indian army spokesman, on the contrary, accused Pakistan of violating the cease-fire at the LoC in Poonch district.

“#Pak initiated unprovoked #CeasefireViolation along #LoC by small arms firing & shelling with #Mortars in #Mankote sector, Distt Poonch(J&K). #IndianArmy retaliates befittingly,” PRO Defence Jammu tweeted late Sunday.

The Indian Defense Ministry said Pakistan’s army committed over 3,000 cease-fire violations this year.

“There have been 3,186 incidents of Ceasefire Violations along Line of Control in Jammu region in this year (from 01 January to 07 September, 2020),” it said in a written reply to a query in Parliament.

“In addition, 242 incidents of cross-border firing have occurred along Indo-Pak International Border in Jammu region in this year (01 January to 31 August, 2020) … appropriate retaliation to the ceasefire violations, as required, has been carried out by Indian Army/BSF (Border Security Force),” it said.

Recent tensions between the South Asian neighbors mounted following New Delhi’s unilateral decision to revoke the decadeslong special status of the Muslim-majority disputed valley.

On Aug. 5, 2019, the Indian government revoked Article 370 and other related provisions from its Constitution, scrapping the state with its autonomy. The region was also split into two federally administered territories.

Simultaneously, India locked down the region, detained thousands of residents, imposed restrictions on movement and enforced a communications blackout.

Measures have been eased, but internet speeds are still restricted. People are also confined indoors now because of the coronavirus.

A two-day-long curfew was reimposed on Aug. 5, 2020, as Kashmiris marked the annexation anniversary as “black day.”

Pakistan has unveiled a new political map, which identifies Indian-administered Kashmir as a disputed territory and states that a decision on its final status will be decided under United Nations resolutions.