History Expects the Sixth Seal in NYC (Revelation 6:12)

If the past is any indication, New York can be hit by an earthquake, claims John Armbruster, a seismologist at Columbia University’s Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory.

Based on historical precedent, Armbruster says the New York City metro area is susceptible to an earthquake of at least a magnitude of 5.0 once a century.

According to the New York Daily News, Lynn Skyes, lead author of a recent study by seismologists at the Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory adds that a magnitude-6 quake hits the area about every 670 years, and magnitude-7 every 3,400 years.

A 5.2-magnitude quake shook New York City in 1737 and another of the same severity hit in 1884.

Tremors were felt from Maine to Virginia.

There are several fault lines in the metro area, including one along Manhattan’s 125th St. – which may have generated two small tremors in 1981 and may have been the source of the major 1737 earthquake, says Armbruster.

There’s another fault line on Dyckman St. and one in Dobbs Ferry in nearby Westchester County.

“The problem here comes from many subtle faults,” explained Skyes after the study was published.

He adds: “We now see there is earthquake activity on them. Each one is small, but when you add them up, they are probably more dangerous than we thought.”

“Considering population density and the condition of the region’s infrastructure and building stock, it is clear that even a moderate earthquake would have considerable consequences in terms of public safety and economic impact,” says the New York City Area Consortium for Earthquake Loss Mitigation on its website.

Armbruster says a 5.0-magnitude earthquake today likely would result in casualties and hundreds of millions of dollars in damage.

“I would expect some people to be killed,” he notes.

The scope and scale of damage would multiply exponentially with each additional tick on the Richter scale. (ANI)

The Russian Horn Separates from Pakistan

Won’t supply arms to Pakistan: Russia

In Moscow, Rajnath Singh and his counterpart discuss the making of AK203 rifle

In Moscow, Rajnath Singh and his counterpart discuss the making of AK203 rifle

Tribune News Service

New Delhi, September 3

Russia has assured India that it will not supply arms to Pakistan during an India-Russia meeting in Moscow on Thursday evening.

In the past, Russia supplied half a dozen helicopters to Pakistan that was objected by India and the supplies were suspended. Russia is the largest supplier of weapons and equipment to India, including the lease of a classified nuclear submarine.

Moscow also assured that it stands by New Delhi’s security interests at a wider level.

The discussions were part of an hour-long meeting the Indian delegation led by Rajnath Singh had with the Russian delegation led by Defence Minister Gen Sergey Shoigu.

The two sides also discussed the making of a new type of rifle, the AK203, in India. Both sides said the discussions were at an advanced stage for the establishment of an India-Russian joint venture for the production of the rifle, which is considered one of the most modern weapons available for infantry forces.

Besides, the two countries started a vital two-day “Indra” naval exercise to be conducted off the Straits of Malacca on September 4 and 5. At the meeting, Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh noted “these exercises demonstrated the common interests of both countries in maritime security in the Indian Ocean Region”.

The Indian delegation comprised Defence Secretary Dr Ajay Kumar and other senior officials. Singh will also attend a meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation here on Friday.

The Impending Saudi Nuclear Horn (Daniel 7)

Secret Sites in the Desert: The Dangers of Saudi Arabia’s Nuclear Hedging

The kingdom of Saudi Arabia is building two clandestine facilities with Chinese assistance, which Western intelligence agencies suspect may have nuclear applications. The secretive construction of these sites raises questions about Riyadh’s nuclear intentions, as well as concerns about Beijing’s role in supplying sensitive nuclear technology abroad.

The two facilities may be part of a Saudi attempt to develop fuel cycle capabilities, which in turn would enable the kingdom to enrich uranium domestically. Enrichment could give the Saudis the option to produce nuclear weapons, if paired later with nuclear weaponization efforts and a missile delivery system.

Saudi Arabia’s incremental nuclear advances run counter to U.S. interests in the Middle East, particularly regarding Washington’s efforts to cease Iran’s uranium enrichment program and verifiably end Tehran’s work on nuclear weapons. Were Saudi Arabia able to enrich uranium, Iran would be less likely to agree to future restrictions on its own nuclear program. Saudi enrichment could also beget a cascade of regional proliferation, with countries seeing value in procuring nuclear know-how or material to offset gains made by Tehran or Riyadh.

Obscure Nuclear Sites and Activities

The Wall Street Journal and the New York Times broke stories on August 4 and 5, about the two suspicious Saudi sites. A U.S. intelligence report leaked to the media appears to be their main source of information.

The Wall Street Journal report alleges that one facility is for the production of uranium ore concentrate. The plant is located in a remote desert near the Saudi city of al-Ula. Chemical refinement of natural uranium ore, a raw material mined from the earth produces uranium ore concentrate (U3O8), also known as yellowcake. This refinement is an early step in the nuclear fuel cycle.

The second site, described by the New York Times, is also located in an isolated area, near the town of al-Uyaynah. According to the Washington, DC-based Institute for Science and International Security, which was cited in the New York Times report, the facility appears to have signatures of a uranium conversion plant.

If Saudi technicians produced uranium ore concentrate at the first site, then they could send the material to the second site to undergo chemical processing for conversion to uranium hexafluoride (UF6). Such natural UF6, which can be used to fabricate fuel for reactors, is also a prerequisite for enrichment—the process that can be used either to purify uranium to levels needed for certain reactors or to create fissile material for nuclear weapons.

Saudi Arabia has no operating reactors, but in the past made plans to construct more than a dozen. At least two will be large-scale units for electricity generation. If Riyadh successfully carries out such plans and inaugurates reactors requiring enriched uranium fuel, then it still would not require domestic uranium enrichment. Enriched uranium is widely available on the international market at a low cost.

The kingdom is not currently known to be working with foreign partners to develop gas centrifuges, the most common means of enriching uranium. Nor have the Saudis disclosed concrete plans for enrichment. However, in 2010, the Lebanon-based Daily Star reported that a Finnish consultancy, on behalf of the Saudis, investigated the feasibility of Riyadh developing enrichment under a “national vision and high-level strategy in the area of nuclear and renewable energy.”

China could theoretically supply Saudi Arabia with uranium enrichment technology. Riyadh is also suspected of having bankrolled Pakistan’s nuclear weapons development and could seek technical expertise or supplies from Islamabad.

If the kingdom sought nuclear weapons, absent significant turn-key assistance, it would still require work on learning to weaponize the fissile material and assemble it in a nuclear device, and then mounting it on a delivery vehicle such as a ballistic missile. Coincidentally, Saudi Arabia twice purchased surface-to-surface missiles from Beijing, once in the late 1980s, and again in the mid-2000s.

In 2014, the Saudis publicly paraded the initial batch of missiles, likely sending a message about its concerns over nuclear diplomacy between Iran and America. Moreover, in 2019, multiple outlets revealed that Saudi Arabia was receiving assistance from China to grow its missile capabilities, assistance which could include technology used in an alleged ballistic missile production facility.

Matching Iran

With its clandestine facilities, Saudi Arabia is likely hedging against a future nuclear weapons-equipped Iran. In 2018, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman stated that Saudi Arabia would emulate its regional rival if it developed nuclear weapons. Thus, it is probable that the Saudis are gradually laying the technical infrastructure to match Iran’s advanced fuel cycle capabilities.

Saudi Arabia’s official rationales for nuclear power are entirely civil in nature, yet questionable given the existence of vast domestic oil supplies. Riyadh states that it seeks to diversify energy sources, conserve oil, and desalinize seawater.

The kingdom has inked nuclear-related agreements or memoranda of understandings with multiple countries that cover everything from reactor purchases to nuclear waste management, radioisotope production to development of national nuclear regulatory legislation, and consultancy assistance. Potential and current partners include France, Argentina, China, South Korea, Hungary, Finland, Russia, Kazakhstan, Jordan, the Czech Republic, Great Britain, and even the United States.

Domestic nuclear power is also part of the kingdom’s widely advertised “Vision 2030” program. For example, in 2017, the nation’s atomic energy establishment, King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy, highlighted three important components of the country’s nuclear program: development of the nuclear fuel cycle; construction of large nuclear power plants; and building of Small Modular Reactors, involving both “joint IP ownership with [South] Korea on SMART technology” for a three-year period and a “long-term strategic partnership with China” related to High-Temperature Gas Reactors.

In April 2019, Bloomberg News published satellite images showing that the Saudis were nearing completion of a small, thirty kilowatt-thermal power research reactor, built with the assistance of an Argentinian company, INVAP. The reactor would not generate electricity but would be used to study scientific applications of nuclear energy. Saudi Arabia denied that the facility would be misused for proliferation purposes.

As noted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the global nuclear proliferation watchdog, Argentina will not be able to supply the reactor with fuel until the kingdom concludes comprehensive safeguards and subsidiary arrangements with the IAEA and submits the facility to inspections. The reactor unit would not be of concern for the production of plutonium, since it would produce only small quantities annually.

The negotiation of the Iran nuclear deal—the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—in 2015 was widely perceived in the region, including by Riyadh, as abandoning precedent set by previous UN resolutions that demanded a halt to Iran’s uranium enrichment program. The JCPOA provided temporary constraints on Iran’s enrichment capabilities while permitting their medium-term expansion, and ultimately, international legitimization of the program. In 2014, former intelligence chief Prince Turki bin Faisal al-Saud publicly stated that the Saudis would want enrichment if a nuclear deal were to acquiesce to the continuation of Iran’s enrichment program.

Weak Safeguards

Saudi Arabia does not yet have adequate safeguards in place to ensure the peaceful use of nuclear material and peaceful nature of nuclear activities on its territory. The absence of such safeguards, despite the reports about the existence of new and significant nuclear activities, is a worrying sign that Riyadh intends to obscure the nature of its nuclear activities for as long as possible.

Saudi Arabia has ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and as such, Riyadh is required to have a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) with the IAEA. In 2005, the Saudis concluded a CSA, but also an IAEA agreement called a “Small Quantities Protocol,” or SQP. An SQP holds in abeyance several vital provisions of the CSA. According to the IAEA, SQPs are typically implemented by countries with “minimal or no nuclear material and no nuclear material in a ‘facility.’”

There are immediate issues with the Saudi approach to safeguards. The version of the SQP signed by Riyadh is outdated and pauses implementation of many more provisions of the CSA than does a revised SQP, such as notifying the IAEA as soon as a decision is made to build a nuclear facility and enabling it to carry out initial verification activities that would permit a deeper understanding of a country’s plans. Ideally, Riyadh should already have its CSA in force to adequately safeguard the newly-discovered facilities, the Argentinian reactor, and any other nuclear facility.

A trigger for the CSA will be if Saudi Arabia soon plans to inaugurate the Argentinian reactor. If the kingdom introduces or produces nuclear material on its territory, then it must bring into force the CSA and conclude subsidiary arrangements for all related facilities. It also must notify the IAEA six months before the introduction of nuclear material.

In addition, unlike its neighbor the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the United States has not been able to convince Saudi Arabia to conclude a “123 Agreement” with the United States for civil nuclear supply under which it forswears domestic uranium enrichment or reprocessing of plutonium—two key processes that can make fissile material for nuclear weapons. A forswearing of enrichment and reprocessing is known as the “gold standard” of non-proliferation agreements.

The Growing Chinese Nuclear Horn (Daniel 7)

China’s Growing Nuclear Weapons Arsenal: How Worried Should We Be?

China’s clear ambition to massively expand its nuclear arsenal is generating extreme concern among U.S. military leaders who recognize the pace at which new weapons are being added dramatically alters the global calculus, according to the Pentagon’s 2020 China Military Report.

“We do believe that over the next decade, that China is likely to at least double the size of its nuclear stockpile in the course of implementing the most rapid expansion and diversification of its nuclear arsenal in its history, China’s history,” Brad Sbragia, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for China, told reporters according to a Pentagon transcript. “An ability to double the stockpile demonstrates a move away from their historical minimum deterrence posture.”

The report specifies China’s fast increase in the number of warheads arming Beijing’s intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) capable of threatening America will likely grow to 200 in the next five years. As an element of this expansion, China is increasing its inventory of long-range land-fired DF-26 Anti-Ship missiles able to fire both conventional and nuclear missiles.

“Combined with a near-complete lack of transparency regarding their strategic intent and the perceived need for a much larger, more diverse nuclear force, these developments pose a significant concern for the United States,” the report explains.

Chilling Declassified Russian Footage of the Biggest Nuclear Bomb Blast of All Time

Arrow Left #1 Icon Created with Sketch.

Arrow right #1 Icon Created with Sketch.

The report also makes the point that China is solidifying a nuclear triad by developing nuclear-capable air-launched ballistic missiles and, according to the text of the report, “publicly revealed a modified bomber that would carry this missile.”

Meanwhile, all of this is taking place within the context of U.S. nuclear modernization which, among many things, includes the construction of 400 new ICBMs. However, many U.S. Air Force leaders believe the new Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) may not come soon enough, given the age and obsolescence issues associated with the decades-old Minuteman III ICBM. Interestingly, the Air Force is working aggressively to sustain its arsenal of Minuteman IIIs while concurrently developing GBSD. In fact, Air Force leaders often cite the high-number of ongoing Minuteman III modernization programs, adding that the service recently test-fired a Minuteman III as part of an effort to demonstrate nuclear readiness.

“A team of Air Force Global Strike Command Airmen launched an unarmed Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile equipped with a test reentry vehicle at 12:03 a.m. Pacific Time Sept. 2 from Vandenberg Air Force Base, Calif.,” an Air Force statement said.

Given all of these dynamics, the report makes the clear statement that the “United States believes it is time for China to participate in nuclear arms control. While China has praised agreements such as the New START and INF, it has also sought to avoid participating in the arms control itself.”

Kris Osborn is the defense editor for the National Interest. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Masters Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University.

Image: Reuters

Babylon the Great Confronts the Russian Horn

B-52 Bombers Fly Unprecedented Patrol Along Edge Of Russian-Controlled Territory In Ukraine (Updated)

American and British spy planes lurked in the Black Sea during the B-52’s highly unique visit to Ukrainian airspace.

By Tyler Rogoway

USAF / AirNav RadarBox

In another unprecedented show of force aimed at Russia, U.S. Air Force B-52H Stratofortress bombers flew from the United Kingdom to Ukraine airspace earlier today. After arriving there, they orbited for an extended period right at the edge of the Russian-occupied Crimean Peninsula and near areas under the control of Kremlin-supported separatists. These sorties are the latest in a flurry of geopolitical posturing between Washington and Moscow and come a week after a Russian Su-27 Flanker fighter jet performed a potentially dangerous maneuver in front of another B-52H flying over the Black Sea.

Three B-52Hs, with the call signs Julia 51, 52, and 53 departed RAF Fairford in the United Kingdom on Sept. 4, 2020. There are conflicting reports about whether the third bomber took part in the mission to Ukraine, but only two of them were ever visible on online flight tracking software. Regardless, the bombers subsequently returned to Fairford, where a total of six of them – all of which are capable of carrying nuclear weapons – have been forward-deployed as part of a Bomber Task Force mission since Aug. 22.

After they had entered Ukrainian airspace, the B-52Hs flew to the southeastern portion of the country and entered a racetrack-like orbit along the coast of the Sea of Azov. The orbit’s southwesternmost point was over the Ukrainian port city of Henichesk, which is around 20 miles, at its closest, from the Crimean Peninsula. The northeasternmost tip of the route was just south of the city of Melitopol, around 115 miles or so from areas under the control of separatists in Eastern Ukraine that Russian forces are actively supporting.

There are unconfirmed reports Ukrainian Su-27 Flankers flew with the bombers during the sorties. In May 2020, Ukrainian Flankers, as well as MiG-29 Fulcrum fighter jets, flew with B-1 bombers in the region. At least one U.K. Royal Air Force (RAF) Eurofighter Typhoon, flying all the way from RAF Akrotiri in Cyprus in the Mediterranean Sea, also appears to have joined the bombers for a time.

In addition, a number of U.S. aerial intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, as well as those from the United Kingdom, were seen operating in the area at the time. This included an Air Force RC-135V/W Rivet Joint spy plane, as well as an RAF Airseeker, which is derived from the Rivet Joint. A RAF Sentinel R1, a radar platform based on the Bombardier Global Express business jet, was also present for a time.

The heavy ISR presence makes good sense as these B-52H sorties could only have prompted various responses from Russian forces in Crimea and elsewhere in the region. The RC-135V/W, Airseeker, and Sentinel R1 aircraft are all capable of collecting various signals and electronic intelligence, and would have been well-positioned to gather information about how Russia’s integrated air defense networks and other command and control nodes reacted to the B-52s. 

The ability of the RC-135V/Ws and the Airseeker, especially, to detect, classify, and geolocate various types of emitters, including air defense radars, means that they would have had a particularly good opportunity to help add to the known “electronic order of battle” of Russian forces in the broader Black Sea region. Russia has established a heavy air defense presence in Crimea since it illegally occupied it in 2014, including the deployment of both S-400 and S-300 surface-to-air missile systems at nine different sites.

Despite some reports, this is not actually the first time B-52s have flown inside Ukraine. In 1994, a B-52, along with a B-1 bomber and KC-10A Extender aerial refueling tanker flew to Poltava Air Base in northwestern Ukraine to mark the 50th anniversary of Operation Frantic during World War II. Operation Frantic was a so-called “shuttle bombing” effort in which U.S. bombers flew from bases in the United Kingdom and Italy, struck their targets in Germany and elsewhere, and then landed in bases in Ukraine, which was then a Soviet Socialist Republic. The last of these missions took place in September 1944.

These latest sorties could ostensibly be intended to mark the anniversary of the end of Operation Frantic, but this seems unlikely. This year is the 76th anniversary, not typically one the deserves special attention, and the bombers did not fly near any of the three bases that supported the World War II bombing missions.

It seems much more likely that flying at least two nuclear-capable B-52s into Ukraine, and this particular part of the country, is meant to demonstrate America’s support for Ukraine. At the same time, it presents a visible challenge to Russia with regards to its continued occupation of Crimea and its support of separatists fighting authorities in Kyiv. 

The Sea of Azov was also the site of a very serious altercation between the Ukrainian Navy and Russian security forces in November 2018, in which Russia detained 24 Ukrainian sailors and impounded three Ukrainian vessels for nearly a year. Ukrainian authorities said the two gunboats and the tug were in extremely poor condition when Russia eventually returned them, something that the Kremlin vehemently denied.

This latest B-52H mission would be in line with a number of past bomber operations in the region, as well. Russian Flankers intercepted at least one of these bombers flying over the Black Sea on Aug. 28, with one of them conducting a possibly dangerous “thumping” maneuver very close to the American aircraft. The bomber was one of four that sortied out that day from Fairford to fly over the airspace of all NATO members in Europe, in an unprecedented demonstration of the alliance’s solidarity to any potential adversaries, including Russia. 

A Russian Flanker also followed one of the B-52s into Danish airspace during that mission. There seems to have been a deliberate decision to keep the bombers inside Ukrainian airspace this time, which would have reduced the chance of any kind of intercept.

In addition, as noted, in May 2020, B-1 bombers also trained in the region together with Ukrainian fighter jets, including conducting mock anti-ship operations clearly meant to send a signal to the Kremlin and the Russian Navy’s Black Sea Fleet. Last year, a B-52, also part of a detachment at Fairford for a short-term deployment, made a run in the Black Sea at Crimea that mirrored what one might expect to see in an actual strike on targets there involving the employment of air-launched cruise missiles, too. 

This latest B-52 operation is just the latest in a string of tit-for-tat shows of force and other posturing between the United States and Russia in both Europe and the Pacific, which the War Zone has been following closely and that you can read about in more detail in this recent story. NATO is also meeting today to discuss how it might respond to the assassination attempt against a major Russian opposition political figure, which involved a secretive chemical weapon that strongly ties the attack to the Kremlin.

Sending B-52s to southeastern Ukraine is sure to draw new responses from the Kremlin, which may feel a need to further escalate with its own shows of force in response.

UPDATE: 12:50pm EST

U.S. European Command (EUCOM) has confirmed that three B-52 bombers took part in the mission over Ukraine today, as did Ukrainian fighter jets, in a press release. The full release is as follows:

“Three U.S. Air Force B-52 Stratofortress bomber aircraft from the 5th Bomb Wing, Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota, conducted vital integration training with Ukrainian fighters Friday inside Ukraine’s airspace.”

“Friday’s strategic bomber mission is part of the long-planned deployment of six B-52s to RAF Fairford in Gloucestershire, England. The mission provided partners valuable midair training. In addition, the mission demonstrated how forward-located aircraft and crews, such as those in the B-52 units, enable collective defense capabilities and provide the U.S., NATO Allies and partners strategic and operational breadth to deter Russia and assure Allies and partners.”

“More than 200 related missions have been conducted since the Bomber Task Force launched operations in the European theater two years ago. These ongoing bomber missions showcase the U.S. Air Force’s ability to continually execute flying missions, sustain readiness and support Allies and partners across Europe, regardless of external challenges to include the current global COVID-19 crisis response.”

Contact the author: Joe@thedrive.com

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Nuclear weapons will be out existential threat (Revelation 16)

LEE H. HAMILTON: Nuclear weapons remain an existential threat

Lee Hamilton is a Senior Advisor for the Indiana University Center on Representative Government; a Distinguished Scholar at the IU Hamilton Lugar School of Global and International Studies; and a Professor of Practice at the IU O’Neill School of Public and Environmental Affairs. He was a member of the U.S. House of Representatives for 34 years.

By LEE H. HAMILTON Columnist

Seventy-five years ago, the United States dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, bringing an end to World War II and sounding a warning about the devastating power of nuclear weapons.

Remarkably, we have managed to avoid using these weapons in warfare again. But nuclear arms still present an existential threat, and it is worrisome that they get so little attention. I am impressed that nuclear weapons only occasionally get extensive coverage on a list of threats facing the United States. This is a change; in decades past, the topic was very much on the minds of policymakers.

I have long believed, and I still do, that the greatest threat, we confront, although not the most likely, is the possibility a nuclear disaster. In terms of causing death and destruction, nothing compares to the awesome power of the nuclear bomb.

Several recent books, including one co-authored by former Defense Secretary William Perry, have brought attention to nuclear weapons. Pundits have commented on our luck in avoiding disaster.

At the height of the Cold War, the U.S. and the Soviet Union each had about 30,000 nuclear weapons, enough to destroy all life on Earth many times over. We relied on a strategy of deterrence called mutually assured destruction. Thanks to arms control agreements and efforts like the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction initiative, American and Russian nuclear arsenals have been reduced by 80% or more.

But now there are signs the threat is increasing. China is building up its small nuclear arsenal, upsetting the balance of power. Russia and the United States are modernizing their nuclear weapons. North Korea is said to be developing ballistic missiles that can carry small nuclear bombs. U.S. military commanders have talked about using low-yield nuclear devices in conflict, blurring the line between conventional and nuclear weapons.

They reportedly argue that more powerful warheads are needed.

Recently we’ve seen arms control efforts discredited. The Trump administration pulled out of an agreement that slowed Iran’s path to acquiring nuclear weapons and announced it would leave the Open Skies agreement, which allows monitoring of weapons. The New START treaty, which limits U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, is scheduled to expire in 2021.

Earlier this year, the Trump administration considered testing nuclear explosives for the first time in 28 years; even though a resumption of testing would be more beneficial to China, which has conducted only a handful of tests, while the U.S. has conducted a thousand or more tests. Trump’s arms control negotiator, Marshall Billingslea, confidently asserted “We know how to win these races and we know how to spend the adversary into oblivion.”

At the same time, tensions are rising in the world. China is engaging in aggressive actions in the South China Sea and clamping down on Hong Kong. Russia tries to destabilize the U.S. with attacks on our democratic processes.

For many Americans, nuclear weapons may seem like an abstract threat. They must compete for attention with more immediate concerns: the COVID-19 pandemic, health care reform, racial justice, the economy and more.

But the awesome destructive power of nuclear weapons puts them in a class by themselves. We need to revive serious concern about the issue and bring it back into active public dialogue. We need to restore our commitment to arms control agreements.

Near the end of Cold War, President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev declared that a nuclear war “cannot be won and must never be fought.” That principle is as true today as it was in the 1980s.

Hamas eyes another Israel fight outside the Temple Walls (Revelation 11)

Hamas eyes another Israel fight as Gaza teeters on brink of collapse

Opinion: Terror group’s leader Yahya Sinwar is preparing for fresh aggression in bid for political dominance ahead of October vote, even though coastal enclave is under total coronavirus lockdown and on cusp of economic and health disaster

Alex Fishman

Published: 09.02.20 , 23:30

There are no understandings as far as Gaza is concerned. No agreements. No anything.

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The way the latest escalation ended is nothing but an invitation to the next round, which may end up being more violent.

This can be attributed to the current leader of Hamas in the Gaza Strip, Yahya Sinwar, who’s steadily losing his grip on the Palestinian enclave his group took over in 2007.

If it were within his power, Sinwar would have gladly erased the last escalation from the collective Palestinian consciousness.

Not only did he fail to achieve any economical, national or military achievement to present to the people of the Strip, the situation in Gaza actually deteriorated.
During the three weeks Israel closed the land and ocean passageways into the Strip, the number of unemployed there jumped by no less than 10%, as thousands lost their jobs and their livelihoods.
Neither Sinwar nor his people can bury these numbers with mere words. This last round of violence against Israel was a colossal failure for him and his people.