Authorities Expecting The Sixth Seal? (Revelation 6:12)

New York Times

By SAM ROBERTS

JULY 17, 2014

Here is another reason to buy a mega-million-dollar apartment in a Manhattan high-rise: Earthquake forecast maps for New York City that a federal agency issued on Thursday indicate “a slightly lower hazard for tall buildings than previously thought.”

The agency, the United States Geodetic Survey, tempered its latest quake prediction with a big caveat.

Federal seismologists based their projections of a lower hazard for tall buildings — “but still a hazard nonetheless,” they cautioned — on a lower likelihood of slow shaking from an earthquake occurring near the city, the type of shaking that typically causes more damage to taller structures.

“The tall buildings in Manhattan are not where you should be focusing,” said John Armbruster, a seismologist with the Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory of Columbia University. “They resonate with long period waves. They are designed and engineered to ride out an earthquake. Where you should really be worried in New York City is the common brownstone and apartment building and buildings that are poorly maintained.”

Mr. Armbruster was not involved in the federal forecast, but was an author of an earlier study that suggested that “a pattern of subtle but active faults makes the risk of earthquakes to the New York City area substantially greater than formerly believed.”

He noted that barely a day goes by without a New York City building’s being declared unsafe, without an earthquake. “If you had 30, 40, 50 at one time, responders would be overloaded,” he said.

The city does have an earthquake building code that went into effect in 1996, and that applies primarily to new construction.

A well-maintained building would probably survive a magnitude 5 earthquake fairly well, he said. The last magnitude 5 earthquake in the city struck in 1884. Another is not necessarily inevitable; faults are more random and move more slowly than they do in, say, California. But he said the latest federal estimate was probably raised because of the magnitude of the Virginia quake.

Mr. Armbruster said the Geodetic Survey forecast would not affect his daily lifestyle. “I live in a wood-frame building with a brick chimney and I’m not alarmed sitting up at night worried about it,” he said. “But society’s leaders need to take some responsibility.”

The Russian Nuclear Treaty Lapse (Daniel 7)

Russia Nuclear Treaty Lapse to Degrade U.S. Influence: Ex-Military Leaders

BY DAVID BRENNAN ON 7/09/20 AT 10:47 AM EDT

A former military leaders and national security officials have written to Congress urging the extension of the U.S.-Russia New START arms control agreement, which is now the only deal restricting the nuclear armories of the two most heavily armed nations in the world.

Members of the American College of National Security Leaders sent a letter Wednesday warning the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that failure to extend New START beyond its February expiration date would represent a failure of U.S. global leadership and could spark a dangerous and costly arms race.

President Donald Trump’s administration has thus far refused to extend the treaty under its existing terms despite repeated offers from Russia to do so. Trump has said he wants to include China in any extended or new deal, but experts and Chinese officials have dismissed the proposal as infeasible.

Retired Air Force Brigadier General Ricardo Aponte, the chief operating officer ACNSL, wrote in a statement that New START should be extended for an additional five years.

“New START currently guards against a new nuclear arms race between the superpowers as both countries benefit from the agreement due to provisions that increase transparency and reliability between Russia and the United States,” Aponte said. “With the stroke of a pen, the treaty can be extended and the extension does not prevent the United States from engaging in other arms control agreements with Russia and others.”

U.S. and Russian officials met last month in Vienna to discuss the extension of New START, which itself is an extension of the original START agreement signed between Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and President George W. Bush in 1991.

Gorbachev has described New START as the last of “the three principal pillars of global strategic stability,” along with the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty from which the U.S. withdrew in 2002 and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty from which the U.S. withdrew last year.

New START limits U.S. and Russian forces to 1,500 deployed strategic nuclear warheads and bombs. It also caps the number of deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers used for nuclear missions at 700. The total allowed number of deployed and non-deployed assets is 800.

Though the Trump administration wants China brought into the deal, the U.S. and Russia currently possess some 90 percent of the world’s nuclear warheads—around 5,800 in the U.S. and 6,375 in Russia, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. China is believed to have around 320 warheads.

Some observers, including the Chinese government, have suggested that Trump’s effort to include China is merely a smokescreen for U.S. withdrawal, driven by the administration’s desire to expand its nuclear capabilities. America’s NATO allies have also expressed support for the treaty’s extension.

China’s director general of arms control Fu Cong said Wednesday that Beijing would be willing to join New START talks if the U.S. and Russia agreed to cut their nuclear arsenals to match China’s. “But actually, we know that it’s not going to happen,” Fu said. “We know the U.S. policy.”

State Department spokesperson Morgan Ortagus said Thursday that the U.S. welcomed China’s commitment to engage—seemingly ignoring the apparent insincerity of the offer—and encouraged face-to-face talks between U.S. and Chinese officials.

“We will all bring different perspectives and objectives to the negotiating table and will surely have disagreements,” Ortagus said. “But it is time for dialogue and diplomacy between the three biggest nuclear weapons powers on how to prevent a new arms race.”

But Aponte told Newsweek that third nations such as China “should be treated separately” when it comes to New START. “Once extended, the U.S. can choose to begin new negotiations with other nuclear armed capable countries such as China,” he explained, something ACNSL would support.

Retired Marine Corps Lieutenant General Willie Williams, who also signed the letter, said that allowing New START to lapse would degrade America’s international leadership credentials, which have been eroding under an isolationist, unilateralist Trump administration.

“With the missteps of our recent past, the United States can ill afford to continue our ‘Global Leadership’ downward slide, knowing that history will not judge us well without a change in vector,” Williams said in the ACNSL statement.

“Global challenges are not new, it’s how we deal with them that makes the difference,” Williams said. “We now find ourselves with an alliance that’s teetering and beginning to look in a different direction for that expressed leadership the United States has provided over the years.”

“Extending the New START Treaty for an additional five years can begin to show the change all are looking for,” Williams said.

Having already ditched the INF treaty after accusing Russia of violations, the Trump administration is also on course to withdraw from the Open Skies agreement in November.

The latter has been in force since 2002 and allows the 35 signatories to conduct unarmed aerial surveillance flights over each other’s territories, in theory decreasing tensions via transparency over force deployments.

Secretary of State Mike Pompeo accused Russia of multiple violations of the treaty upon announcing the U.S. withdrawal. Russia has warned that the move will increase military tensions and make the world—and America’s European allies—less safe.

Aponte suggested that Russia’s reported violations of the INF and Open Skies treaties should be treated separately from New START. Asked whether a New START extension might send a message that violations are rewarded, Aponte responded: “I do not believe so.”

“Keeping current nuclear systems of the two nations under the New START guidance is beneficial to both,” he told Newsweek. “Deviations from the treaty can be highlighted and discussed diplomatically. In addition, any new weapons development that are not part of this treaty are not forecast for years, well beyond the extension period (five years) of the treaty.”

Trump’s Foolish Nuclear Games (Revelation 18:10)

Trump’s Nuclear Test Would Risk Everything to Gain Nothing

The Trump administration has exited three major nuclear agreements: the Iran nuclear deal, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty with Russia, and the Open Skies Treaty. All three decisions were controversial. Former Director of National Intelligence Michael Hayden has called the most recent move — America’s withdrawal from the Open Skies Treaty, a useful confidence-building measure between Russia and the West — “insane.” The landmark New START Treaty, which caps nuclear warheads and launchers between Moscow and Washington, is on deck for renewal next. Washington’s stance on arms control, Russia’s announcement of several new weapons systems, breakneck investments in hypersonics, and Washington’s increasing confrontation with Beijing signal that a fresh nuclear arms race is within the realm of possibility. As Jeffrey Lewis writes, “Obama’s dream of a nuclear-free world is becoming a nightmare.”

For supporters of arms control, things may be about to get much worse. The Washington Post broke a story in May that theU.S. government has been in an “ongoing conversation” about whether to conduct nuclear weapons testing for the first timesince 1992. Presidential candidate Joe Biden called discussions about resuming a test program “reckless” and “dangerous.”

Nuclear testing, even at very low yields, would jeopardize the hard-fought Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which prohibits its signatories from testing nuclear weapons in any environment. The treaty was arguably one of the most difficult packages the United States has ever negotiated, and though it has floundered in the Senate since the 1990s, it remains a cornerstone of U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy. President Bill Clinton, who signed the comprehensive test ban in 1996, described it as the “longest sought, hardest fought prize in the history of arms control.” More than 160 countries have ratified the treaty — not including the United States and China who are among the few to have signed but not yet ratified it — but the treaty has yet to enter into force. Some have questioned whether the Trump administration has plans to unsign the treaty. Moreover, renewed nuclear testing could unravel all past efforts to generate worldwide buy-in.

The Trump administration’s main justification for nuclear testing is ostensibly based on concerns that China and Russia may be conducting low-yield tests of their own — which both countries have, of course, denied. Those opposed to such testing contend that the United States stands to gain very little from it unless the nation plans to embark on a new and expensive weapons design program; computer simulations are sufficient to ensure that U.S. nuclear capabilities are safeguarded; and U.S. nuclear tests would lead other nuclear powers to do the same.

While the possibility that competitor countries might surpass the United States by cheating on the test ban is concerning, this situation is not altogether new.

In the course of ongoing research, I came across declassified executive agency documents that explain why the White House pursued the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 — the precursor the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty — despite high confidence that the Soviet Union would violate it and concerns that those violations could go undetected. The documents demonstrate that Kennedy administration officials recognized that a test ban would be advantageous for the United States even if the Soviet Union found a way to cheat. In particular, they concluded that a test ban could freeze technological progress by U.S. adversaries in the most important classes of weapons. This, in their view, would be worth the risk of losing ground on other technological dimensions. In light of unsubstantiated protestations that China and Russia are now flaunting the norm against nuclear testing, Cold War-era debates are relevant to certain debates today.

Nuclear Testing and the First Test Ban Treaty

Though it may now seem like ancient history, nuclear testing was once widespread. The United States conducted 1,054 nuclear tests from 1945 to 1992, prior to the finalization of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. For decades, many Americans believed that nuclear war could really happen. Early attempts to restrict or ban nuclear weapons, beginning with the Baruch Plan in 1946, ran into resistance because a nuclear deterrent was considered essential to America’s Cold War defense doctrine. Since the weapons could not be banned, the next best option for arms control advocates was to outlaw testing, since only through testing can new and better bombs be developed. But a test ban was controversial in Washington.

In the 1950s, nuclear testing was ramping up on both sides of the Cold War. Under President Dwight Eisenhower, the United States was faced with an uncomfortable trade-off. The United States at that time led the world in nuclear testing, with the Soviet Union close behind. According to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization’s Preparatory Commission, the United States was detonating nearly three bombs for every Soviet bomb. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union continued to narrow the gap. Nuclear explosions were tried in every conceivable environment — land, air, and sea. Popular backlash began to mount as it became clear that fallout from these tests was causing public health issues and environmental damage. By 1955, the international community was calling on the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom (at that time, the only other nuclear power) to negotiate a ban. Supporters of continued testing countered that American allies depended on a strong deterrent, a strong deterrent depended on new and better weapons, and the only way to achieve such weapons was through further testing. Most importantly, if the United States did agree to such restrictions, the Soviets still couldn’t be trusted not to secretly cheat. Since developing new weapons was considered essential for national security, they argued, a test ban would make the free world less safe.

Eisenhower was personally sympathetic to a test ban. In fact, in 1958, he and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev agreed to a voluntary two-way moratorium just four days after Khrushchev came to power. The advent and improvement of underground testing methods had by then relieved some of the pressure to test above ground or in the atmosphere. The main question was whether underground tests could convey the same military-scientific advantages as above-ground ones. After President John F. Kennedy entered office and Moscow and Washington drifted further apart over the 1961 Berlin Crisis, the Soviet Union suddenly abandoned the moratorium and resumed testing, sparking fears that American reluctance to test too would lead to qualitative inferiority.

Kennedy appealed to Khrushchev to resume the moratorium and make it legally binding. After the Cuban Missile Crisis, which brought both countries to the brink of nuclear war, Moscow and Washington restarted formal talks on a test ban. Their efforts over 12 days of negotiations in July 1963 culminated in the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), which banned all testing under water, in the atmosphere, or in outer space. Although this treaty was eventually ratified with bipartisan support, it faced consistent opposition from skeptics. Critics of the Limited Test Ban Treaty were particularly concerned about the possibility that the Soviets would clandestinely violate the test ban. The Soviet track record didn’t look promising. One prominent talking point of skeptics was that the Soviet Union had abrogated 62 out of 64 treaties since its formation. If the Soviet Union cheated, it was feared, it could then engage in breakout development that would render a compliant United States technologically inferior and strategically vulnerable — mirroring arguments made by the Trump administration in recent months about similar ambitions on the part of Beijing.

Ensuring Soviet compliance was an obvious concern for test ban treaty negotiators. After all, deterrence theory has long been premised on the prisoner’s dilemma, a paradox in which two parties who can gain from cooperation choose non-cooperative options that leave them both worse off than before due to a lack of trust. The ability to monitor compliance by other parties is crucial, but mid-century verification technology was primitive compared to that of today. The United States had yet to fully deploy constellations of advanced seismological equipment and spy satellites that could detect small, low-yield explosions. For other critics, the prism of confrontation was enough. Future President Gerald Ford, at that time still a member of the House of Representatives, lamented to a constituent that “Russia’s mere eagerness for [a test ban treaty] arouses serious doubts” about their intentions. After all, why should the United States bind itself to an agreement that its counterparts can’t be trusted to honor?

Debates Within the Kennedy Administration on a Test Ban

Inside the Kennedy administration, the landscape of the nuclear testing debate between top officials was spelled out in a report jointly commissioned — available in the archives at the Ford Presidential Library —  by the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), headed at the time by William C. Foster, and the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Harold Brown, who would later go on to become secretary of defense. There are compelling parallels with the present day. The report concludes that even if Soviet cheating was assumed with certainty, a test ban would still be in the U.S. national interest. Kennedy concurred.

Nuclear weapons are commonly divided into two categories: strategic and tactical. Strategic weapons, which tend to have the largest yields, are useful for deterrence and would hopefully never need to be used. Tactical weapons, conversely, tend to have smaller yields and have more niche uses that theoretically make them suitable for the battlefield.According to the report, the Defense Department “believe[d] (without being certain) that [the United States was] ahead of the Soviets in the quality of [its] tactical nuclear weapons.” Moreover, among top defense officials, there was a “consensus, [although] not necessarily unanimous,” that cheating with low-yield testing would lead to substantial improvements in Soviet tactical nuclear weapons technology. Kennedy had already campaigned on a perceived “missile gap.” The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency admitted that only tests above a 20-kiloton threshold — about the size of the first nuclear test in 1945 — would be detectable. Though this threshold was about an order of magnitude smaller than most nuclear warheads of the day, by 1961 technology had advanced to the point where small-scale tests could yield significant data. If Moscow were to secretly cheat by testing under 20 kilotons while Washington complied with a ban, it was thought, American nuclear superiority in an entire class of weapons could be jeopardized.

Why would American leaders ever have considered surrendering a technological lead to a country whose leader had only a few years prior threatened to “bury” Western democracy? Discussions between Brown, Foster, and others are illuminating. For them, the question was not whether the United States would be put at any disadvantage, but rather if these disadvantages could be traded for enhanced security in areas where it mattered most — strategic capabilities. As the Brown-Foster report points out, “When both sides have [tactical nuclear weapons], differences in quality appear to make very much less difference [since] either side can so easily escalate the size [of the weapon].”Under a test ban regime, the Soviet Union might have secretly been able to improve its tactical capabilities while the United States lagged behind. But, under no test ban at all, it might have only been a matter of time until the Soviets reached parity in strategic weapons. For proponents of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, potential cheating was a non-issue: Locking in America’s qualitative superiority in the types of weapons that mattered most was far more pressing than watching its short-lived edge across all types be eroded.

Nuclear Testing and Cheating Today

Old debates about the Limited Test Ban Treaty are once again relevant today. Administration officials have accused Russia and China of “probably” violating the test ban, though no evidence has been provided. But, if the United States resumed nuclear testing after nearly 30 years of restraint it would become an international pariah without significantly adding to its own security. An American decision to test again would fulfill its own prophecy, impelling U.S. adversaries to resume their own test programs if they have not done so already.

Even low-yield nuclear tests conducted underground in order to minimize environmental damage would be calamitous for the United States’ reputation as a responsible, reasonable, and trustworthy member of the international community. It would join the ranks of North Korea — the only other country since 1998 to test a nuclear device — and would lose its ability to criticize rogue nuclear aspirants with a straight face. It would also seriously imperil the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which the United States has relied on to keep nuclear weapons from proliferating. In particular, Washington has supported and benefited from the global monitoring system — consisting of 337 facilities in 89 countries around the world — run by the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. This system complements U.S. national technical means to detect nuclear blasts and is key to engaging the international community in efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation, but could never be sustained if parties began withdrawing in response to American tests.

There are also many unilateral reasons not to resume nuclear testing. Although nuclear modernization has some arguable merits for deterrence, testing is not required for a robust modernization program. Even if the White House is determined to expand the nuclear arsenal by acquiring new warheads, the Defense Department has no doctrine to justify nuclear testing. In a world where the United States has more than enough advanced nuclear weapons to fulfill its strategic deterrence objectives, testing has become an activity that only fledgling nuclear aspirants who are desperate to bolster their budding capabilities need to engage in. Finally, other states — both allies and non-aligned countries — have long looked to the United States for leadership on nonproliferation matters, something past American administrations were fully cognizant of as they combatted the diffusion of nuclear weapons throughout the 20th century.

The challenges the country faces are much different than they were in 1960, but history still has important lessons. Compared to the first decades of the Cold War, the world is no longer under a nuclear “sword of Damocles.” Nuclear testing by the United States would destabilize the international system and undermine American national interests. By unraveling the tapestry of arms control that previous generations fought hard to achieve, the United States risks creating more problems for itself than it solves. If American leaders could rally to forge a test ban with the Soviet Union — whose propensity to cheat was considered inevitable — during the darkest years of the Cold War, their successors should be able to uphold a test ban now.

Justin Key Canfil is a PhD candidate in political science at Columbia University. He is also a U.S.-Asia Grand Strategy fellow at the University of Southern California and a non-resident fellow with the Cyber Project at Harvard’s Belfer Center. His research investigates past and present debates over the international law and politics of emerging technologies. You can find him on Twitter @jcanfil.

Image: U.S. Department of Energy

China Tells Babylon the Great No Nuclear Deal

China dismisses US outreach on arms control talks saying it has ‘no interest’

By Nicole Gaouette and Jennifer Hansler, CNN

Updated 6:58 PM EDT, Thu July 09, 2020

Washington(CNN) China issued a stinging response to a US statement Thursday that welcomed Beijing’s willingness to engage in arms control talks.

Beijing has “no interest” in any such negotiations, a statement by Chinese embassy in Washington said.

State Department spokeswoman Morgan Ortagus said Thursday in a statement that the United States “welcomes China’s commitment to engage in arms control negotiations,” a day after a senior Chinese diplomat said Beijing would be happy to join talks if the US agreed to lower its number of nuclear weapons to match China’s.

“I can assure you that if the US says that they are ready to come down to the Chinese level (of nuclear weapons), China will be happy to participate the next day. But actually, we know that’s not going to happen,” Fu Cong, head of the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s arms control department, said at a press briefing in Beijing Wednesday.

Fu was referring to the Trump administration’s ongoing attempts to renegotiate the New START Treaty — the last remaining nuclear arms control pact — and the US insistence that any renewed treaty should include China.

On Wednesday, President Donald Trump’s special envoy for arms control, Marshall Billingslea, cast Fu’s comments in a positive light during an online defense forum organized by the European Union, calling them “positive indications and evolutions in the Chinese position.”

“Frankly, it sounds a little like we’re pre-negotiating,” Billingslea said. Characterizing Fu’s comments as a “stated willingness to engage in negotiations, albeit with some preconditions,” the US nuclear envoy said it “seems to us the prudent next step will be to sit down for discussions. … I would recommend they also sit down with Russia.”

A fraction

Critics say the US insistence that Beijing join the agreement is an attempt by Trump administration officials who oppose international arms control treaties to create a poison pill that guarantees negotiations will fail. Beijing has repeatedly rejected the idea of taking part in the talks because its nuclear arsenal — estimated to be around 320 weapons — is a fraction of the 5,000 warheads that Russia and the US are thought to possess.

Billingslea has said that China is engaged in a “rapid buildup” aimed at achieving “nuclear parity” with the US and Russia. The US has briefed other nations on its intelligence about China’s nuclear program, Billingslea has said.

On Thursday, Ortagus said Billingslea “will invite the Chinese government to join in good faith negotiations in Vienna, Austria. The United States also recommends that China meet with Russia at an early date to consider next steps for trilateral arms control negotiations. We will all bring different perspectives and objectives to the negotiating table and will surely have disagreements. But it is time for dialogue and diplomacy between the three biggest nuclear weapons powers on how to prevent a new arms race.”

But a spokesman for the Chinese Embassy in Washington said China “has no interest in joining Russia and the US in their bilateral negotiations” and pointed to a recent news briefing in which Fu assailed US policies.

In remarks to the press in June, Fu had noted that “US officials have recently been making a lot of noises about China joining the US-Russia negotiation on nuclear arms reduction. They even went so far as to tweeting a staged photo,” a reference to a photo Billingslea tweeted that showed Chinese flags at a table before a meeting with Russia.

“Vienna talks about to start. China is a no-show,” the nuclear envoy wrote in the June 22 tweet, even though there was no expectation that China would participate. “Beijing still hiding behind #GreatWallofSecrecy on its crash nuclear build-up and so many other things. We will proceed with #Russia, notwithstanding.”

“China has made its position known on numerous occasions,” Fu said, referring to the photo and Beijing’s longstanding refusal to engage.

The Chinese official said that given “the huge gap” between China’s nuclear arsenal and that of the US and Russia, “it is unrealistic” to expect China to join the negotiations.

“The US knows full well the huge gap between the Chinese and American nuclear arsenals, both in terms of quantity and sophistication. And they are bent on increasing this huge gap,” Fu said.

The Trump administration has focused on developing new nuclear weapons.

Earlier this year, the Pentagon deployed a new submarine-launched low-yield nuclear weapon, the first new US nuclear weapon in decades. The Trump administration’s 2018 Nuclear Posture Review warned that adversaries might believe they could use a smaller nuclear weapon against the US or its allies without fear of US nuclear retaliation because American weapons are disproportionately more destructive.

CNN’s Kylie Atwood contributed to this report

Islamic Jihad Vows Battle Outside the Temple Walls (Revelation 11)

Islamic Jihad Vows to Expand Means of Battle with Israel

TEHRAN (Tasnim) – The Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine said it would continue to enhance the capabilities and instruments in the fight against the Zionist regime of Israel.

Tasnim News Agency

In a statement released on the 6th anniversary of Israel’s military operation against the Gaza Strip, the Islamic Jihad said the Palestinian nation is united, would increase its power continuously, and will diversify the instruments and methods to fight against the Zionist enemy.

The movement also vowed that the Palestinian resistance will never allow the enemy to continue acts of aggression against people of Palestine or occupy a tiny part of the Palestinian territory.

The Palestinian resistance will press on with plans to strengthen its power to defend the Palestinian nation, territories and sanctities, the statement added, warning the Zionist regime not to take any criminal action against Palestinians, because “the resistance is prepared for decisive response to any crime.”

The Gaza Strip has been under an Israeli blockade since June 2007. The blockade has caused a decline in the standard of living as well as unprecedented levels of unemployment and unrelenting poverty.

Israel carries out regular attacks on Palestinians in Gaza under the pretext of hitting Hamas targets. It has also launched several wars on the enclave, the last of which began in early July 2014 and ended in late August the same year. The Israeli military aggression killed nearly 2,200 Palestinians and injured over 11,100 others.

Indian Policies Taking Us To The First Nuclear War (Revelation 8 )

Indian Policies Taking Region Towards Nuclear War: Sardar Atiq Ahmed

Former Prime Minister, Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJ&K) Sardar Atiq Ahmed on Friday said the Indian policies were taking the region towards a nuclear war that was not in the interest of any country

ISLAMABAD, (UrduPoint / Pakistan Point News – 10th Jul, 2020 ) :Former Prime Minister, Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJ&K) Sardar Atiq Ahmed on Friday said the Indian policies were taking the region towards a nuclear war that was not in the interest of any country.

Talking in a Radio Programme,he said that over a million Indian army personnel deputed in Occupied Kashmir could not suppress the freedom movement and determination of Kashmiri people.

He said the situation of Kashmiri’s in Occupied Kashmir was miserable as they have been deprived of even basic rights.

It is a bit motivation that the Kashmir dispute has got the attention of the world, while we, the Kashmiri’s would appeal the international organizations to force India to stop worst human rights violations and genocide committed by its forces in the occupied valley, he added.

He said India must also realize that the martyrdom of Burhan Muzaffar Wani has provided momentum to struggle of Kashmiri’s for their right to self-determination.

Israel is Declaring War Outside the Temple Walls (Revelation 11)

Fatah leader: Israel annexation plan a ‘declaration of war’

Senior Fatah official Jibril Al-Rajoub, 28 February 2017 [Shadi Hatem/Apaimages]

July 10, 2020 at 11:36 am

Secretary-General of the Palestinian Fatah movement’s Central Committee, Jibril Al-Rajoub, described Israel’s annexation plan as “a declaration of war” that would change all rules of engagement.

Speaking to Al-Mayadeen news channel, Al-Rajoub said Fatah and Hamas have abandoned the division and are heading towards confronting the ‘deal of the century’ and the annexation plan.

Al-Rajoub added that Israel was provoked by his appearance in a joint conference with the deputy head of Hamas’ political bureau, Saleh Al-Arouri, last week, noting that the two weeks that preceded their joint conference witnessed extensive contacts.

“The Palestinian leadership and factions want to turn the Israeli threat into an opportunity to unite with the international community, which is supporting us,” he said, adding that a Palestinian strategy has been developed against the deal of the century which started with stopping the security coordination with Israel and ceasing relations with Washington.

Al-Rajoub explained that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s annexation plan is an opportunity for the Palestinians to arrange their internal affairs and relationship with countries in the region.