The History Of New York Earthquakes: Before The Sixth Seal (Rev 6:12)

Historic Earthquakes

Near New York City, New York

1884 08 10 19:07 UTC

Magnitude 5.5

Intensity VII

USGS.gov

This severe earthquake affected an area roughly extending along the Atlantic Coast from southern Maine to central Virginia and westward to Cleveland, Ohio. Chimneys were knocked down and walls were cracked in several States, including Connecticut, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania. Many towns from Hartford, Connecticut, to West Chester,Pennsylvania.

Property damage was severe at Amityville and Jamaica, New York, where several chimneys were “overturned” and large cracks formed in walls. Two chimneys were thrown down and bricks were shaken from other chimneys at Stratford (Fairfield County), Conn.; water in the Housatonic River was agitated violently. At Bloomfield, N.J., and Chester, Pa., several chimneys were downed and crockery was broken. Chimneys also were damaged at Mount Vernon, N.Y., and Allentown, Easton, and Philadelphia, Pa. Three shocks occurred, the second of which was most violent. This earthquake also was reported felt in Vermont, Virginia, and Washington, D.C. Several slight aftershocks were reported on August 11.

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More Nuclear Testing By Russia (Revelation 16)

Sensors detect rise in radiation coming from region including Russian city of St Petersburg

By Harry Howard For Mailonline and Reuters 17:04 EDT 26 Jun 2020 , updated 12:48 EDT 27 Jun 2020

Sensors normally used to detect nuclear weapons tests have picked up an unexplained rise in radiation coming from a region which includes the Russian city of St Petersburg.

The increased levels were picked up in a region which also covered the tips of Denmark and Norway as well as southern Sweden, much of Finland and the Baltic countries.

They were detected by the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), which oversees a network of hundreds of monitoring stations.

A spokesman for the organisation the radiation was ‘certainly’ produced from nuclear fission – the process used to generate nuclear power.   

The monitoring stations ordinarily detect nuclear weapons tests by using seismic, hydroacoustic and other technology.

Seismic refers to earthquakes or other vibrations underneath the earth’s surface, while the term hydroacoustic refers to an underwater sound.   

The station in question, in Stockholm, Sweden, detected three different isotopes, or elements, while scanning the air for radionuclides – telltale radioactive particles that can be carried long distances by the wind.

CTBTO chief Lassina Zerbo said in a tweet which included a map of the affected region that the levels detected were higher than usual but ‘not harmful for human health’

The isotopes detected were caesium-134, caesium-137 and ruthenium-103.  

CTBTO chief Lassina Zerbo said in a tweet which included a map of the affected region that the levels detected were higher than usual but ‘not harmful for human health.’ 

He said they were detected on June 22 and 23. 

A spokeswoman for the Vienna-based CTBTO added: ‘These are certainly nuclear fission products, most likely from a civil source.’

‘We are able to indicate the likely region of the source, but it’s outside the CTBTO’s mandate to identify the exact origin.’

Nuclear fission refers to the atomic chain reaction that generates heat in nuclear reactors used in nuclear power stations. 

HOW DO NUCLEAR REACTORS WORK? 

A nuclear reactor creates energy by splitting atoms of uranium.

The energy released from these atoms is then used to boil water. 

This, in turn, drives a turbine.  

A reactor core contains the uranium pellets and a 1000 megawatts (MWe) facility would have about 75 tonnes of enriched uranium.

Uranium-235 is bombarded with neutrons to split the atom, which then creates different elements or another isotope of Uranium. 

Either way, it releases energy. 

These often also undergo radioactive decay and a chain reaction is triggered – contributing to the net energy output. 

Steam is produced, condensed and then recycled so the only waste products are often the radioactive compounds created from the fission. 

Control rods can be added or removed from the reactor core to either increase or decrease the rate of reaction. 

These are made of stable elements such as boron, silver, indium and cadmium that are capable of absorbing many neutrons without undergoing fission.   

Estimates of the First Nuclear War Are Misleading (Revelation 8 )

International estimates of Pakistani nukes misleading

Experts say reports about India do not account for its shift in stance

ISLAMABAD: International estimates about the country’s nuclear arsenal are misleading and biased while downplaying the capabilities of Pakistan’s hostile neighbour, India..

“Western think tanks have had a historical tendency to misreport Pakistan’s nuclear programme as the fastest growing one, and downplay the scope of India’s nuclear capabilities,” said Ambassador Ali Naqvi, the executive director of the Centre for International Strategic Studies (CISS) during a webinar on Friday. Hosted by his institute, the webinar focused on the myths about the Pakistani nuclear programme.

Noting that certain ideas are often propagated about the Pakistani programme by the international media and certain academics, Naqvi pointed to a report recently published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) which suggested that the “size and diversity” of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons was greater than that of India and that there was no openness about the “status or size” of the arsenals.

The report, he said, had claimed that Pakistan had 160 warheads, which were 10 more than those in the Indian arsenal

CISS Senior Fellow Dr Naeem Salik said that a difference of ten warheads in the arsenals of two nuclear armed neighbours has been reported in most estimates for over a decade, which in itself is an admission that no country’s nuclear programme was growing faster than the other.

Dr Salik suggested most of the estimates were mere guesses in the absence of accurate data on key factors of warhead production, including nature of weapon design, and capacity of plutonium production and others.

South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI) DG Dr Maria Sultan pointed to the huge transition in India’s force posture from the ‘No-First Use’ doctrine to one of ‘First Use’.

Moreover, data on the estimated number of warheads for India did not match with New Delhi’s restructuring of its strategic forces, military posture, and the actual amount of fissile material stockpiles.

Published in The Express Tribune, June 27th, 2020.

Gaza terror groups said ‘preparing response’ outside the Temple Walls (Revelation 11)

Gaza terror groups said ‘preparing response’ to annexation – The Jerusalem Post

“There is great coordination between the factions to devise a plan for responding to the plan, and the Joint Operations Room [of the armed groups] is continuing to hold contacts in this regard.”

The latest report came in the aftermath of Friday night’s firing of two rockets towards Israel from the Gaza Strip. The rocket attack came as Palestinians in the Gaza Strip were set to receive another cash grant from Qatar. Some 100,000 families are expected to benefit from the grant, with each receiving $100.

Palestinian political activists said that Friday’s rocket attack was aimed at showing that the delivery of the Qatari grant to the Gaza Strip would not stop Hamas and other groups from pursuing the armed struggle against Israel.

“There’s no doubt that the rocket attack could not have taken place without Hamas’s prior knowledge or approval,” said Ibrahim Abu Samhadaneh, an independent political analyst from the Gaza Strip.

“Hamas does not want to be seen as if it’s accepting a bribe from Qatar not to attack Israel,” he said. “In addition, Hamas wants Israel and the rest of the world to known that the Palestinian factions are serious about their threat to escalate the situation in response to the annexation. If Hamas’s military wing says that the annexation would be considered a declaration of war, it needs to prove to the Palestinians that this is not an empty threat.”

Sources in the Gaza Strip confirmed on Saturday that Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s armed wing, Al-Quds Brigades, was behind the rocket attack.

The group was quoted as saying that the Palestinian “resistance” has the right to respond to “any aggression plan” by Israel. “Palestinian Islamic Jihad and its military wing won’t stand idly by in the face of this scheme, which comes within a number of projects aiming at liquidating the Palestinian cause,” the group cautioned.

The sources noted that there is complete coordination with Hamas and the other factions in the Gaza Strip on the steps that would be taken politically and in the field in response to the annexation plan.

In a related development, Hamas said that its leaders in the Gaza Strip and abroad, who on Friday discussed the Israeli plan and its repercussions, warned that “any step taken by the Zionist occupation towards stealing our land under the name of annexation or the crime of the century constitutes a new aggression against our people.”

The “crime of the century” refers to US President Donald Trump’s plan for Mideast peace, also known as the “Deal of the Century.”

The Hamas leaders threatened to “make all efforts and use all means available to confront and foil [the annexation plan] within the framework of comprehensive resistance.”

They called on Palestinians to “unleash the widest popular movement to express rejection and anger at the annexation plans and the liquidation of the Palestinian cause.”

Why Japan Will Not Be a Nuclear Horn

Okinawa Governor Refuses to Host Prohibited U.S. Nuclear Missiles

Photo: Governor Tamaki (right) with U.S. Marines stationed in Okinawa (2019). Public domain | Source: Wikimedia Commons

By Jaya Ramachandran

GENEVA (IDN) – Governor Denny Tamaki of Okinawa district has rejected the U.S. plans to base on the island missiles capable of threatening China – apparently as part of President Donald Trump’s move to challenge Beijing and upgrade the importance of Taiwan, 500 kilometres away from the island. If a plan for Okinawa to host such missiles were to develop, Tamaki said: “I can easily imagine fierce opposition from Okinawa residents.”

Okinawa comprises more than 150 islands in the East China Sea between Taiwan and Japan’s mainland. It’s known for its tropical climate, broad beaches and coral reefs, as well as World War II sites.

Okinawa has been a critical strategic location for the United States Armed Forces since the end of World War II. The island hosts around 26,000 U.S. military personnel, about half of the total complement of the United States Forces Japan, spread among 32 bases and 48 training sites.

The largest island (Okinawa) hosts the Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum, commemorating a massive 1945 Allied invasion, and Churaumi Aquarium, home to whale sharks and manta rays.

Missiles the U.S. plans to base on Okinawa are prohibited by the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty between the U.S. and the Soviet Union which, after dissolution, reconstituted into the Russian Federation in 1991.

U.S. President Ronald Reagan and the then Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev agreed to eliminate and permanently forswear all of their nuclear and conventional ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of 500 to 5,500 kilometres.

It was the first arms-control treaty to abolish an entire category of weapons systems. Besides, two protocols to the agreement established unprecedented procedures for observers from both nations to verify first-hand the other countries destruction of its missiles.

The INF Treaty led to the elimination of 2,692 U.S. and Soviet nuclear and conventional, ground-launched ballistic and cruise missile. The U.S. President Donald Trump formally withdrew from the treaty August 2, 2019, citing Russian noncompliance with the accord. The Pentagon tested two previously prohibited missiles in August and December 2019.

Since the United States withdrew from the Treaty, Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea have publicly said that they were not asked to nor are they considering serving as hosts for new U.S. ground-launched missiles. Secretary of Defence Mark Esper has previously suggested that he would like to see the deployment of such missiles in Europe and particularly Asia to counter China.

A senior Defence Department official told the Los Angeles Times that the Pentagon is “very attentive to our allies’ concerns, and we recognized their political challenges”. However, the official continued, “everything that’s said in the media is not necessarily what’s said behind closed doors”.

As the Washington-based Arms Control Association reported on June 26, Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Jens Stoltenberg said on June 17 after a NATO Defence Ministerial that the alliance has “no intention to deploy new land-based nuclear missiles in Europe”.

China is firmly opposed to any deployment of such missiles in the Asia-Pacific. “If the U.S. insists on the deployment, it will be a provocation at China’s doorstep,” said Chinese Defence Ministry Spokesperson Senior Colonel Wu Qian on June 24. “China will never sit idle and will take all necessary countermeasures,” he warned.

Meanwhile, the Trump administration continues to insist that China join trilateral arms control talks with the United States and Russia and has criticized Beijing’s decision not to attend the June 22 talks in Vienna on the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), the last remaining arms control agreement limiting their nuclear arsenals.

Before the start of the Vienna talks, Special Envoy for Arms Control Marshall Billingslea, who led the U.S. delegation at the negotiations tweeted a picture of the table, with some empty seats reserved with Chinese flags. “Vienna talks about to start,” he said. “China is a no-show…We will proceed with Russia, notwithstanding.”

Fu Cong, director-general of the department of arms control of China’s foreign ministry, replied, “What an odd scene…Good luck on the extension of the New START! Wonder how LOW you can go?” The United States and Russia are currently believed to possess about 6,000 total nuclear weapons apiece, while China has roughly 300.

According to the Arms Control Association, following the Vienna talks, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian said on June 23 that the U.S. placement of Chinese flags at empty seats “is unserious, unprofessional and unappealing for the U.S. to try getting people’s eyes in this way”.

He also noted the incorrect design of the flags that the United States set on the table. “We hope certain people in the U.S. can do their homework and improve their general knowledge to avoid becoming a laughingstock,” he added.

The Trump administration claims that China is engaged in a secret crash program to build up its nuclear forces and that future arms control efforts must include Beijing.

But China has repeatedly refused to join either trilateral talks with the United States and Russia or bilateral talks with the United States.

Before the talks in Vienna, Billingslea on June 8 invited Beijing to join, but the following day, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying declined the invitation. “China has repeatedly reiterated that it has no intention of participating in the so-called trilateral arms control negotiations with the United States and Russia,” he said. “This position is very clear.”

Billingslea urged China to reconsider. “Achieving Great Power status requires behaving with Great Power responsibility,” he tweeted June 9. “No more Great Wall of Secrecy on its nuclear build-up.”

Secretary of State Mike Pompeo held a meeting in Hawaii June 18 with Yang Jiechi, director of China’s Foreign Affairs Office. It is not clear to what extent arms control was discussed at the meeting. After the meeting, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs David Stilwell told reporters that Washington is “looking for [Beijing’s] positive engagement in trilateral arms talks… We’d like them to participate in these talks that prevent an unfortunate outcome.”

Defence Secretary Esper echoed similar views at a June 18 meeting with the defence ministers of the NATO. Esper “talked about the urgency of engaging in meaningful trilateral arms control efforts with both Russia and China,” according to a Defence Department readout.

Russia has refused to force China to change its position and join the talks, despite pressure from the United States to do so.

“China should itself decide whether these talks are beneficial for the country,” said Russian Ambassador to the United States Anatoly Antonov June 20. “We will not force our Chinese friends.”

Antonov also repeated a long-time Russian stance that, if China joins arms control talks, then U.S. allies France and the United Kingdom should as well.

Billingslea acknowledged that the U.S. “definition of multilateral might be different, but the principle remains the same”. He claimed that China’s nuclear build-up poses a much greater threat than the French and British nuclear arsenals.

The Trump administration has yet to put forward a concrete proposal for what it wants arms control with China to achieve or detail what the United States would be willing to put forward as concessions in trilateral talks with Russia and China. [IDN-InDepthNews – 27 June 2020]

Photo: Governor Tamaki (right) with U.S. Marines stationed in Okinawa (2019). Public domain | Source: Wikimedia Commons

IDN is flagship agency of the Non-profit International Press Syndicate.

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We’re Very Lucky That Russia Never Shot Its Nuclear Bomb ‘Cannons’ …YET

We’re Very Lucky That Russia Never Shot Its Nuclear Bomb ‘Cannons’ At NATO

Here’s What You Need To Remember: The Soviets would continue developing tactical nukes for use in artillery, but later shells utilized miniaturized warheads that allowed nukes to fit in compact projectiles in the Soviet-standard 152mm and 203mm calibers. Likewise, the United States also made nuclear shells in the 155mm and 203mm calibers after abandoning the 260mm M65 cannon.

In the 1950s, both NATO and Warsaw Pact doctrine focused on the employment of tactical nuclear weapons. Truly strategic nuclear weapons and the doctrine of mutually assured destruction (MAD) were at their infancy at the time, so nuclear weapons were seen as a tactical as well as a strategic tool.

As a result, both the United States and the Soviet Union developed a multitude of battlefield nukes, from the tiny Davy Crockett nuclear recoilless rifle to the M65 Atomic Cannon. The Soviet Union responded in kind, beginning the development of their own massive atomic howitzers and even mortars.

The largest of these pieces was the massive 406mm Soviet 2A3 “Kondensator.” But in the end, this piece was a failure. It was mechanically complex and obsolete by the time it was adopted.

Why did the Soviet Union produce these massive white elephants? Can anything be learned from the folly of the 2A3? Why was the caliber so huge compared to American guns?

The story of the 2A3 begins in 1954. The United States had rolled out the 280mm M65 atomic cannon just a year before, and the Soviets needed to catch up. Their response came in two forms, the 406mm howitzer (2A3/Object 271) and a 420mm mortar (2B1/Object 273).

The initiative to develop these two weapons was approved by the Council of Ministers in April 1955. The first ballistic test barrel was completed later that year, and in December 1956 the first prototype was created by mating the gun with the chassis. The design was paraded on Red Square in 1957.

The chassis for the 2A3 was derived from the T-10 heavy tank with additional hydraulic shock absorbers to absorb the massive recoil force of the 406mm projectile. Despite these measures, the 2A3 would travel a few meters back with every shot, and inevitably something would break and minor repairs would have to be conducted.

Aiming the gun was largely achieved by rotating the chassis, although small precision adjustments could be made with a limited electric traverse mechanism.

The reason for the massive caliber of the cannon was simple: Soviet engineers at the time weren’t sure if they could construct compact nuclear ammunition, so a large caliber was specified to make the design of the nuclear projectile easier.

The final projectile design weighed 570kg and could be launched out to a range of around twenty-five kilometers, just a few less than the M65 Atomic Cannon and far less than modern conventional artillery. The whole vehicle weighed around sixty-five tons.

As a result of this massive weight, the 2A3 was incredibly slow and faced significant mobility challenges; it couldn’t travel across most bridges and its massive size meant that it couldn’t really travel through cities or even under some low hanging power lines.

The range was also found to be lacking relative to nuclear rockets or modern tactical missiles. As a result, production of the 2A3 was cut off after only four units were produced in favor of newer nuclear rocket such as the Luna (FROG-7). These missile systems were far more mobile and compact relative to the massive 2A3 and had almost triple the range at seventy kilometers.

The Soviets developed the 2A3 was a response to American nuclear artillery. Unfortunately, as its development dragged on the entire concept became obsolete.

Perhaps what can be learned is that in making “big” guns and rockets, it’s always best to keep an eye on upcoming technologies that could fundamentally alter the battlefield such guns might fight on.

The Soviets would continue developing tactical nukes for use in artillery, but later shells utilized miniaturized warheads that allowed nukes to fit in compact projectiles in the Soviet-standard 152mm and 203mm calibers. Likewise, the United States also made nuclear shells in the 155mm and 203mm calibers after abandoning the 260mm M65 cannon.

Charlie Gao studied political and computer science at Grinnell College and is a frequent commentator on defense and national security issues.

Image: Wikimedia Commons.

Iran Continues to Spin Her Nukes (Daniel 8:4)

Iran’s uranium enrichment program

June 26, 2020

Lt. Col. (res.) Dr. Raphael Ofek

Iran continues to insist that its nuclear program is designed for peaceful purposes despite all evidence of its military nature. This evidence includes the IAEA’s recent findings regarding Tehran’s progress in the field of uranium enrichment. Given Iran’s current uranium holdings and enrichment capabilities, it can theoretically break out from its NPT commitment and develop its first nuclear bomb within four months.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director-General issued a report on June 5, 2020 that is worded to deflate Iran’s renunciation of its signing of the JCPOA nuclear agreement. The report notes Tehran’s announcement on January 5 that its nuclear program is no longer “subject to any restrictions in the operational sphere,” but also notes that it claims a willingness to “continue to cooperate with the agency as in the past.”

Be that as it may, the report is hardly reassuring.

On June 1, Iran notified the agency that it has decided to stop implementing its commitment to limit centrifuge research and development. The report goes on to detail Tehran’s many deviations from the nuclear agreement, as discovered by the IAEA inspectors. These deviations include the following:

On July 1, 2019, the agency verified that Iran’s accumulated enriched uranium stock exceeds the allowable amount of 300 kg of UF6 (uranium hexa-fluoride compound used in the uranium enrichment process) enriched to 3.67% (uranium content at 300 kg UF6 is 202.8 kg).

On July 9, 2019, Iran began enriching uranium up to 4.5%, above the allowable rate of 3.67%.

On November 6, 2019, Iran began once again to enrich uranium at the Fordow facility using 1,044 IR-1 centrifuges (Iran’s first centrifuge model).

On May 11, 2020, Iran’s heavy water stockpile reached 132.6 tons. This exceeds the quantity allowed for aggregation (up to 130 tons).

According to recent IAEA examinations, Iran has developed and manufactured centrifuge components as well as assembled centrifuge cascades in violation of the nuclear agreement.

On May 20, 2020, the IAEA verified that the enriched uranium stockpile accumulated by Iran had reached a volume of 1,571.6 kg (550.7 kg over the amount found in the previous quarterly report). This quantity included 873.4 kg of enriched uranium to 4.5%, 215.1 kg of uranium enriched at 3.67%, and uranium enriched up to 2% or less. This is a significant breach of the agreement by Iran.

The most significant deviation from the agreement, which was discovered on June 1, 2020, was the operation at the Natanz enrichment plant of advanced centrifuges developed in Iran for uranium enrichment to 4.5%: 164 IR-2m centrifuges, 164 IR-4 centrifuges, and 164 IR-6 centrifuges. According to a report by the Washington-based Institute of Science and International Security (ISIS) of June 8, 2020, which referred to the latest IAEA report, the IR-2m centrifuge enrichment capacity is 3.7 SWU (Separative Work Unit) per year, the estimated capacity of the IR-4 model is about 3.3 SWU/year, and the estimated capacity of the IR-6 centrifuge is 6.8 SWU/year. This can be compared with the first Iranian model, the IR-1, which, based on IAEA reports from the first half of this decade, is about 0.9 SWU/year.

As previously reported in the media, for example in the case of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons project (which, as is well known, has supplied knowhow on this topic to Iran in the past), to enrich natural uranium (whose fissile uranium-235 isotope’s concentration is about 0.7%) to 90% (weapons grade), the enrichment process must be performed in four steps. They are: enrichment to less than 5%; enrichment of the product obtained from the previous stage to 20%; enrichment to 60%, and finally to 90%. Theoretically, if Iran’s current uranium quantities—one portion enriched to 4.5% (873.4 kg) and the other to 3.67% (215.1 kg) as of May 20—were subsequently enriched to 20%, 60%, and 90%, the final product would be about 15 kg of uranium enriched to 90%. That is enough to produce one nuclear bomb core.

The enrichment capacity required for this is approximately 2,800 SWU. If we include the IR-1 centrifuges that Iran operates—5,600 at Natanz and 1,044 at Fordow—Iran’s current enrichment capacity is about 8,240 SWU/year. This implies that within four months, Iran could break out of its commitment to the NPT and enrich the amount of uranium it needs for its first nuclear bomb.

Kazem Garibabadi, Iran’s representative at the IAEA, confirmed the data presented in the IAEA’s latest report. He stressed that while Iran has suspended its 2015 commitments under the JCPOA nuclear agreement, it continues to cooperate with the IAEA in “nuclear verification and monitoring.” As for its decision in January to withdraw from the agreement, Tehran said that was in response to the sanctions imposed on it by the US and a signal to the EU, which it believes has not acted sufficiently to revoke or circumvent those sanctions.

Garibabadi’s comments appeared to reflect his country’s official statement that its nuclear program is “peaceful,” and that its signing of the 2015 nuclear agreement was “voluntary.” He also apparently wanted to send a message to the IAEA member states that Iran’s significant progress in developing its enrichment program is of a civilian nature.

Iran’s presentation of itself as a country building a peaceful nuclear program is flatly contradicted by the vast amount of intelligence revealed to date, particularly that gleaned from the “Iran’s Nuclear Archive” operation. That intelligence unequivocally indicated that the program is intended primarily for nuclear weapons production.

According to a March 3 report, the IAEA said it has identified three sites in Iran, undisclosed by the regime, where it may be storing undeclared nuclear materials or carrying out nuclear-related activities. In a statement to the IAEA’s Board of Governors on March 9, IAEA Director-General Rafael Grossi urged Iran to fully cooperate with IAEA inspectors and allow them quick access to the suspected sites.

Garibabadi had this to say on the matter: “’Intelligence services’ (of course Western services) fabricated information… [which] creates no obligation for Iran to consider such requests.”

In April, a cyberattack attributed to Iran on Israeli water facilities was intended to increase the concentration of chlorine in the drinking water of Israeli citizens. Had it succeeded, the attack would have sickened many Israeli civilians and deprived many more of drinking water during a heat wave. Fortunately, the Iranian attack was detected at its beginning and thwarted before it could do any damage.

Iran’s attempt to poison the citizens of a country it considers to be an enemy demonstrates its willingness to go far to harm the State of Israel. As it has stated many times over four decades, it wishes to destroy Israel completely. If it succeeds in achieving a nuclear arsenal, that would constitute an existential threat to Israel.

Lt. Col. (res.) Dr. Raphael Ofek, a BESA Center Research Associate, is an expert in the field of nuclear physics and technology who served as a senior analyst in the Israeli intelligence community.