China Enlarges Her Nuclear Horn (Daniel 7:7)

China Wants More Nuclear-Armed Submarines. Should Everyone Be Worried?

Tong Zhao

What does China’s nuclear capability look like now compared to other nuclear-armed countries?

China releases no official information about its nuclear weapons stockpile. However, according to open-source research, China currently has fewer than 300 nuclear warheads.

Tong Zhao

Tong Zhao is a fellow in Carnegie’s Nuclear Policy Program based at the Carnegie–Tsinghua Center for Global Policy.

China also has a wide range of nuclear weapon delivery systems. These are mostly ballistic missiles of various ranges, which can carry nuclear warheads to targets around the world.

Unlike those of the United States and Russia, it is commonly believed that China’s nuclear weapons are kept in storage and are not deployed on active alert in peacetime.

Does China have more or fewer nuclear weapons than its peers?

China’s overall nuclear arsenal is at least ten times smaller than those of the United States or Russia. Washington and Moscow each have around 4,000 nuclear weapons in their arsenals, plus thousands more that are retired and waiting to be dismantled.

China’s nuclear stockpile is of a similar scale to those of other medium-sized nuclear weapon states. It seems to be slightly smaller than that of France, which has about 300 warheads, but a bit larger than that of the UK, which has about 215.

Why does China want more nuclear weapons in the first place?

China feels that the credibility of its existing nuclear deterrent is not strong enough.

In other words, Beijing is anxious that other countries are not completely convinced that, if they were to launch a preemptive strike against China’s nuclear weapons, China would be able to strike back and destroy them.

If China only needs enough nuclear weapons to show it can defend itself, why does it want more?

As long as there is a decent chance that some Chinese nuclear weapons could survive a hypothetical hostile first strike and be available for a Chinese counterstrike, Beijing’s deterrent would be credible enough.

The problem is that many Chinese experts have started to worry that this second-strike credibility is eroding. They believe China needs more and better nuclear weapons to show that it could still strike back if attacked.

Their fear is mainly due to new challenges from emerging non-nuclear technologies, such as missile defense and conventional precision strike weapons.

Chinese experts worry that other countries’ conventional weapons are now sophisticated enough to endanger Chinese nuclear weapons, if the other country struck first.

And enemy missile defense could make it harder for China to strike back. This is because any remaining Chinese nuclear missiles that survived a hypothetical first strike would risk being shot down before reaching their targets.

Worse, some U.S. experts have published research that says a first strike by the United States could potentially strip China of any ability to retaliate with nuclear weapons. In light of such research, Beijing is increasingly uneasy and keen to make its nuclear forces more robust, more diverse, and more high-tech.

Does China want to increase the size of its nuclear arsenal overall?

China’s main goal is not to significantly increase its number of nuclear weapons.

Instead, Beijing wants to arm certain submarines with nuclear warheads. The plan is to diversify the structure of its nuclear force and to make sure that each category of nuclear weapons would be as survivable as possible. Essentially, China wants to avoid having all its eggs in one basket.

How many nuclear submarines does China want?

As a rule, China would need at least four nuclear-armed submarines to keep one submarine deployable at all times. This is because the other three submarines would need to undergo regular maintenance and crew training or would be on their way to or from patrol areas.

By the same logic, if Beijing feels it needs to keep at least two nuclear-armed submarines constantly at sea to constitute a credible deterrent, it would have to build at least eight nuclear-armed submarines.

Why do maintenance and refueling take so long?

Submarines need frequent and regular maintenance. In particular, refueling submarine reactors is a time-consuming, expensive process, which typically involves cutting the submarine open.

For example, one type of nuclear-armed submarine, the U.S. Ohio-class model, currently requires a four-year, mid-life overhaul, including a two-year refueling period. Future models of this particular U.S. submarine will have a core that lasts as long as the ship itself, but it is unlikely that Chinese submarines will be so cutting-edge.

Can China just move underwater some of the nuclear weapons it already has on land?

No. These additional warheads cannot simply come from the existing land-based missile force.

This is because land-based missiles are still the most important component of China’s nuclear deterrent. Even if China uses the same type of warheads for its submarine-launched missiles, it cannot afford to risk undermining its land-based deterrent by moving too many of those warheads out to sea.

Why is it a good idea to keep nuclear weapons underwater in the first place?

The mainstream view is that putting nuclear weapons on submarines makes them more likely to survive enemy detection and attack. In most cases, it is harder for an enemy to detect and track submarines in the open ocean than land-based missiles.

Submarine-launched missiles have another benefit. They make it difficult for an enemy to predict where a missile strike may come from. This could make it harder for the enemy to intercept the missiles.

Does putting nuclear weapons underwater make them harder to defend?

It depends. The noisier a submarine is, the more vulnerable it is. That’s because enemy technology can detect where submarines are by the sounds they make. To build and maintain a quiet fleet requires advanced technology and good operational experience. Beijing is still in the process of trying to achieve these standards.

What’s more, putting nuclear weapons on submarines would mean that China is deploying its nuclear weapons outside of its territory for the first time, making them more vulnerable to potential enemies.

How might other countries respond to China getting more nuclear submarines?

Other countries may see China’s growing nuclear submarine fleet as part of an effort to beef up its nuclear forces and to make nuclear weapons a bigger part of the country’s national security strategy.

A new Chinese submarine (Type 094a) that is capable of carrying nuclear warheads

If they believe this to be the case, U.S. allies may rely more on the U.S. nuclear umbrella for their security. This commits the United States to responding with a nuclear counterstrike if a rival were to launch a nuclear attack against one of its allies.

To protect its nuclear-armed submarines, China needs to deploy massive general-purpose forces in its coastal waters to fend off enemy ships and aircraft that could threaten them. Other countries may see this as an aggressive Chinese move to seek regional military dominance. Neighboring countries may increase their security cooperation with the United States, and among themselves, to counter the perceived growth of China’s sphere of influence.

What might be the broader consequences?

A growing Chinese nuclear stockpile may make the United States and Russia more reluctant to reduce their own nuclear arsenals.

If the world’s major powers were to renew their interest in nuclear weapons, this would have a devastating impact on regional and international strategic stability. Everyone would feel a greater need to invest more in their own nuclear weapons and would feel less secure.

Furthermore, by adding more Chinese military patrols to already crowded waters, China’s efforts to protect its submarines and counter U.S. anti-submarine warfare would also make things more tense between conventional military forces. There would be no winner in the end.

Could these dynamics make a nuclear war more likely?

The risk of a nuclear war may increase as a result of unforeseen incidents and unintentional escalations.

One issue is that China’s nuclear-armed submarines could be mistaken for nuclear-powered attack submarines armed with only conventional weapons. Nuclear attack submarines are nuclear-powered, but they do not carry nuclear weapons, whereas nuclear strategic submarines do. A threat to the latter is seen as a much higher-level threat.

In a crisis, for example, the Chinese could misinterpret a U.S. effort to track and trail China’s conventionally armed nuclear attack submarines. They might wrongly believe that the United States was actually preparing for a preemptive strike against China’s nuclear strategic submarines, which probably operate in the same area.

In such a scenario, China might decide to use its nuclear weapons before it believes they will be destroyed, resulting in a nuclear exchange.

The reported lack of reliability in China’s nuclear command, control, and communication system may make such risks even more dangerous. If there were a breakdown in communication in a crisis, it would be more likely that China might misjudge the situation and overact.

What do people in the West not understand about how China thinks about its nuclear deterrent?

President Donald Trump and his administration’s 2018 Nuclear Posture Review portrays China as adopting some sort of escalate to de-escalate strategy—meaning that Beijing supposedly may intend to use nuclear weapons first to intimidate an enemy if China were facing a major defeat in a hypothetical conventional military conflict.

In such an instance, this line of U.S. thinking goes, Washington would have to consider using tactical nuclear weapons to deter or respond to Beijing’s potential use of nuclear weapons.

But there is no evidence that China actually does embrace or is considering such a strategy. On the contrary, Chinese military strategists seem to have incorporated the country’s unconditional no-first-use policy deeply in their military thinking and planning.

This U.S. misunderstanding of China’s nuclear posture could lead to misjudgment and overreaction, which could increase the risk of inadvertent nuclear war.

What should China and other countries do to make a nuclear war less likely?

They need to better understand each other’s nuclear thinking and nuclear postures, and they must avoid exaggerated threat perceptions and overreactions.

They ought to limit the role of nuclear weapons to only deterring the use of nuclear weapons by others, thus minimizing the part nuclear weapons play in their national security strategies.

They should also avoid dangerous nuclear postures, such as putting nuclear forces on high alert during peacetime or allowing nuclear and conventional weapon systems to share the same set of command, control, and communication systems.

Finally, they should give up any plans to incorporate unproven artificial intelligence technologies with nuclear weapons (such as self-navigating nuclear torpedoes) or efforts to use cyber technologies to interfere with each other’s nuclear command, control, and communication systems.

A Closer Look At The Sixth Seal (Revelation 6:12)

A Closer Look At The Sixth Seal (Rev 6:12)

A Look at the Tri-State’s Active Fault Line

Monday, March 14, 2011

By Bob Hennelly

The Ramapo Fault is the longest fault in the Northeast that occasionally makes local headlines when minor tremors cause rock the Tri-State region. It begins in Pennsylvania, crosses the Delaware River and continues through Hunterdon, Somerset, Morris, Passaic and Bergen counties before crossing the Hudson River near Indian Point nuclear facility.

In the past, it has generated occasional activity that generated a 2.6 magnitude quake in New Jersey’s Peakpack/Gladstone area and 3.0 magnitude quake in Mendham.

But the New Jersey-New York region is relatively seismically stable according to Dr. Dave Robinson, Professor of Geography at Rutgers. Although it does have activity.

“There is occasional seismic activity in New Jersey,” said Robinson. “There have been a few quakes locally that have been felt and done a little bit of damage over the time since colonial settlement — some chimneys knocked down in Manhattan with a quake back in the 18th century, but nothing of a significant magnitude.”

Robinson said the Ramapo has on occasion registered a measurable quake but has not caused damage: “The Ramapo fault is associated with geological activities back 200 million years ago, but it’s still a little creaky now and again,” he said.

“More recently, in the 1970s and early 1980s, earthquake risk along the Ramapo Fault received attention because of its proximity to Indian Point,” according to the New Jersey Geological Survey website.

Historically, critics of the Indian Point Nuclear facility in Westchester County, New York, did cite its proximity to the Ramapo fault line as a significant risk.

In 1884, according to the New Jersey Geological Survey website, the  Rampao Fault was blamed for a 5.5 quake that toppled chimneys in New York City and New Jersey that was felt from Maine to Virginia.

“Subsequent investigations have shown the 1884 Earthquake epicenter was actually located in Brooklyn, New York, at least 25 miles from the Ramapo Fault,” according to the New Jersey Geological Survey website.

The Antichrist is Iraq’s Political Savior

Iraq’s top cleric is becoming its political savior

Geneive Abdo, Bloomberg

9:57 am EDT, Monday, October 22, 2018

It took five months since Iraq’s national elections, but the country finally has a new prime minister, Adel Abdul-Mahdi. In truth, however, neither he nor new President Barham Salih nor the firebrand cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, whose alliance won the most parliamentary seats in May, will likely have the greatest influence over whether Iraq can make the reforms necessary to become a stable and prosperous country.

Rather, the key figure is Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, 88, the senior cleric in Iraq’s Shiite religious hierarchy. While Sistani has followed the Shiite tradition of generally staying away from a direct role in politics, he engaged in backroom negotiations for months to bring together the contentious factions that eventually reached a compromise on Abdul Mahdi, an economist and former vice president.

Sistani’s position at the pinnacle of the political pyramid is unprecedented for an Iraqi cleric. Throughout the history of Shiism – until the 1979 revolution that led to the creation of an Islamic theocracy in Iran – religious leaders refused to assert themselves directly into affairs of the state.

It was Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, leader of the Iranian revolt, who radicalized the role of senior clerics with his concept of velayat e-faqih, literally “guardian of the Islamic jurist.” Khomeini’s rationalization for entering politics was based upon the idea that as representatives on earth of the Hidden Imam – also known as the Mahdi – clerics, namely himself, were to take absolute political power over all believers.

Sistani, an Iranian citizen, opposes this idea of the velayat because he believes it leads to dictatorship, Iran being the perfect example. But he has departed from his traditional nonpolitical position because he understands the Iraqi state is currently weak, caught in partisan struggle and vulnerable to Iran’s strategic ambitions.

He is said to be very concerned that Iran has played an increasingly greater role in Iraq since the U.S. withdrew most of its forces in 2011. This is not to say that Iraq’s most powerful cleric is always allied with, or subservient to, American interests. He is, first and foremost, a nationalist.

Clerical sources in the Shiite holy city of Najaf tell me it is only out of “necessity” – what is known as maslahat in Islam – that Sistani is now playing this prominent role in government. Khomeini used the same concept when he declared himself the ultimate leader of Iran, less than a year after he re-entered Iran from exile to lead the revolution.

But there is an important distinction between the ways the two men have interpreted maslahat. Sistani sees it as a social and moral imperative to uphold the general welfare, what in Arabic is called al-hisbah, and requires one in a position of authority to intervene to “enjoin good and forbid wrongdoing.” Khomeini, on the other hand, did not distinguish between the public’s welfare and that of the state.

Sistani derives his influence not by appointment – like Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei – but by being a model whom Shiite Muslims can emulate. This gives him sway over his followers’ daily lives not only in Iraq but across the region. While this is the first time he has used this influence directly in partisan politics, he has previously asserted his authority to help the nation. He was outspoken in urging Iraqis to fight against the Islamic State, and he has on occasion served as a neutralizer between Iran and the U.S. As a result, he has been at odds with Sadr, who in the past had his followers fight U.S. troops and believed the U.S. should depart from the country.

By expanding his role beyond the realm of religion to include issues such as maintaining public order, Sistani could be charting a new and lasting course for the Iraqi clerical establishment, known as the marjiyya. The big questions are whether he can continue to fulfill this broader role, and whether after his death more clerics will emerge who will be able to exercise similar influence.

In either case, Iraqis should wish for Sistani’s interventions to continue, because above all he is a compromiser. Not only did his strong hand help break the stalemate in forming the new government, but also resulted in Salih becoming president. The Kurdish leader has a reputation as a peacemaker and is a darling of Washington. (Abdul Mahdi, a technocrat a heart, is thought to be more neutral in the competition between the U.S. and Iran.)

Sistani’s role in all this showed political acumen. Initially, he issued a directive saying that no politician who had served in office in the past should be allowed to take the prime ministership. But, according to Sistani’s son Mohammad Reza, Abdul Mahdi was exempted from this restriction because he had resigned from his most recent position as Iraq’s oil minister before he completed his term.

In promoting Abdul Mahdi, Sistani was able to remove from contention two other candidates who are heavily under Iranian influence: Nouri al-Maliki, who held the premiership from 2006 to 2014, and Hadi Ameri, a militia leader whose coalition grabbed the second-most parliamentary seats in May. Sistani even used one of his Friday prayer sermons to indirectly criticize Maliki, telling Iraqis to “avoid falling into the trap of those … who are corrupt and those who have failed.”

Sistani and other top clerics believe Iran wields far too much influence in Iraq, and have worked for years to limit Tehran’s sway. “There is a desire among the marjiyya and the public to have a new government of true national unity,” Jawad al-Khoie, a religious scholar and professor in Najaf, told me. But like many in Iraq, the Shiite religious establishment fears outside interference. “The interventions and pressures may not allow this to happen,” al-Khoie said.

Sistani’s role as power broker is a good thing for Iraqis as they try to move away from their sectarian identities and toward a more nationalistic identity. Yes, the government still suffers from corruption, economic mismanagement and political polarization, and it will take strong secular leadership to create the stability Sistani is seeking. The question is whether such progress will be made during the ayatollah’s lifetime.

– Abdo is a resident scholar at the Arabia Foundation and the author of four books, most recently “The New Sectarianism: The Arab Uprisings and the Rebirth of the Shi’a-Sunni Divide.”

Babylon the Great Prepares to Nuke UP

Trump threatens nuclear buildup until other nations ‘come to their senses’

Washington (CNN) — President Donald Trump told reporters Monday that the United States would increase its nuclear arsenal until other nations “come to their senses,” threatening an arms race days after he said he would withdraw the US from a Cold War nuclear treaty.

“Until people come to their senses, we will build it up,” Trump said from outside the White House.

Trump announced over the weekend that he intended to pull the US out of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty with Russia and accused Russia of violating the deal.

Some observers, including Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Bob Corker, have said the announcement could be a move to push Russia into compliance, and Trump, in his comments on Monday, said he hoped to include China in the arrangement.

Trump repeated on Monday that Russia had not adhered to the Cold War-era treaty and said his vow to increase the US nuclear stockpile included a posture against China as well.

“It’s a threat to whoever you want,” Trump said. “And it includes China, and it includes Russia, and it includes anybody else that wants to play that game. You can’t do that. You can’t play that game on me.”

Trump noted that China was not a party to the agreement, but said, “They should be included.”

Russia has denied it is in violation of the treaty, and former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev — who signed the deal with US President Ronald Reagan in 1987 — said the US announcement was “very irresponsible.”

Despite threatening to spend vast sums to increase the US nuclear arsenal, Trump said ultimately he hoped to bring the country back onto the path of reducing its weapons stockpiles.

“We have more money than anybody else by far,” Trump said. “We’ll build it up until they come to their senses. When they do, then we’ll all be smart, and we’ll all stop. And by the way not only stop, we’ll reduce, which I would love to do. But right now, they have not adhered to the agreement.”

The Cauldron Outside the Temple Walls Continues On (Revelation 11:2)

428785The Palestine Cauldron Boils on

Posted by NDT Special Bureau

October 22, 2018

By NDT Special Bureau

Just over a fortnight back, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu met with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in New York on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly to discuss Gaza and revive peace talks with the Palestinians. The two leaders also “discussed regional developments and the situation in Gaza” during the two-hour-long meeting.

In recent months, mass protests along Gaza’s border with Israel have triggered repeated deadly clashes between Hamas militia and the Israeli army.

With each clash, there emerge clear warnings of the risk escalating the conflict several notches to a new level to be the new normal. The World Bank warned recently that the Gaza Strip’s economy is in “free fall”. The cuts to aid and salaries add to an already crippling Israeli blockade on the Hamas-run enclave.

Gaza is sandwiched between Israel and Egypt. A destabilised Gaza in the neighbourhood is not in Egypt’s interests. Hence, it is coordinating with the UN to broker a long-term truce between Israel and Hamas. Egypt was the first Arab country to sign a peace treaty with Israel in 1979. Amongst all the regional leaders, Netanyahu seems to have cultivated the best possible rapport with Sisi as both have met on several occasions since the latter came to power. President Sisi has also been discussing with Netanyahu ways of reviving the Israel-Palestinians peace process. Sisi told Netanyahu that “a final and just settlement to the Palestinian issue would contribute to providing a new situation in the Middle East.” However, such efforts have been stalled in recent weeks. Netanyahu told Israeli journalists that he would never relinquish security control over the West Bank.

In addition, Egypt is also mediating reconciliation talks between two Palestinian warring groups – religious fundamentalist Hamas and secular Fatah movement. Their spillover of decade-long bloody split in 2008 continues.

Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas in his recent speech at the UN General Assembly was too critical of Israel’s recently passed ‘nation-state’ law. He termed it a racist law designed to erase the Palestinians’ link with their homeland. “Jerusalem is not for sale,” he said reacting to the American decision to recognise the city as Israel’s capital and to shift its embassy there. Donald Trump’s ‘deal of the century’ to bring ‘peace’ between Israel and the Arabs could legitimise the current status quo confining the Palestinians to Bantustans.

The implications of Abbas’s warning is that rather than dousing the conflict, Americans peace plan, to be implemented with the help of regional Arab countries, could initiate another intifada. When Jews reclaim the Haram al-Sharif to build the Third Temple, the danger of greater communal violence could conflagrate to reality.

Islamist group Hamas now controls Gaza. Fresh violence ensued along the Gaza border on October 12, killing seven Palestinians in clashes. Israel accused Hamas of using demonstrations as cover for attacks against the Jewish state, suspended fuel deliveries and threatened to inflict “very strong blows” on Hamas. “Hamas has apparently not understood the message – if these attacks do not stop, they will be stopped in another way, in the form of very, very strong blows”, Netanyahu said during the weekly cabinet meeting.

Confronted with never-ending Hamas militancy, Israel has now issued another threat to Hamas to desist from creating chaos in the region. Both the parties must try to end the continuous war and end it forever to ensure peace and stability in the region. Compromise seems to be the inevitable and the best possible solution under the circumstances.

But Iran’s strong backing of Hamas – which lays credence to the dictum that “Iran is Hamas,” complicates the matter further. This also makes Iran – Israel confrontation a closer, imminent and more dangerous possibility.

The Truth About Iran’s Nuclear Program (Daniel 8:4)

In his speech to the U.N. General Assembly last month, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu revealed that Iran, in addition to having an archive of files documenting its illicit military nuclear research, has a warehouse containing nuclear equipment and material. The prime minister exhorted International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Yukiya Amano to “go and inspect this atomic warehouse immediately,” before Iran hides its contents.

A week later, however, the IAEA rejected his suggestion. In a statement, the agency said, “All information obtained, including from third parties, is subject to rigorous review and assessed together with other available information to arrive at an independent assessment based on the agency’s own expertise.”

This wasn’t the first time the IAEA failed to investigate possible Iranian violations discovered by Israeli intelligence. When Israel in April smuggled out a half-ton of documents and CDs from a Tehran warehouse, the IAEA issued a similar statement: “In line with standard IAEA practice, the IAEA evaluates all (nuclear) safeguards-relevant information available to it,” but gave no indication that it would investigate further.

Israel subsequently shared many of the files it recovered from Iran with independent weapons experts and selected journalists. The Wall Street Journal assessed in July that the documents showed not only aspects of the Iranian nuclear weapons program the IAEA knew about, but also details “about which international inspectors were unaware.”

Though it is charged with monitoring Iran’s compliance with the nuclear accord, at least twice the IAEA has acknowledged it was not verifying compliance. In September 2017, Amano said the IAEA did not have the tools to verify items listed in Section T of the accord, governing “activities which could contribute to the development of a nuclear explosive device.” David Albright, president of the nonpartisan Institute of Science and International Security and a former weapons inspector, said the statement was an admission that “the deal is not fully implemented.”

In announcing the Iran nuclear deal in January 2016, President Obama said Iran couldn’t possibly cheat because the agreement ensured “the most comprehensive, intrusive inspection regime ever negotiated to monitor a nuclear program.” The guarantee for Iran’s full compliance, therefore, was one of the central selling points of the accord. However, critics at the time pointed out that the IAEA did not, in fact, have complete knowledge of Iran’s nuclear weapons program.

In an analysis of the final IAEA report on the past military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program, Albright observed that, “Iran did not provide the IAEA with anywhere near a full declaration about its past nuclear weapons related activities, and it did not provide the kind of transparency and cooperation required for the IAEA to conclude its investigation.”

This effectively meant the nuclear watchdog was unable to explain in full Iran’s nuclear weapons activities, including verification that Iran’s nuclear program had been completely dismantled.

The gaps in the IAEA’s knowledge — of Iran’s past nuclear work, of its military sites, of items mentioned in Section T of the nuclear deal, and of the nuclear sites discovered by Israeli intelligence — raise questions about the full extent of Iran’s nuclear program. These gaps are important as we approach November, when President Trump

Defenders of the nuclear deal have argued that the United States is wrong to impose sanctions on Iran because the IAEA confirmed it has been complying with the deal. But with its failure to establish a full picture of Iran’s nuclear ambitions, it can’t be said to have confirmed the country’s compliance; just that Iran didn’t blatantly violate the deal at any site that the IAEA has access to.

When he revealed Iran’s nuclear archive in April, Netanyahu said Iran kept the files to “use them at a later date.” In other words, the gaps in the IAEA’s knowledge of Iran’s nuclear program mean the deal enables Iran to do what Obama said the accord would never allow: develop nuclear weapons.

There is a lot that we don’t know about Iran’s nuclear program. There is a lot we will be unable to know because the deal has too many holes, and the IAEA is unable — or unwilling — to address them.

Joshua S. Block is CEO and president of The Israel Project. He is a former Clinton administration official and spokesman at the State Department’s USAID. He got his start on Capitol Hill in the office of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy and was a spokesman for the Clinton/Gore and Gore/Lieberman presidential campaigns. Follow him on Twitter @JoshBlockDC.