OBAMA AIDS IRANIAN NUCLEAR TERROR

October 6, 2016 Daniel Greenfield
Daniel Greenfield, a Shillman Journalism Fellow at the Freedom Center, is a New York writer focusing on radical Islam.
Senator Obama opposed naming Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps a terror group even while it was closely involved in organizing attacks against American soldiers in Iraq. Then, as part of his dirty deal with Iran, he secretly sent a fortune in foreign cash on airplanes linked to the IRGC.
And, as another part of the secret ransom deal with Iran, he lifted UN sanctions on Bank Sepah.
The United States has gone after plenty of banks for aiding terror finance, but Bank Sepah is somewhat unique in that it is a financial institution actually owned and operated by Islamic terrorists.
Bank Sepah is an IRGC bank. The IRGC, despite Obama’s denials, is an Islamic terror group with American blood on its hands. It is to Shiite Islam what ISIS is to Sunni Islam. And even the Democrats know it.
After the Khobar Towers bombing, which killed 19 Americans, President Clinton sent a message to the leader of Iran warning that the United States had evidence of IRGC involvement in the attack.
More recently, Secretary of State John Kerry admitted that the IRGC have been “labeled as terrorists” when discussing how the Shiite terror organization will benefit from Obama’s sanctions relief.
Bank Sepah however had been sanctioned for something bigger than terrorism. The scale of bombings it was involved in could make the Khobar Towers attack seem minor. Sepah had been sanctioned for being „involved in nuclear or ballistic missile activities.“
Among other activities, it had helped Iran buy ballistic missile technology from North Korea.
Iran’s nuclear weapons program would only be halfway complete if it gets the bomb. It also needs missiles to be able to strike Israel, Europe and eventually America. That’s where North Korea and Bank Sepah come in. Bank Sepah helps keep Iran’s ballistic missile industry viable. By delisting it, Obama aided Iran’s ballistic missile program just as he had earlier aided its nuclear program.
Obama’s holistic approach to the Iranian bomb is to help the terror state assemble the physical components it needs to become a nuclear power. And the truth is hidden within the secret deals.
There are secret deals that Obama made with Iran that we already know about. There are secret deals that we suspect exist. And there are secret deals whose existence we are not even aware of.
Obama rang in Rosh Hashana, the Jewish New Year, by assuring the Rabbis on a conference call that they didn’t need to worry about Iran nuking anyone because “every pathway to a nuclear weapon is now closed off.”
That’s funny because last year he was still claiming that under his deal in 13 years Iran’s breakout time will, “have shrunk almost down to zero.” If every pathway to a nuclear weapon is closed, how could Iran possibly have zero breakout time to make the occasion of the bar mitzvah of his dirty nuclear deal?
And which Obama do you believe? Try neither.
The secret document revealed earlier this year by the AP showed that Iran would be able to get its uranium enrichment in gear after 11 years and more than double its enrichment rate. What happens by the thirteenth year? Then Iran gets a blank check on centrifuges. That’s what Obama really meant.
Then breakout time to the bomb drops from a year to six months. Or even less. Until it hits zero.
But Ernest Moniz, Obama’s sniveling Secretary of Energy, assured the AP that it wouldn’t be a problem because Iran would only be allowed to store 300 kilograms of low-enriched uranium.
Even as Obama was assuring the Rabbis of how thoroughly Iran was complying with his deal, new revelations were emerging of how he had helped Iran fake its compliance with the deal.
That’s the sort of thing you go to hell for. But it’s a little too late for Obama to worry about that.
The issue was simple. Obama wanted to lift sanctions on Iran. But Iran was not in compliance with even his mostly worthless agreement. So Obama decided that it was time to help the terror state fake it.
Iran was only allowed to keep 300 kilograms of low-enriched uranium. Obama agreed to upgrade that amount to “unknown quantities”. How much is an “unknown quantity”? Like the rest of Iran’s nuclear program, we don’t know. Low-enriched uranium, even in unknown quantities, doesn’t sound that scary. Except that according to a former U.N. weapons inspector, it can be used to produce highly enriched uranium. And that’s how you go from zero to a mushroom cloud over your city.
And then there are the large hot cells that Iran was allowed to keep running.
Secretary of Energy Moniz didn’t just lie to the AP. Lying to the media is practically an Obama indoor sport. He told the same lie in his testimony to the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee. Senators were assured that Iran would be allowed to keep „only 300 kilograms of low (3.67 percent) enriched uranium hexafluoride, and will not exceed this level for fifteen years.“ Iran didn’t have to wait 15 years to exceed that amount. Or even 15 minutes. Obama gave them a pass on it right out of the gate.
But Moniz wasn’t a rogue liar. He was telling the lie that he had been told to tell.
At the Rosh Hashana conference call with the Rabbis, Obama repeated the false claim that Iran had “shipped out 98 percent of its enriched uranium”. He told the lie even though the truth had already come out at the beginning of September. The 98 percent or 300 kilogram limit had been bypassed by him.
No one challenged him or called him out on his lie. And that is the problem.
Obama has lied about the Iran deal from the very beginning. And that’s not about to change.
The fairy godmother of Iran’s enrichment was Hillary Clinton. The “breakthrough” in the negotiations took place when she accepted some Iranian nuclear enrichment. And then it was just a matter of determining how much enrichment would take place officially and how much would take place unofficially that would be officially ignored or covered up by our own government.
That is how we got to the ticking atomic time bomb.
Obama hasn’t just turned a blind eye to Iran’s race to the bomb. He has empowered and enabled all elements of it from its nuclear program to its ballistic missile program. He has ensured that Iran would have the money, the manpower and the resources to become a nuclear power. He directed elements of our intelligence services and military to prevent Israel from striking Iran’s nuclear program. He even aided its core terrorist organization and its ballistic missile program.
This isn’t an error. It’s not cowardice. It’s treason.
A coldly calculated plan to turn Iran into a nuclear power is coming together. On the other end of it lies the horrifying death of millions.
Why would Obama and Hillary do such a horrifying thing? The American scientists and spies who helped the Soviet Union get the bomb believed that they were making the world a better place by limiting our ability to use nuclear weapons. Their treason almost led to the end of human life on earth.

Russian Horn vs Obama Cuts

DAVID AXE
10.06.16 11:00 PM ET
As of Oct. 1, Russia had hundreds more nuclear warheads deployed than the United States did. A startling 429 more, in fact, according to the U.S. State Department.
Don’t panic quite yet. The gap is probably temporary. But that doesn’t mean all’s well when it comes to potentially world-ending weaponry.
Seemingly more worrying for the United States, Russia’s 1,796 deployed warheads exceed—by a whopping 246 weapons—the cap of 1,550 deployed nuclear weapons that Moscow and Washington agreed to as part of the 2011 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.
The United States, meanwhile, is already well below the New START cap. America’s missile submarines, nuclear-capable heavy bombers, and land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles are armed with just 1,367 warheads, the State Department says.
Both Russia’s nuke surplus and America’s lesser total could change in the next 17 months. Washington and Moscow have agreed on a Feb. 5, 2018, deadline for fully implementing New START. Until then, the countries’ respective nuclear arsenals could fluctuate in size—and often.
“You have to keep in mind that numbers go up and down on a day-to-day basis, so a one-day [snapshot] may mislead about force trends over time,” Jeffrey Lewis, a nuclear expert who blogs at Arms Control Wonk, told The Daily Beast.
Both the United States and Russia have signaled their intention to abide by New START’s terms, meaning Russia will probably start shedding old warheads pretty soon, replacing them with a smaller number of newer atomic munitions and ultimately erasing the current nuclear disparity. “Neither of us is in violation of the agreement,” Lewis stressed.
New START is actually one of the few reasons for optimism amid the U.S.-Russia strategic arms race. For starters, the treaty only covers deployed nukes—meaning those on quick alert aboard subs, on planes, and in silos.
The treaty doesn’t limit how many perfectly functional nuclear weapons the United States and Russia can keep in storage. In many cases, those warheads could go from “stored” to “deployed” with just a few hours’ work.
Neither Washington nor Moscow discloses the exact number of nukes it keeps in storage, but Hans Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists, has estimated each country’s total stockpile to be around 4,500 warheads.
Neither government has expressed any interest in cutting its overall atomic stockpile. And both governments plan to spend hundreds of billions of dollars in coming decades modernizing their nuclear arsenals with new warheads… and better rockets, bombers, and submarines to carry them.
“Although these programs do not constitute a buildup of the overall nuclear arsenal, they are very comprehensive and reaffirm the determination by both Russia and the United States to retain large offensive nuclear arsenals at high levels of operational readiness,” Kristensen wrote on his blog.
While New START seems to be holding strong, a separate disarmament deal—whereby the United States and Russia agreed to dispose of excess fissile material—has just collapsed. The Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement, signed in 2000, covered 34 tons of surplus, weapons-grade plutonium in each country.
Under the terms of the agreement, both Russia and the United States would render the plutonium unusable for military purposes—not only to decrease nuclear tensions between the two powers, but also to ensure the excess plutonium didn’t somehow wind up in terrorists’ hands.
Citing a “radically changed environment,” Russian President Vladimir Putin announced Oct. 3 that Russia was pulling out of the deal. Nevertheless, Moscow informally pledged that it wouldn’t use the old plutonium in weapons—agreement or no.
“The decision by the Russians to unilaterally withdraw from this commitment is disappointing,” White House press secretary Josh Earnest said. “The announcement about the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement is more in line with those kinds of decisions that have only deepened Russia’s isolation in the international community.”
Meanwhile, the United States has been insisting for at least three years now that Russia is violating the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which bans many types of short-range nuclear weapons.
U.S. officials have not said just how Russia is allegedly violating the treaty, but the purported breach might involve the road-mobile SS-25 ballistic missile and the RS-26, a small, nimble ballistic missile apparently designed to thwart U.S. missile defenses.
Earnest expressed cautious optimism that, despite everything, Russia is still committed to reducing the risk of atomic warfare. He pointed to Russia’s cooperation with the United States in negotiating the deal with Iran to end that country’s nuclear-weapons program. “I think that’s an indication of the priority that Russia has placed on nonproliferation,” Earnest said.
But Russia’s and America’s equal commitments to maintaining and modernizing their overall nuclear arsenals—regardless of any agreement to cap the number of deployed warheads—speaks to an underlying atomic distrust that lingers a quarter-century after the Cold War ended.
“How the two countries justify such large arsenals is somewhat of a mystery,” Kristensen noted, “but seems to be mainly determined by the size of the other side’s arsenal.”

U.S. Troops Being Deployed to Iraq May Face Violent Resistance From Antichrist’s Men

Michael Krieger | Posted Tuesday Oct 4, 2016 at 4:46 pm
My belief is, we will, in fact be greeted as liberators.
– Dick Cheney on NBC’s Meet the Press, March 16, 2003
Reuters reported:
The United States will send around 600 new troops to Iraq to assist local forces in the battle to retake Mosul from Islamic State that is expected later this year, U.S. and Iraqi officials said on Wednesday.
The new deployment is the third such boost in U.S. troop levels in Iraq since April, underscoring the difficulties President Barack Obama has had in extracting the U.S. military from the country.
The United States has gradually increased the number of U.S. troops in Iraq this year, and moved them closer to the front lines of battle. Obama approved sending 560 more troops to Iraq in July, three months after the United States said it would dispatch about 200 more troops there.
To send the new troops, the White House will raise its cap on U.S. forces in Iraq from 4,647, to 5,262 troops, a senior U.S. defense official said.
What Reuters didn’t report, is that various Iraqi state militias, known as Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs), are preparing for violent resistance against these U.S. troops, which they see as an occupying force.
Al Monitor reports:
Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi said his government will work on a consensus formula to convince PMU factions of the need to involve US troops in the battle to resolve the problem as soon as possible. He also hopes to persuade Washington that the PMU is a national force of the Iraqi state and should be part of a special military system to liberate Mosul.
It seems there is a strong possibility an understanding can be reached — if the PMU is assured the United States does not intend to build a military base in Ninevah province. Mosul is the capital of Ninevah.
However, many are not convinced. Hassan al-Kaabi, a member of the PMU backing up the Iraqi government forces, rejects the presence of US troops in the battle for Mosul and believes they are not keen to help Iraqis fight terrorism.
“I will fight them wherever they are,” he told Al-Monitor. “They are an occupation force that pretends to be assisting us.”
Kaabi joined the PMU on June 14, 2014, one day after Shiite cleric Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani issued a fatwa calling for the PMU’s formation. Kaabi said, “Iraqis are capable of liberating their cities on their own.” He is but one of the thousands of PMU fighters who think the presence of US troops does not serve the interests of the Iraqi people.
Late last month, PMU leader Rayan al-Kaldani issued a threat, saying, “The PMU will be dealing with any illegitimate and foreign forces in Mosul the way it deals with the gangs of the Islamic State.”
Akram al-Kaabi, the secretary-general of PMU faction Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, said, “The Americans are worried about the PMU joining the battle for Mosul because … it will prevent [US troops] from establishing a base there.” He added, “The Americans’ intention is to seize the Qayyarah air base in southern Mosul.”
Qais al-Khazali, the general secretary of the prominent PMU faction Khazali Network, also has threatened to kill US troops in the battle for Mosul. Michael Pregent, a former US military intelligence officer, told Fox News last month that Khazali’s fighters pose a true danger to US troops. In fact, he said, most of the PMU factions that are fighting alongside US forces have fought against US forces in the past.
Pregent expects the PMU to clash with US troops, making it more difficult for the Iraqi government to liberate Mosul.
Khazali has been backed by Iran, which seems to be pushing toward preventing any US participation. Ali Akbar Velayati, the president of the Expediency Discernment Council’s Center for Strategic Research, an Iranian think tank, agrees that “the PMU … will not allow Washington to assume any role in the battle.”
Most, if not all, PMU factions perceive the US military presence in Iraq as an occupation. The PMU also fears falling victim to US air raids, as happened last month in Syria.
It is not the first time armed factions have threatened to target US forces in Iraq. Muqtada al-Sadr, the head of the Sadrist movement, said in July that any US forces present in Iraq will be targeted.
Almost 15 years later, it’s quite clear U.S. troops continue to be seen as “liberators” by the Iraqis.
For prior articles on the disaster that is Iraq, see:
Gurmeet Kanwal
Strategic stability
Following the terrorist strike in Uri, several Pakistanis, including Khawaja Asif, the defence minister, have held out nuclear threats to deter Indian military retaliation.
They have been particularly vocal in holding out the threat of employment of tactical nuclear warheads (TNWs) against Indian forces. For almost three decades, India has shown immense strategic restraint despite grave provocation from Pakistan.
However, first in Pathankot in January 2016 and then in Uri in September 2016, India’s red lines were crossed and the government was left with no option but to include calibrated military measures in its response.
Strategic stability is a product of deterrence stability, crisis stability and arms race stability in the context of a hostile political relationship between two nations. The state of strategic stability in South Asia has for long been a cause of concern for the international community due to Pakistan’s proxy war against India.
Pakistan’s „first use“ doctrine, quest for full spectrum deterrence, the development of TNWs as weapons of warfighting, the army’s control over nuclear decision-making and the risk that nuclear weapons may fall into jihadi hands, are all causes of instability. Hence, overall, the state of relations between the two countries may be described as „ugly stability“, a term coined by Ashley Tellis.
Possibility of limited war
The conventional wisdom in India is that there is space for limited war below the nuclear threshold. Though Indian military retaliation to a major terrorist strike would be carefully calibrated to avoid threatening Pakistan’s nuclear red lines, under certain circumstances the exchanges could escalate to a war in the plains.
For example, Pakistan may launch pre-emptive offensive operations across the international boundary (IB), forcing India to launch counter-offensive operations to destroy Pakistan’s war-waging machinery and simultaneously capture a limited amount of territory as a bargaining counter.
Pakistani analysts believe no Indian Prime Minister will authorise massive retaliation with nuclear weapons in such a contingency. Such a belief would tend to lower the threshold of use of nuclear warheads, but does not address the issue of the consequences that Pakistan will suffer if the Indian PM, heading the Political Council of the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA), actually approves massive retaliation. Deterrence is ultimately a mind game.
Efficacy of TNWs as weapons of warfighting
Simple calculations on the efficacy of TNWs against mechanised forces combat group (roughly comprising an armoured regiment and a company of mechanised infantry) advancing in desert or semi-desert terrain are revealing.
The combat group (60 armoured fighting vehicles, AFVs) would normally advance with two combat teams forward over a frontage of 10-12km and depth of 8-10km.
If a nuclear warhead of 8-10kt is detonated over this combat group (low air burst explosion, with ground zero close to the centre), the initial casualties would be in the range of 20-30 personnel killed or wounded and 10-12 AFVs destroyed or damaged.
While the leading combat group would need to regroup – that is, undertake casualty evacuation, repair and recovery and decontamination, the reserve combat group of the combat command/armoured brigade could resume the advance in six to eight hours.
The template used for working out the casualty figures given above is United States Field Manual FM 3-3-1. Also, the Hatf-9 warhead is likely to be of a much lower yield than 8-10kt and would, consequently, cause even lesser damage.
If an Indian bridge head across a water obstacle is hit, the casualties would be a hundred times greater, but in a bridge head the adversary’s troops would be in contact with Indian troops and, hence, a bridge head is a much less likely target.
In the process, it would risk the destruction of major Pakistani cities, should India choose to retaliate massively. The leadership of the Pakistan army must have done these calculations.
Therefore, their advocacy of Indian disinclination to retaliate massively in response to their use of TNWs on their own soil indicates either a flawed analysis, or is nothing but a bluff – a bluff that the Indian armed forces would be inclined to call.
Doctrinal challenges
During a crisis, if deterrence breaks down, the essence of nuclear strategy would lie in minimising civilian and military casualties and material damage and preventing escalation, while ensuring the survival of the state.
If Pakistan detonates TNWs on Indian forces on its own soil, the major options available to India are the following:
Option A: Massive retaliation to inflict unacceptable damage and cripple Pakistan as a functional nation state.
Option B: A quid pro quo or quid pro quo plus response („flexible response“), in order to minimise the probability of further nuclear exchanges and keep the level of casualties and destruction as low as possible.
Option C: Refrain from retaliating with nuclear weapons, but warn Pakistan of dire consequences if any more nuclear strikes are launched. This option is the least likely to be adopted.
If deterrence ever breaks down, publicly declared doctrine will become irrelevant. The Political Council of the NCA will decide how to retaliate based on the advice given by the Executive Council, of which the three services chiefs are members.
The method and mode of retaliation will be based on the prevailing operational-strategic situation and the likely reactions, especially the probability of further nuclear exchanges, and the reactions of the international community – the threats held out, the appeals made and the course of discussions held in the UN Security Council.
From India’s point of view, massive retaliation (Option A) is the most suitable option for deterrence as anything else will run the risk of lowering the nuclear threshold and encourage the Pakistan army to continue to bank on the early use of TNWs to counter operational reverses.
Flexible response (Option B) would run the risk of continuing and repeated nuclear strikes. Also, breaking the nuclear taboo would be considered unacceptable by the international community.
Impact of TNWs on India’s nuclear doctrine
India’s nuclear doctrine premised on „credible minimum deterrence“ and posture of „no first use“ has stood the test of time and no major change is necessary.
India’s declaratory strategy of „massive retaliation“ to a nuclear first strike is „designed to inflict unacceptable damage“ and would work well even in a contingency where Pakistani planners may consider using TNWs against Indian forces on Pakistani soil as they cannot possibly risk the destruction of their country.
However, the credibility of massive retaliation needs to be enhanced through a carefully formulated signalling plan that is designed to showcase the technological proficiency and operational preparedness of India’s nuclear forces and the firmness of its political will.

Iran Threatens America Again (Ezekiel 18)

5 Oct 2016
In a speech delivered last month in Tehran and translated this week by the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), Mohsen Rafighdoost, who was minister of the IRGC during the 1980s and the Iran-Iraq War, added that IRGC ground forces are “five times better” than the U.S. Army.
“Despite all the enemy media and cultural propaganda against us, if America wants to try its luck against us, [it should know that] we are completely capable of mobilizing nine million fighters” against it in under 10 days, Rafigdoost said.
“The IRGC’s ground forces are perhaps five times better than the American army,” he said.
Rafighdoost also declared that Iran’s missiles are capable of reaching Israel and expressed his wish that Israel would launch its own missile at the Islamic Republic so that it could respond by “flattening Tel Aviv.”
We have warehouses full [of missiles] in Tehran, Zanjan [in northwest Iran] and Oshnavieh [in Western Azerbaijan Province in northwest Iran] that can strike Tel Aviv. If only a single [Israeli] shell would strike anywhere in this country, so that we can flatten Tel Aviv.”
Rafighdoost also claimed that the leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Khomeini established Hezbollah in Lebanon to promote Islamization in other countries. Rafighdoost himself was involved in Hezbollah’s creation as well as advancing Iran’s ballistic missile program.
Today, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei carries the torch and the army’s obedience to him has made the IRGC “a supreme force in the region.”
“Despite all the criminal [plots], Iranian security forces grow stronger every day. Some of the statements being put out there are made out of lack of awareness, and anyone who makes them is ignorant,” Rafighdoost said.

Preparing For The Asian Nuclear War (Rev 18)

By Nabanita Maji on October 6, 2016
It seems like the India vs. Pakistan war will soon become real. There is no denial that the two major incidents, the Uri attack and the surgical strikes between the two nations, have jeopardized the situation even more. And now, Pakistan has raised the possibility of a nuclear attack against India.
Talking to the media, Pakistani Defense Minister Muhammad Asif went out in the open and threatened to hit back at India. He has also raised the possibility of a nuclear strike against the rival nation.
He said, “We haven’t kept the nuclear devices that we have just as showpieces. But if our safety gets threatened, we will annihilate them (India).”
In fact, sometime back, Asif had said, “Allah has said in the Qur’an, ‘The horses must be prepared,’ therefore Pakistan must always keep itself all prepared. In case there is a threat to our security, or if anyone steps on to our soil or if there’s someone designing a threat to our security, we would not hesitate to use those (nuclear) weapons for our defense.”
In yet another shocking incident, the Indian police department recently detained a pigeon that was found carrying a warning note message for Prime Minister Narendra Modi. The note read, “Modi, we’re not the same people from 1971. Now each and every child is ready to fight against India.”
Sources claimed that the Pakistan-based militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) penned the warning note. It also somewhat hinted that Pakistan is even set to train its children for an India vs. Pakistan War.
On the other hand, Sharif has openly denounced India’s bold move against the jihadi militants – the infamous surgical strikes. But that is not the end of it. Pakistan also received strong support from China on the Kashmir issue. Furthermore, China has also pledged to resolve disputes between Islamabad and New Delhi.
For comments and suggestions, leave a message in the comments section below. Like and Follow our Facebook page for more stories and to stay up-to-date with the latest happenings.

The outcome of the Pakistani nuclear war (Rev 8)

Gurmeet Kanwal
Strategic stability
OoFollowing the terrorist strike in Uri, several Pakistanis, including Khawaja Asif, the defence minister, have held out nuclear threats to deter Indian military retaliation.
They have been particularly vocal in holding out the threat of employment of tactical nuclear warheads (TNWs) against Indian forces. For almost three decades, India has shown immense strategic restraint despite grave provocation from Pakistan.
However, first in Pathankot in January 2016 and then in Uri in September 2016, India’s red lines were crossed and the government was left with no option but to include calibrated military measures in its response.
Strategic stability is a product of deterrence stability, crisis stability and arms race stability in the context of a hostile political relationship between two nations. The state of strategic stability in South Asia has for long been a cause of concern for the international community due to Pakistan’s proxy war against India.
Pakistan’s „first use“ doctrine, quest for full spectrum deterrence, the development of TNWs as weapons of warfighting, the army’s control over nuclear decision-making and the risk that nuclear weapons may fall into jihadi hands, are all causes of instability. Hence, overall, the state of relations between the two countries may be described as „ugly stability“, a term coined by Ashley Tellis.
Possibility of limited war
The conventional wisdom in India is that there is space for limited war below the nuclear threshold. Though Indian military retaliation to a major terrorist strike would be carefully calibrated to avoid threatening Pakistan’s nuclear red lines, under certain circumstances the exchanges could escalate to a war in the plains.
For example, Pakistan may launch pre-emptive offensive operations across the international boundary (IB), forcing India to launch counter-offensive operations to destroy Pakistan’s war-waging machinery and simultaneously capture a limited amount of territory as a bargaining counter.
Pakistani analysts believe no Indian Prime Minister will authorise massive retaliation with nuclear weapons in such a contingency. Such a belief would tend to lower the threshold of use of nuclear warheads, but does not address the issue of the consequences that Pakistan will suffer if the Indian PM, heading the Political Council of the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA), actually approves massive retaliation. Deterrence is ultimately a mind game.
Efficacy of TNWs as weapons of warfighting
Simple calculations on the efficacy of TNWs against mechanised forces combat group (roughly comprising an armoured regiment and a company of mechanised infantry) advancing in desert or semi-desert terrain are revealing.
The combat group (60 armoured fighting vehicles, AFVs) would normally advance with two combat teams forward over a frontage of 10-12km and depth of 8-10km.
If a nuclear warhead of 8-10kt is detonated over this combat group (low air burst explosion, with ground zero close to the centre), the initial casualties would be in the range of 20-30 personnel killed or wounded and 10-12 AFVs destroyed or damaged.
While the leading combat group would need to regroup – that is, undertake casualty evacuation, repair and recovery and decontamination, the reserve combat group of the combat command/armoured brigade could resume the advance in six to eight hours.
The template used for working out the casualty figures given above is United States Field Manual FM 3-3-1. Also, the Hatf-9 warhead is likely to be of a much lower yield than 8-10kt and would, consequently, cause even lesser damage.
If an Indian bridge head across a water obstacle is hit, the casualties would be a hundred times greater, but in a bridge head the adversary’s troops would be in contact with Indian troops and, hence, a bridge head is a much less likely target.
In the process, it would risk the destruction of major Pakistani cities, should India choose to retaliate massively. The leadership of the Pakistan army must have done these calculations.
Therefore, their advocacy of Indian disinclination to retaliate massively in response to their use of TNWs on their own soil indicates either a flawed analysis, or is nothing but a bluff – a bluff that the Indian armed forces would be inclined to call.
Doctrinal challenges
During a crisis, if deterrence breaks down, the essence of nuclear strategy would lie in minimising civilian and military casualties and material damage and preventing escalation, while ensuring the survival of the state.
If Pakistan detonates TNWs on Indian forces on its own soil, the major options available to India are the following:
Option A: Massive retaliation to inflict unacceptable damage and cripple Pakistan as a functional nation state.
Option B: A quid pro quo or quid pro quo plus response („flexible response“), in order to minimise the probability of further nuclear exchanges and keep the level of casualties and destruction as low as possible.
Option C: Refrain from retaliating with nuclear weapons, but warn Pakistan of dire consequences if any more nuclear strikes are launched. This option is the least likely to be adopted.
If deterrence ever breaks down, publicly declared doctrine will become irrelevant. The Political Council of the NCA will decide how to retaliate based on the advice given by the Executive Council, of which the three services chiefs are members.
The method and mode of retaliation will be based on the prevailing operational-strategic situation and the likely reactions, especially the probability of further nuclear exchanges, and the reactions of the international community – the threats held out, the appeals made and the course of discussions held in the UN Security Council.
From India’s point of view, massive retaliation (Option A) is the most suitable option for deterrence as anything else will run the risk of lowering the nuclear threshold and encourage the Pakistan army to continue to bank on the early use of TNWs to counter operational reverses.
Flexible response (Option B) would run the risk of continuing and repeated nuclear strikes. Also, breaking the nuclear taboo would be considered unacceptable by the international community.
Impact of TNWs on India’s nuclear doctrine
India’s nuclear doctrine premised on „credible minimum deterrence“ and posture of „no first use“ has stood the test of time and no major change is necessary.
India’s declaratory strategy of „massive retaliation“ to a nuclear first strike is „designed to inflict unacceptable damage“ and would work well even in a contingency where Pakistani planners may consider using TNWs against Indian forces on Pakistani soil as they cannot possibly risk the destruction of their country.
However, the credibility of massive retaliation needs to be enhanced through a carefully formulated signalling plan that is designed to showcase the technological proficiency and operational preparedness of India’s nuclear forces and the firmness of its political will.

One Nuke Is Too Many (Revelation 8)

All bets are off, if even one nuclear bomb is used: Pakistan Nuclear physicist Pervez Hoodbhoy
As the din of those rooting for war reached a crescendo, Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif even threatened to unleash tactical nuclear weapons on India. (PTI) As the din of those rooting for war reached a crescendo, Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif even threatened to unleash tactical nuclear weapons on India. (PTI)
The Uri attack that killed 19 Indian Army soldiers and the subsequent “surgical strikes” across the Line of Control (LoC) that took out an estimated 35-40 militants has seen the ratcheting up of dangerous rhetoric on both sides of the border.
As the din of those rooting for war reached a crescendo, Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif even threatened to unleash tactical nuclear weapons on India. How portentous is the threat? What does “tactical” mean when used in the same breath as nuclear weapons?
In an email interview with IANS, Pervez Hoodbhoy, the Karachi-based nuclear physicist, who is a champion of freedom of expression, answers questions with “surgical” precision. He teaches physics and mathematics in Lahore. He was voted 85th in a list of 100 public intellectuals from around the globe by ‘Foreign Policy’ magazine in 2011. Excerpts from the interview:
Q: What is the difference between tactical and strategic nuclear weapons?
A: Tactical weapons generally have smaller yields and can be launched from trucks armed with multiple rocket barrels. These have ranges that do not exceed 100km. Strategic weapons can be aircraft or missile delivered to any place on the subcontinent.
Q: Under what circumstances is Pakistan likely to deploy and use its tactical nuclear weapons?
A: Pakistan has always said that its tactical nuclear weapons exist to thwart a major Indian land invasion or sea blockade. However, I suppose that there must be planning for other contingencies as well.
Q: How much damage can they cause in comparison to strategic nuclear weapons?
A: Both can inflict a huge amount of damage depending upon where they are used. There is no clear distinction between strategic and tactical weapons. If used against a military target, the warhead is called tactical. But when used against a population centre, dam or industrial site, it is called strategic.
Q: What is the likelihood of the use of a tactical nuclear weapon escalating into a full-blown nuclear war?
A: The use of a nuclear weapon against any kind of target signals that a nuclear war has started. The chances are that if one is used, there will be a retaliatory strike. Escalation is very likely, to the point that war may end only when all weapons have been used up.
Q: Can the use of nuclear weapons ever be justified, however low-intensity? In the context of Indo-Pakistan hostilities, have they been a deterrent?
A: People need to understand that the use of a single nuclear weapon, even if small in size, is breaking a deep taboo. Once broken, all bets are off because anything can happen after that. While it is clear that nuclear weapons have prevented India from using its larger conventional might against Pakistan, they have allowed Pakistan to take a much more aggressive position against India. I had argued with the late K. Subrahmanyam (a strategic affairs analyst and an early shaper of Indian nuclear policy) on this point repeatedly 20 years ago, but he had dismissed the possibility of Pakistan achieving bomb status.
Q: As a rational voice from across the border, who do you think has been the “aggressor” of the two countries? Do you see any weight in India’s claim of being a victim of Pakistan’s proxy wars?
A: People like me have long argued that Pakistan has used the nuclear umbrella to protect groups such as Lashkar-e-Toiba. This is an abominable fact. Under no circumstances should Pakistan shelter or aid those who kill and murder, whether the victims be Indians or Pakistanis. At the same time, I am dismayed by the hard line India is taking on Kashmir. It could push us into even more difficult times.