Regardless Of The Talks, Iran Will Soon Have A Nuclear Bomb (Daniel 8:3)

What You Need to Know About the Iran Nuclear Talks

Iran-Nuclear-TalksBy Margaret Hartman

Last week in Geneva, U.S. and Iranian officials kicked off another round of talks in an attempt to resolve the long conflict over Iran’s nuclear program. While Iran insists it only wants to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, and has every right to do so, world powers fear the country is working to develop a nuclear bomb. Since 2003, the international community has repeatedly tried to cut a deal to curb Iran’s uranium enrichment program, and both sides are hopeful about the current negotiations. Here’s a look at how we got to this potentially historic moment, and what to expect as the final deadline approaches.
When did the negotiations begin?
The conflict over Iran’s nuclear program dates back to the ’70s (the New York Times has a handy timeline), but the current talks began with the November 2013 accord in which Iran agreed to freeze much of its nuclear activity and accept more international oversight for the first time in more than a decade. In return, six major powers — Britain, France, Germany, China, Russia, and the United States — agreed to scale back sanctions that contributed to Iran’s serious economic problems in recent years. (The group is known as the P5+1, for the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, plus Germany.)
Even as the two sides praised the deal as the dawning of a new era, there was public disagreement over what it actually meant. Hassan Rouhani, Iran’s new, more moderate president, said, “Let anyone make his own reading, but this right is clearly stated in the text of the agreement that Iran can continue its enrichment, and I announce to our people that our enrichment activities will continue as before.” However, John Kerry, the U.S. secretary of State, quickly countered that there was “no inherent right to enrich” in the deal, adding, “everywhere in this particular agreement it states that they could only do that by mutual agreement, and nothing is agreed on until everything is agreed on.”
The nations were supposed to negotiate a more comprehensive deal within six months, but unsurprisingly they missed that deadline. Diplomats gave themselves another four months to hash out the details, and then in November 2014 they pushed back the deadlines again, agreeing to settle on a political framework by March 31, 2015, and finalize the technical details by June 30, 2015.
What does each side want?
The negotiations are incredibly complex, but broadly, the two sides are haggling over the limits on Iran’s ability to produce nuclear material and how long those restrictions would be in place. Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who has been extremely critical of the talks, said the only acceptable deal would be one that leaves Iran with “zero enrichment, zero centrifuges, zero plutonium, and of course an end to ICBM development,” but the P5+1 isn’t pushing for zero enrichment. Instead, the agreement would cap how many centrifuges, the machines that enrich uranium, Iran could operate.
Iran has about 19,000 centrifuges, 10,000 of which are operating, and the U.S. has reportedly offered to let Iran enrich uranium with around 6,500 centrifuges. (Some of these reports on the terms of the negotiations came via the Israeli media, prompting concerns that Netanyahu’s office was leaking the figures, and further straining the U.S.-Israeli relationship.) The Obama administration has argued that those reports are misleading, since Iran’s nuclear capabilities would depend on the types of centrifuges they’re allowed to operate and the permitted size of their enriched uranium stockpile, not just the number of centrifuges.
The U.S. initially wanted restrictions on Iran’s nuclear activities to remain in place for up to 20 years, while Iran was pushing for less than 10 years. The Associated Press reported this week that one plan under consideration would place Iran’s uranium enrichment program under strict controls for a decade, then gradually ease restrictions over the next five years if Iran complies with the terms of the agreement. As the New York Times notes, “that would allow the Iranians to say the tough constraints would last for only 10 years and the Americans to say they had a 15-year agreement.”
Kerry and Obama have both said that they would only accept a deal with a “breakout time” of at least a year — meaning that if Iran decides to violate the terms of the agreement, it will take a year for it to produce enough fuel for a nuclear weapon. (Of course, that’s a complicated calculation, and there’s disagreement over how much time it would take Iran to make a bomb.) “We have always said that we would have a one-year breakout time for a double-digit number of years and that remains the case,” a senior U.S. official said on Monday, though according to The Wall Street Journal, they would not elaborate on whether the deal would allow a shorter “breakout time” after the first decade.
Another sticking point is the fate of Iran’s existing nuclear facilities. Officials say its underground enrichment facility at Fordo may be turned into a research facility, and its heavy-water reactor at Arak, may be redesigned to produce less plutonium, another potential fuel for nuclear bombs.
Iranian officials have suggested that they expect sanctions to be quickly lifted once a deal is reached, but P5+1 want them removed gradually as Iran proves it’s meeting its obligations.
What role does the U.S. Congress play?
Congressional Republicans, along with some Democrats, are skeptical of the Iran agreement and angry that they are being cut out of the process. Bipartisan legislation introduced last month, despite a veto threat from Obama, would impose new sanctions on Iran if a deal is not reached by the June deadline.
The debate is sure to intensify next week when Prime Minister Netanyahu addresses Congress, but Kerry said while testifying before a Senate Appropriations subcommittee this week that lawmakers should wait to see the deal before taking new action against Iran. “The president has made clear — I can’t state this more firmly — the policy is Iran will not get a nuclear weapon,” Kerry said. “And anybody running around right now, jumping in to say, ‘Well, we don’t like the deal,’ or this or that, doesn’t know what the deal is. There is no deal yet.”
Where do things stand now?
Negotiations between Kerry and Iranian foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif in Geneva ended Monday. “These talks have been productive,” said State Department spokeswoman Jen Psaki. “There’s still more work to do.” Talks are set to resume next week at a location to be determined.
What happens if they don’t reach a deal?
President Obama said earlier this month that if a deal can’t be reached by the current deadline, another extension is unlikely. “The issues now are sufficiently narrowed and sufficiently clarified. We’re at a point where they need to make a decision,” Obama said. “[We] are presenting to them a deal that allows them to have peaceful nuclear power but gives us the absolute assurance that is verifiable that they are not pursuing a nuclear weapon.”
The president said the failure of the negotiations would not put the U.S. on “immediate war footing” with Iran, but there could be serious consequences for all parties, from the resumption of Iran’s efforts to build a nuclear weapon to sanctions that further cripple its economy and a greater risk of war across the Middle East. “We need to seize this opportunity,” said Foreign Minister Zarif. “It may not be repeated.”

Preparing For A Nuclear Attack From The Third Horn (Daniel 8:8)

 
Given the presence of a strong government in New Delhi and the pressure on it from Indian citizens in the event of a repeat of 26/11 type terror attack, the ties between the two neighbours have greater danger of escalating towards a devastating nuclear warfare, in particular from Pakistan.
 
Such a dangerous scenario can only be avoided by the US working with Islamabad to ensure that there is no further large scale terror attack on India emanating from Pakistan, two top American experts – George Perkovich and Ashley Tellis – told members of the powerful Senate Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Strategic Forces during a hearing yesterday.
 
South Asia is the most likely place nuclear weapons could be detonated in the foreseeable future. This risk derives from the unusual dynamic of the India-Pakistan competition,” said Perkovich, vice president for Studies Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
 
The next major terrorist attack in India, emanating from Pakistan, may trigger an Indian conventional military riposte that could in turn prompt Pakistan to use battlefield nuclear weapons to repel an Indian incursion. India, for its part, has declared that it would inflict massive retaliation in response to any nuclear use against its territory or troops,” he said.
 
Obviously, this threatening dynamic – whereby terrorism may prompt conventional conflict which may prompt nuclear war – challenges Indian and Pakistan policy-makers. India and Pakistan both tend to downplay or dismiss the potential for escalation, but our own history of close nuclear calls should make US officials more alert to these dangers. The US is the only outside power that could intervene diplomatically and forcefully to de-escalate a crisis,” Perkovich said.
 
Tellis said the most useful US contribution towards preventing a Pakistani use of nuclear weapons in such a scenario – and the Indian nuclear retribution that would result thereafter – would be to press Pakistan to exit the terrorism business or risk being left alone (or, even worse, the object of sanctions) if a major Indian military response ensues in the aftermath of any pernicious terrorist attack.
 
“Other than this, there is little that the United States can do to preserve deterrence stability between two asymmetrically-sized states where the gap in power promises to become even wider tomorrow than it is today,” he said.
 
Both the experts, who are from the Carnegie, told members of the Senate sub-committee that Pakistan today has more nuclear weapons than that of India.

Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty Was Just A Short Delay Of The Prophecy (Rev 16)

NPT spoof

 

BY RAMESH THAKUR

In contrast to the total and scandalous failure of its 2005 predecessor, the Eighth Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference of May 2010 was a modest success.
By the end of 2012, as reported in my Centre’s inaugural “Nuclear Weapons: The State of Play” report, much of this sense of optimism had evaporated. By the end of 2014, as our followup report “Nuclear Weapons: The State of Play 2015″ documents, the fading optimism has given way to pessimism.
North Korea conducted its third nuclear test in early 2013 and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is yet to enter into force.
Cyber threats to nuclear weapons systems have intensified, outer space remains at risk of nuclearization, and the upsurge of geopolitical tensions over the crisis in Ukraine produced flawed conclusions about the folly of giving up nuclear weapons on the one hand, and open reminders about Russia’s substantial nuclear arsenal, on the other.
As part of the Global Attitudes survey conducted by the U.S. Pew Research Center from March 17 to June 5, 2014, a total of 48,643 respondents in 44 countries were asked which one of the following five poses the gravest threat to the world: nuclear weapons, inequality, religious-ethnic hatred, environmental pollution, or AIDS and other diseases?
No Latin American country has nuclear weapons The continent’s anti-nuclear commitment was reinforced by the negotiation of the regional nuclear-weapon-free zone in 1967 under the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which consolidates and deepens the NPT prohibitions on getting the bomb.
Since then virtually the entire Southern Hemisphere has embraced additional comparable zones in the South Pacific, Southeast Asia and Africa.
Consequently looking out at the world from our vantage point, we see no security upsides by way of benefits from nuclear weapons; only risks.
Indeed it helps to conceptualize the nuclear weapons challenge in the language of risks. Originally many countries acquired the bomb in order to help manage national security risks.
As the four famous strategic heavyweights of Henry Kissinger, Sam Nunn, William Perry and George Shultz — all card-carrying realists — have argued in a series of five influential articles in The Wall Street Journal between 2007 and 2013, the risks of nuclear proliferation and terrorism posed by the existence of nuclear weapons far outweigh their modest contributions to security since the end of the Cold War.
Viewed through this lens, the nuclear risks agenda has four components:
• Risk management.
We must ensure that existing weapons stockpiles are not used; that all nuclear weapons and materials are secured against theft and leakage to rogue actors like terrorist groups; and that all nuclear reactors and plants have fail-safe safety measures in place with respect to designs, controls, disposal and accident response systems.
• Risk reduction.
This means strengthening the stability-enhancing features of deterrence, such as robust command and control systems and deployment on submarines. As part of this, it would help if Russia and the U.S. took their approximately 1,800 warheads off high-alert, ready to launch within minutes of threats being supposedly detected.
If other countries abandoned interest in things like tactical nuclear weapons that have to be deployed on the forward edges of potential battlefields and require some pre-delegation of authority to use to battlefield commanders. Because any use of nuclear weapons could be catastrophic for planet Earth, the decision must be restricted to the highest political and military authorities.
• Risk minimization• .
There is no national security objectives that Russia and the U.S. could not meet with a total arsenal of under 500 nuclear warheads each deployed in the air (a few), on land (some), and at sea (most). And if all the others froze their arsenals at current levels, this would give us a global stockpile of 2,000 bombs instead of the current total of nearly 16,400.
Ratifying and bringing into force the CTBT, concluding a new fissile material cutoff treaty, banning the nuclear weaponization of outer space, respecting one another’s sensitivities on missile defense programs and conventional military imbalances etc. would all contribute to minimizing risks of reversals and setbacks.
None of these steps would jeopardize the national security of any of the nuclear-armed states; each would enhance regional and international security modestly; all in combination would greatly strengthen global security.
• Risk elimination.
Successive blue ribbon international commissions, from the Canberra Commission through the Tokyo Forum, Blix Commission, and Evans-Kawaguchi Commission, have emphatically reaffirmed three core propositions.
The only guarantee of zero nuclear weapons risk, therefore, is to move to zero nuclear weapons possession by a carefully managed process.

The Pakistan Horn Will Fulfill Prophecy (Daniel 8:8)

Major terror attack against India could trigger Nuclear-war

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Pakistan may use nuclear weapons against India if the latter goes for a large scale military assault against it in retaliation for a major terror attack emanating from across the border, two top American experts have warned US lawmakers.

Given the presence of a strong government in New Delhi and the pressure on it from Indian citizens in the event of a repeat of 26/11 type terror attack, the ties between the two neighbours have greater danger of escalating towards a devastating nuclear warfare, in particular from Pakistan.
Such a dangerous scenario can only be avoided by the US working with Islamabad to ensure that there is no further large scale terror attack on India emanating from Pakistan, two top American experts. George Perkovich and Ashley Tellis, told members of the powerful Senate Armed Services Committe and Sub committee on Strategic Forces during a hearing yesterday.
“The next major terrorist attack in India, emanating from Pakistan, may trigger an Indian conventional military riposte that could in turn prompt Pakistan to use battlefield nuclear weapons to repel an Indian incursion. India, for its part, has declared that it would inflict massive retaliation in response to any nuclear use against its territory or troops,” he said.
“Obviously, this threatening dynamic, whereby terrorism may prompt conventional conflict which may prompt nuclear war – challenges Indian and Pakistan policy- makers. India and Pakistan both tend to downplay or dismiss the potential for escalation, but our own history of close nuclear calls should make US officials more alert to these dangers.
The US is the only outside power that could intervene diplomatically and forcefully to de-escalate a crisis,” Perkovich said. Tellis said the most useful US contribution towards preventing a Pakistani use of nuclear weapons in such a scenario and the Indian nuclear retribution that would result thereafter, would be to press Pakistan to exit the terrorism business or risk being left alone (or, even worse, the object of sanctions) if a major Indian military response ensues in the aftermath of any pernicious terrorist attack.
“Other than this, there is little that the United States can do to preserve deterrence stability between two asymmetrically-sized states where the gap in power promises to become even wider tomorrow than it is today,” he said. Both the experts, who are from the Carnegie, told members of the Senate sub-committee that Pakistan today has more nuclear weapons than that of India.

A Nobel Price For Peace (2 Chronicles 36)

Obama’s chilling Iran nuke lie

What Nobel Peace Prize?

The Nobel Price For Peace

Reports that President Obama agrees Iran should be free to make a nuclear bomb in about 10 years put the lie to his repeated vow never to allow an Iranian nuke. The broken promise is the international twin to his domestic whopper that you “can keep your doctor.”

You can’t, but Iran can keep its enriched uranium, making this lie an even bigger bombshell. As in, bombs away.
The deal also would launch a new round of nuclear proliferation among Arab states, with Saudi Arabia long promising to get a bomb if Iran does. Others fearful of Iran’s dominance are sure to follow, escalating the tit-for-tat patterns in the region into a nuclear nightmare.
In short, the unfolding nuclear landscape presents the whole of mankind with unprecedented peril.
The terms of the developing agreement, as explained to reporters by negotiators, vindicates concerns that Obama would surrender to Iranian demands while claiming otherwise. He caved in with a deal that envisions a decade-long phase-out of restrictions, allowing Obama to say that there will be no bomb on his watch.
Israel faces a new era of extreme risk, simultaneously in the cross hairs of a genocidal enemy and betrayed by its longest and closest ally. The betrayal continued even yesterday, with Secretary of State John Kerry blasting critics, presumably including Benjamin Netanyahu.
“Anyone running around right now, jumping to say we don’t like the deal, or this or that, doesn’t know what the deal is,” Kerry said in Senate testimony. “There is no deal yet.”
That’s only technically accurate because Obama and Kerry are keeping the details secret. The scam recalls how the White House hid the details of ObamaCare until the bill was passed; it’s what the FCC is doing with Internet regulations.
The timing is especially suspect, with the nuclear deal moving toward finality on the eve of Netanyahu’s planned speech to Congress next week. Iran recently said the US was “desperate” for an agreement, and the reasons are obvious. Getting Iran’s signature on a document, any document, before the visit would allow Obama to take the steam out of Netanyahu’s warning by spinning the settlement as the best possible and making it seem unstoppable.
That shouldn’t fly, given the stakes to us, Israel and our Arab allies. But that all depends on whether Democrats continue to put loyalty to Obama ahead of their duty to America’s national security.
Even a handful of Dems joining with majority Republicans would be enough to reject any terms that allow Iran to get a nuke. In doing so, those senators would be enforcing the refrain that no deal is better than a bad deal.
And make no mistake — Obama has produced a very bad deal. Bad for America, and bad for the world.