Nuke For Nuke Against Russia Is A Really Bad Idea (Rev 15:2)

The Wrong Move: Adding Nuclear Weapons to the Russia-Ukraine Conflict
missle-ranges
FEBRUARY 9, 2015 BY LT. GEN. ROBERT GARD GREG TERRYN

Despite the wishes of two key Congressmen, more nuclear weapons in Eastern Europe is a bad idea.
You may have missed it, but last month two key members of Congress asked the military to move additional U.S. nuclear weapons and dual-capable aircraft into Eastern Europe.

Reps. Mike Rogers, R-Ala., chairman of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, and Mike Turner, R-Ohio, chairman of the Tactical Air and Land Forces Subcommittee, sent a joint letter to Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel and Secretary of State John Kerry advocating the addition of new sites in Eastern Europe for the deployment of additional U.S. nuclear weapons and dual-capable aircraft.

In their letter, the two chairmen extend a Russian statement claiming its sovereign “right” to deploy nuclear weapons in Crimea to an “intention” to do so. They also assert Russian “moves to deploy nuclear-capable Iskander short-range ballistic missiles as well as nuclear-capable Backfire bombers in the illegally occupied territory [Crimea].”

There is no evidence that Russia has taken or is preparing to take any of these actions; but the letter alleges that they pose a new military threat to U.S. allies and our forces in Europe, and that the U.S. must respond “to change President [Vladimir] Putin’s calculus.”

Declared U.S. policy is to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security, not to employ them in hopes of intimidating a hostile head of state.

Fortunately, nuclear weapons have played no overt role in Russia’s annexation of Crimea or its ongoing aggression in eastern Ukraine. And while the U.S. and its European allies must react, introducing a nuclear confrontation into the already dangerous situation is more likely to cause Putin to respond in kind than to change his calculus. Declared U.S. policy is to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security, not to employ them in hopes of intimidating a hostile head of state.

Russia’s possible deployment of nuclear weapons in Crimea would provide it little, if any, additional military capability. In fact, Russian dual-capable weapons in that area are not a new development; Russia’s naval fleet in the Black Sea has had a nuclear capability since well before the conclusion of the Cold War. Additionally, if Russia were to locate Backfire bombers in Crimea, which would require extensive upgrading of the Gvardiesky airbase, it would provide no additional reach to Western Europe or vicinity. Why overreact to a militarily ineffective provocation even if it should occur?

For whatever deterrent value they may provide, the U.S. already has some 200 B-61 nuclear bombs based in Europe, along with dual-capable aircraft to deliver them. Deploying additional tactical nuclear weapons to Europe would escalate tensions between NATO and Russia while providing no additional security to our allies or to U.S. forces deployed there. As noted by then-Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. James Cartwright, our tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe have no uniquely military function that cannot be provided by our other nuclear weapons.

Deploying additional U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to Europe would make them more vulnerable to a Russian preemptive attack, even with conventional weapons, in the event of an escalating crisis. Also, it is well-known that Russia possesses a far larger stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons than the U.S. has in its inventory. Russia could be tempted to employ its tactical nuclear weapons superiority to take out the U.S. weapons deployed in Europe in the mistaken belief that it could confine the conflict to Western Europe.

In addition, the role of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons deployed in allied NATO countries has been a topic of contention for years. Some East European allies welcome the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe for symbolic assurance of their security, while some Western European allies oppose their presence as unnecessarily provocative and dangerous. Following a determination that our nuclear sites in Europe were not secure, the United Kingdom actually insisted on the removal of U.S. nuclear weapons from its territory. While Russian aggression has quieted calls for removal of U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe, the addition of more nuclear weapons to NATO countries would cause a serious split in the alliance.

Moreover, preparing additional sites in Europe to accommodate tactical nuclear weapons would require a significant financial commitment at a time of budget austerity with far higher priorities for scarce resources allocated to defense. Given the concern over budget caps and sequestration, syphoning defense dollars from conventional priorities to provide funds for this unnecessary and expensive proposal gives new meaning to the definition of “counterproductive.”

Deploying additional U.S. tactical nuclear weapons and more dual-capable aircraft in Europe provides no advantage: It would be an expensive initiative that would add nothing to our security, divert funds from higher priority defense expenditures, likely provoke Russia to deploy nuclear weapons in Crimea, increase the possibility of nuclear war, and be divisive amongst our NATO allies.

AUTHORS

Lt. Gen. Robert G. Gard, Jr., (ret.) is chairman of the board of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. Full Bio

Greg Terryn is a Scoville Fellow at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, where his work focuses on nuclear threat reduction and nonproliferation issues.

Obama Drinks The Purple Cool Aid (Ezekiel 17)

Obama takes a stupid pill: Don’t be afraid of Iran, Nukes are ‘contrary to their faith’

khomeinibomb
February 10, 2015 by Michael Dorstewitz

At a Monday news conference in the White House with visiting German Chancellor Angela Merkel, President Barack Obama said we have nothing to fear from a nuclear Iran because nuclear weapons are against Islam.

It’s a good thing Merkel wasn’t sipping a beverage at the time or she may have either choked or performed a classic spit-reaction.

Here’s the setup:

“We are presenting to them [Iran] … a deal that allows them to have peaceful nuclear power but gives us the absolute assurance that is verifiable that they are not pursuing a nuclear weapon,” the president said.

Now for the zinger:

“And if in fact what they claim is true, which is they have no aspiration to get a nuclear weapon, that in fact, according to their Supreme Leader, it would be contrary to their faith to obtain a nuclear weapon….”

And what part of the Quran did that come from? Is it in the “don’t eat bacon” section, or the “beat your wives daily” part?

And here’s another question: If nukes are so against their religion, what’s with all the testing of delivery systems and nuclear talks with North Korea?

Even more to the point, neighboring Pakistan is just as Islamic as Iran. In fact, it’s official name is “Islamic Republic of Pakistan.” It’s been a nuclear power since 1998.

In an interview published Monday, Obama faulted media hype for ramping up the public’s fear of terrorism, and said the real danger was global warming.

It all makes one wonder if he’s living in the same world as the rest of us.

Read more: http://www.bizpacreview.com/2015/02/10/obama-takes-a-stupid-pill-dont-be-afraid-of-iran-nukes-are-contrary-to-their-faith-178739#ixzz3RPCGcDQV

The Seed Of WW3: The Asian Subcontinent (Rev 16)

CHINA, INDIA, PAKISTAN
SWABBING THE BLEAKNESS OF SUBCONTINENTAL NUCLEAR INSTABILITY – ANALYSIS
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FEBRUARY 10, 2015
By IPCS
By Vijay Shankar*

After the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962, it dawned upon President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev how catastrophically close to nuclear war they had blundered due to a misshapen military-led nuclear policy, a ludicrous nuclear doctrine that believed that a nuclear war could be fought controlled and won. Both leaders sought a change to the nuclear status-quo. As Khrushchev described it, “The two most powerful nations had been squared off against each other, each with its finger on the button.” Kennedy shared this distress, remarking at a White House meeting, “It is insane that two men, sitting on opposite sides of the world, should be able to decide to bring an end to civilisation.” He called for an end to the Cold War. “If we cannot end our differences,” he said, “at least we can help make the world a safe place for diversity.” In a series of private letters, Khrushchev and Kennedy opened a dialogue on banning nuclear testing. Thus began a progression of political moves and agreements that sought to dampen the risk of a nuclear war, contain the proliferation of nuclear weapons, do away with tactical nuclear weapons, limit strategic arms, cut arsenal size and indeed bring stability to nuclear relations. If at all there is a historical lesson to be learned then it is that nuclear risk reduction and stability begins with serious dialogue between leadership.

The Subcontinental Nightmare

If one were to hypothesise what petrifying form a nuclear nightmare may take, then it is a hair trigger, opaque nuclear arsenal that has embraced tactical use under decentralised military control steered by a doctrine seeped in ambiguity and guided by a military strategy that carouses and finds unity with non-State actors. It does not take a great deal of intellectual exertions to declare that this nightmare is upon the subcontinent. The need to bring about an awakening to the dangers of a nuclear conflagration is therefore pressing.

The effect of an enfeebled civilian leadership in Pakistan that is incapable of action to remove the military finger from the nuclear trigger; the active attendance and involvement of jihadists in swaying strategy; technology intrusions brought in by covert means; absence or at best ambiguity in doctrinal underpinnings that make Pakistan’s nuclear posture indecipherable and the alarming reality of ‘intention-to-use’, all in aggregate makes the status-quo untenable. The need for change in the manner in which we transact nuclear business is urgent. Strategic restraint predicated on failsafe controls, verification in a transparent environment, providing logic to size and nature of the arsenal and putting the brakes on the slide to nuclear capriciousness become imperatives to stabilising the deterrent relationship on the subcontinent.

But the catch is, how does one begin a meaningful nuclear dialogue with an emasculated Pakistani civilian establishment that does not control a military which in turn finds no reason to come to terms with a subordinate role? And as Cohen so succinctly put it, “Pakistan will continue to be a state in possession of a uniformed bureaucracy even when civilian governments are perched on the seat of power. Regardless of what may be desirable, the army will continue to set the limits on what is possible in Pakistan.” Add to this is the widely held belief within the army that terror as sanctioned by the Quran (I shall cast terror into the hearts of the infidels: Sura 12) is a legitimate instrument of State power; the nature of the predicament becomes clear.

The Tri-Polar Tangle

A singular feature of the deterrent relationship in the region is its tri-polar character. As is well known today, it is the collusive nature of the Sino-Pak nuclear relationship which created and sustains its nuclear weapons programme. Therefore it is logical to conclude that there exists doctrinal links between the two which permits a duality in China’s nuclear policy; a declared No First Use can readily fall back on Pakistan’s developing First Use capability as far as India is concerned. Such links have made China blind to the dangers of nuclear proliferation as exemplified by the AQ Khan affair.
No scrutiny, of any consequence, of the regional nuclear situation can avoid looking at the internals of Pakistan. The country today represents a very dangerous condition that has been brought about by the precarious recipe that the establishment has brewed in nurturing fundamentalist and terrorist organisations as instruments of their military strategy. The extent to which their security establishment has been infiltrated is suggested by the attacks on PNS Mehran, Kamra air base, Karachi naval harbour and the assassination of the Punjab Governor; while the recent murderous assault on the Army School in Peshawar and the every day terror killings are more symptomatic of the free-run that these elements enjoy across the length and breadth of that country. Such a state of affairs does not inspire any confidence in the likelihood of the nuclear nightmare fading away or the robustness of their nuclear command and control structures to keep it in check.

Failure of the US Af-Pak Policy

As early as 2003 the US set out two major policy goals towards Pakistan, firstly holding it as an indispensable ally in its war in Afghanistan and secondly ending the proliferation of nuclear weapons in and from the region. However, over a decade later, both goals have failed dismally. There are confirmed reports that the Pak military has persistently deceived the US forces while elements within the former either lack the will to combat the insurgency or are actively involved with the jihadists. On the nuclear front, the rapid setting up of the unsafeguarded Khushab series (II, III and IV) nuclear reactors with Chinese collaboration having no other purpose than the production of weapon grade Plutonium, development of tactical nuclear weapons and the uninhibited growth of their arsenal do not in anyway enthuse belief in the US ability to exercise any stewardship over Pakistan’s nuclear stockpile. The inexplicable disappearance of key nuclear scientists who had recorded liaisons with al Qaeda remain alarming episodes that must cause anxieties. With US involvement in the Af-Pak greatly diminished and their focus on nuclear proliferation much sharper, the time is ripe for the US to clamp down on the maverick Pakistani nuclear posture.

Orientation of Sino-Pak Nuclear Collusion

The key to GHQ Rawalpindi’s compliance with rational norms of nuclear behaviour lies in Beijing. And the direction, in which Sino-Pak collusion is headed will to a large extent influence nuclear stability in the region. If the alliance was intended (as it now appears) to nurture a first use capability in order to keep subcontinental nuclear stability on the boil then the scope for achieving lasting stability is that much weakened. However, the current political situation in Pakistan presents a frightening possibility which is not in China’s interest to promote, more so, since Islamic terrorist elements have sworn to obtain nuclear weapons and the politico-ethnic situation in western China remains fragile. This in turn provides an opportunity to the Indian leadership to bring about change in the current ‘tri-polar tangle’.

A Blue Print for Regional Nuclear Stability

Against the reality of conventional war with its limited goals, moderated ends and the unlikelihood of it being outlawed in the foreseeable future, the separation of the conventional from the nuclear is a logical severance. Nuclear weapons are to deter and not for use; intent is the key; coherence and transparency are its basis. These remain the foundational principles that a nuclear weapon state must adhere to. However, given the politics of the region, historical animosities and the persisting dominance of the military in Pakistan, the dangers of adding nuclear malfeasance to military perfidy is more than just a possibility. Stability in this context would then suggest the importance of not only reinforcing assured retaliation to nuclear violence, but at the same time for India to bring about a consensus among both China and the US to compel Pakistan to harmonise with foundational rules of nuclear conduct. India’s current strategic relations with the US and Prime Minister Modi’s impending visit to China provides a timely opportunity to bring an end to the nightmare by swabbing the bleakness of subcontinental nuclear instability.

*Vijay Shankar
Former Commander-in-Chief, Strategic Forces Command of India

Welcome to The Quran Obama: Taqiyya Means You Just Got Had (Rev 13:16)

In his eagerness to conclude a deal with the Islamic Republic of Iran over its nuclear program, U.S. President Barack Obama has knowingly or not, overlooked what is known to Muslims as “taqiyya.”

According to the Middle East Forum “The Quran allows Muslims to have a declared agenda, and a secret agenda (Jihad, slaughter, and mayhem) during time of weakness, this is called Taqiyya.” To put it in simpler words, it is the “art” of deception, or more correctly, of deceiving non-Muslim infidels.

While negotiations with the P5+1 are ongoing, last Monday (February 2, 2015) Iran’s military launched a satellite into space called Safir-e Fajr. According to the Iranian Arabic-language Al-Alam TV, the Fajr satellite was successfully placed 450 kilometers above earth. Iran’s “moderate” President Rouhani proudly noted “Our scientists have entered a new phase for conquering space. We will continue on this path.” The Iranian Defense Minister General Hossein Dehgan added that the 21-meter, 26 ton launcher named Safir–Fajr shows “the ability of Iran to build satellite launchers.”
This new development should elevate the Obama administration’s concerns, if not cause full-fledged alarm over the Islamic Republic development of satellite technology that could have military purposes, including the continued development of long-range ballistic missiles, capable of carrying nuclear warheads that could reach American soil. But in typical taqiyya form, Iran has denied having a military role for its space program and its nuclear program.

The Obama administration, instead, is concerned about the upcoming address of Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to the U.S. Congress and the American people. Netanyahu, the White House fears, might reveal Iran’s deception, which might compel the administration to re-think the current P5+1 negotiation with Iran, and perhaps justify the Mark Kirk (R-IL)-Robert Menendez (D-NJ) bill to impose sanctions on Iran. President Obama maintains now that he refuses to “set artificial deadlines” to the negotiations with Iran, but he also conceded in a press conference that “we are not going to have talks forever.” The New York Times reported (May 19, 2009) that Obama told Netanyahu during his White House visit, “We’re not going to create a situation in which talks become an excuse for inaction while Iran proceeds with developing a nuclear –and deploying – a nuclear weapon.”

After two deadlines following the interim agreement have expired, and a third will expire this summer, President Obama’s words sound rather hollow. In his threat to veto the Kirk-Menendez bill, he sounds more like Iran’s defense attorney than being committed to preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear bomb. All the while, Iran is proceeding with spinning centrifuges.

According to the Times of Israel (January 31, 2015) which quoted Israel TV Channel 10, the deal taking shape between Washington and Tehran “would allow Iran to continue enriching uranium in over 7000 centrifuges. It quoted an unnamed Jerusalem source saying “The terms of the deal would leave Iran closer than was thought to nuclear weapons, mere months from producing enough material for a bomb.” The same article suggested that the U.S. has agreed to 80% of Iran’s demands.

The existential threat to Israel from a nuclear Iran has prompted PM Netanyahu to accept Speaker John Boehner’s invitation to address U.S. Congress in early March. Netanyahu feels that he has no choice but to speak out against the imminent deal with Iran. Sources close to Netanyahu suggest that Netanyahu’s address will praise Obama’s efforts rather than criticize him, and it will not be a partisan speech, or focus too much on the proposed sanctions by the U.S. Congress. It would simply address the dangers of the deal currently concocted between the P5+1 and Iran. In his address to the U.S. Congress, Netanyahu should chronicle Iran’s deception and taqiyya tactics in its efforts to acquire nuclear weapons.

The Canadian Centre for Treaty Compliance has chronicled Iran’s deception on its nuclear program. In 2002, the dissident group, National Council of Resistance in Iran (NCRI) announced the location of two nuclear sites in Iran; a nuclear fuel production facility in Natanz, and heavy water facility in Arak. On September 12, 2003, the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) Board of Governors Resolution called on Iran to ensure no further failures to report, and demanded not to introduce nuclear material into its pilot enrichment cascade in Natanz.

September 24, 2005, Resolution: GOV/2005/87 finds that Iran’s many failures and breaches of its obligation to comply with NPT Safeguards Agreement , as detailed in GOV/2003/75, constitute non-compliance in the context of Article XII.C  of the Agency’s (IAEA) Stature; finds also that the history of concealment of Iran’s nuclear activities has given rise to…

On January 10, 2006, Iran broke the IAEA seal at Natanz. John Bolton, U.S. ambassador to the UN reported that the “Iranians reverted to form by breaking IAEA seal at the Natanz enrichment facility and resuming ‘research work.’” In its September, 2008 report, the IAEA said that the document describes experimentation in connection with symmetrical initiation of a hemispherical high explosive charge suitable for an implosion type nuclear device.

The New York Times reported (November 16, 2009) that the “International inspectors who gained access to Iran’s newly revealed underground nuclear enrichment plant voiced strong suspicions in a report that Iran was concealing other atomic facilities.” Iran however, will not allow inspectors access to military sites, nor will it allow inspectors to interview key nuclear scientists.

On February 19, 2010, the Washington Post revealed that U.N. nuclear inspectors, citing evidence of an apparent ongoing effort by Iran to obtain new technologies, publicly suggested for the first time that Iran is actively seeking to develop a weapons capability. On August 30, 2012, the IAEA released a report showing a major expansion of Iranian enrichment activities. The report said that Iran has more than doubled the number of centrifuges at the underground facility at Fordow, from 1,064 centrifuges in May to 2,140 centrifuges in August.

The Chicago Tribune (November 7, 2014) quoted nuclear expert David Albright of the Institute for Science and International Security as saying “…it will be difficult if not impossible for Western inspectors to accomplish these goals without knowing exactly how far Iran’s scientists have advanced in nuclear weapons research.” Albright added, “If Iran gets a deal without disclosing the past military dimensions of its program, it would continue to be able to say that there was never any military nuclear program, and it was justified in denying inspectors to military sites. That creates a dangerous precedent: The Iranians could leverage that agreement to bar inspectors from suspected nuclear sites in Iran, simply calling them military sites.”

On November 25, 2009, President Obama seemed to have had much less trust in Iran’s aims regarding its nuclear program. At a news conference at the conclusion of a G-20 Pittsburgh, PA summit he stated, “Iran’s action raised doubts about its promise to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes only.” This was said in the context of Iran’s clandestinely building an underground plant (near Qom) to make nuclear fuel that could be used to build a nuclear bomb. Asked about the use of military force against Iran, Obama said, “I have always said that we do not rule out any option when it comes to U.S. security interests.”

The Iranians have now figured out that the Obama administration’s eagerness to strike a deal with them overrides most other considerations. Their taqiyya tactics of deceiving the IAEA and the P5+1, including the U.S. notwithstanding, Tehran’s arrogant defiance in insisting that it will continue to build up its nuclear program, as well as its space launchers, makes it clear that the Obama administration might ultimately accept a nuclear Iran.