Pakistani Nuclear Horn Becoming Enormous (Daniel 8:8)

Pakistan Could Soon Have More Nukes Than the U.K. and France

Pakistan nuclear missiles

And smaller and more destabilizing ones, too

Pakistan has one of the fastest growing nuclear stockpiles in the world. Islamabad refuses to release any information regarding its nuclear stockpile, but open sources suggest it possesses as many as 120 atomic warheads.
A satellite image from January 2014 seems to indicate that Pakistan’s National Defense Complex has finished fitting out of two additional Hatf-7 Babur cruise missile launchers, one of the few non-strategic nuke systems that Pakistan could deploy against an attacking Indian army.

The 350-kilometer-range Babur, which debuted in 2005, is Pakistan’s first land-attack cruise missile. There’s also an air-launched version. The more recent Nasr, a surface-to-surface missile system with a 60-kilometer range, first appeared in 2011.

Both platforms are highly mobile and sport technology that many analysts believe originated in China.
We don’t know how many of each system Pakistan’s NDC has produced, but continuing production underscores Islamabad’s intention to deploy nukes to counter India’s conventional forces.
DigitalGlobe imagery from January 2014 shows Pakistan’s Khushab complex with Khushab 4 still under construction
Pakistan and India have been at odds since decolonization. The two countries clashed over Jammu and Kashmir in 1947, 1965 and 1999, over the creation of Bangladesh in 1971 and almost recently over the Indian parliament and Mumbai terrorist attacks in 2001 and 2008.
The tense relationship got tenser when both countries conducted nuclear weapons tests in 1998.
To be fair, the regional atomic arms race on the subcontinent is tiny compared to the USA and the USSR’s own race during the Cold War. There has been no South Asia equivalent of the Cuban missile crisis, no false alarms or computer glitches that could have led to massive retaliation on a catastrophic scale.
But that doesn’t mean we shouldn’t worry.
DigitalGlobe imagery from January 2014 shows two completed Hatf-7 and one possible Hatf-7 chassis parked in front of three high bay garages at Pakistan’s NDC
Pakistan, in particular, is a problem. Due to India’s overwhelming conventional forces, Pakistan increasingly sees nuclear weapons not as a strategic deterrent but as a means to help level the playing field — or so it says.
Parroting sentiments in the army, Pakistani politicians often cite the bomb as the ultimate guarantor of the nation’s security. Not surprising, Islamabad is boosting its fissile material production capacity and building more warheads in the process.
According to the International Panel on Fissile Nuclear Materials, those countries maintain approximately 225 and 300 warheads, respectively.
Satellite imagery from 2013 suggests that Pakistan has begun operating its third plutonium production reactor at Khushab. Imagery from 2014 shows further progress on a fourth reactor that’s still under construction.
Each of the three 50-megawatt reactors produces approximately 11.5 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium, providing up to 35 kilograms per year. When the fourth comes online, possibly around 2016, Pakistan could be producing up to 46 kilograms a year.
And since the Khushab complex went operational in 1998, Pakistan has been shifting from highly enriched uranium to plutonium-based weapons. This is an important development if the country wants to create smaller and lighter warheads. A typical plutonium weapon requires four kilograms of Pu-239 to create a bomb, while HEU devices require 15 kilograms of U-235.
Using plutonium can mean a lighter device on a smaller and more mobile missile. More and more, Pakistan’s military planners believe they need these tactical nukes to balance India, which in April 2004 proposed a new military doctrine emphasizing rapid mobilization and offensive operations.

Pakistan’s potential tactical nukes could lower the barrier to a nuclear exchange. At least that’s what Indian officials believe.

“India will not be the first to use nuclear weapons, but if it is attacked with such weapons, it would engage in nuclear retaliation which will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage on its adversary,” Shyam Saran, former Indian foreign secretary and the current chairman of India’s National Security Advisory Board, told an audience at Delhi’s Habitat Centre in April.
“The label on a nuclear weapon used for attacking India, strategic or tactical, is irrelevant from the Indian perspective,” Saran said.
“[A] limited nuclear war is a contradiction in terms,” he continued. “Any nuclear exchange, once initiated, would swiftly and inexorably escalate to the strategic level. Pakistan would be prudent not to assume otherwise as it sometimes appears to do, most recently by developing and perhaps deploying theater nuclear weapons.”
All that said, it’s unclear how close Pakistan is to actually deploying its tactical nukes. Likewise, India has only proposed its new offensive doctrine—it hasn’t implemented the plan. But that’s not to say tragic miscalculations couldn’t occur.
“Pakistani motivation is to dissuade India from contemplating conventional punitive retaliation to sub-conventional but highly destructive and disruptive cross-border terrorist strikes,” Saran said.
But it seems unlikely New Delhi will cave to the implicit threat. And what happens when India calls Pakistan’s atomic bluff? Assuming it is a bluff.

Babylon The Great Tries To Buy Her Way Out Of THE END

Irresponsible spending on nuclear arsenal

nuclear spending

Do you know that our U.S. government is planning to tax us for about $1 trillion over the next 30 years to produce 80 new nuclear bombs each year? A September 2014 New York Times article reported our president “laid out his atomic refurbishment plans, which the Congressional Budget Office now estimates will cost $355 billion over the next decade. But that is just the start. The price tag will soar after 10 years as missiles, bombers and submarines made in the last century reach the end of their useful lives and replacements are built … It estimated the total cost of the nuclear enterprise over the next three decades at roughly $900 billion to $1.1 trillion.”

The U.S. has 1,500 nuclear missiles on ready alert and another 3,400 in reserve storage. These weapons are deemed usable and reliable by government and private experts for the next 50 to 100 years to constitute deterrence against attack by a hostile nuclear power.

Physicians for Social Responsibility has projected the likely scenario of the horrendous effects of a nuclear war that launched less than a hundred nuclear weapons. There would be thousands of immediate deaths from blast, heat approaching the temperature of the sun, and radiation. Then for several years the sun’s rays would not warm earth due to suspended soot. This would cause a nuclear winter over much of earth. Crops would fail. There would be mass starvation and it is estimated that there would be over a billion deaths.

So why produce more such weapons of death and destruction?

The U.S. doesn’t need more nuclear deterrence — we already have a surplus, with ever-increasing costs to maintain these weapons responsibly. This is partly driven by pork barrel subsidization or “corporate welfare” to the weapons contractors and arms merchants that lobby heavily and are rewarded handsomely. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel recently requested several billion dollars to upgrade the nuclear weapons management program which is in a state of decay. Colin Powell has stated that nuclear weapons are useless and they should never be used because of the devastation to the planet and all of life.

Six years ago, former Secretaries of State Schultz and Kissinger, former Defense Secretary Perry, and former Senate Armed Services Chair Nunn advocated for a series of action steps to reduce the danger of nuclear catastrophe, including substantial negotiated reductions in the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals. It is of utmost importance that our two nations work to restore relationships which have soured over recent years. This has not only led to a breakdown of diplomatic relations between our countries, but has increased the danger of conflict. It is essential that we return to the bargaining table for the sake of humankind.

In the early months of 2015 the new Congress will be asked to authorize billions of dollars for nuclear bomb production as part of the proposed near trillion dollar nuclear weapons program over the next 30 years. If this is approved, will our taxes be increased? That’s not something the new Congress would embrace — more likely funds would be carved out of social programs, education, healthcare and Social Security. Remember, there’s no free money and the taxpayer, the people, must pay.

Sen. Dianne Feinstein, in a Dec. 3, 2014 Washington Post article, flatly stated that nuclear weapons are a financial burden and a threat to global security. She added that “the current level of spending on nuclear weapons is unnecessary and unsustainable” and “we are holding far more nuclear weapons than are necessary, and the cost is undermining other national security priorities”.
Move to contact your Congressional representatives, House and Senate — and tell them not to approve more money for more nuclear weapons that we don’t need. We citizens must speak up or pay up.

Go to for House representatives, for senators’ contact information.
Terrence Clark, M.D., Lewis Patrie, M.D. and Robert Howarth, M.S.E., are members of Physicians for Social Responsibility.

Babylon The Great Will Be Destroyed In One Hour (Rev 18:10)

Air Force admits nuclear flaws, faces uncertain path to remedying underinvestment, low morale

  • Nuclear Missteps-1.jpg

    FILE – In this April 15, 1997 file photo, Air Force Lt. Jerome White stands at the door of his missile launch capsule 100-feet under ground where he and his partner are responsible for 10 nuclear-armed ICBM’s, in north-central Colorado. Faced with one of its biggest challenges in years, repairing a troubled nuclear missile corps, the Air Force has taken an important first step by admitting, after years of denial, that its problems run deep and wide. (AP Photo/Eric Draper) (The Associated Press)

Faced with one of its biggest challenges in years — repairing a troubled nuclear missile corps — the Air Force has taken an important first step by admitting, after years of denial, that its problems run deep and wide.

Less certain is whether it will find all the right fixes, apply them fully and convince a doubting force of launch officers, security guards and other nuclear workers that their small and narrow career field is not a dead end.

The stakes are huge.

The nation’s strategy for deterring nuclear war rests in part on the 450 Minuteman 3 missiles that stand ready, 24/7, to launch at a moment’s notice from underground silos in five states.

Some question the wisdom of that strategy in an era of security threats dominated by terrorism and cyberattacks. But whatever their role, those intercontinental ballistic missiles, or ICBMs, will have to be safeguarded for years to come.

The responsibility is enormous, the cost of mistakes potentially colossal. The business end of these missiles can deliver mass destruction with breathtaking speed. Accidents, though rare, are an ever-present worry.

That’s why it can be disquieting to hear missile officers describe their unhappiness and lack of faith in nuclear force leaders.

In sworn testimony to investigators looking into allegations that two ICBM commanders at Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota, were mistreating their subordinates, one officer spoke of deep pessimism.

“I go about most of my days wishing I was in another place, in another Air Force field,” the officer said, according to a copy of investigation testimony provided in September and obtained by The Associated Press under the Freedom of Information Act. The officer’s name was removed from the document by Air Force censors citing privacy protection.

The belated admission by the Air Force and the Pentagon’s civilian leaders, after a series of AP stories revealing the issue, that the nuclear force is suffering from years of neglect, mismanagement and weak morale has yielded opposing interpretations of what it means.

Some, including experts who are critical of the Air Force, say it makes more obvious the need to invest billions to modernize the force. The flaws are fixable, they say. They cite a resurgent Russia and a belligerent North Korea as reasons to make the added investment to ensure that America’s nuclear force is revitalized.

Subscribing to this view, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel announced on Nov. 14 that the Pentagon would make top-to-bottom changes — more than 100 in all — in how the nuclear force is managed and operated. He said the Pentagon would spend up to $10 billion more over six years to improve the force. Ten days later Hagel announced his resignation, leaving questions about follow-through.

The opposing view is that this moment presents an opportunity to reconsider and restructure the nuclear force, possibly eliminating the ICBMs while enhancing the remaining sea- and air-launched nuclear forces. That view, however, is not predominant in the Obama administration, which favors the policy embraced by its predecessors, that the decades-old nuclear structure must be preserved for the foreseeable future.

What that leaves is a risk of reverting to past practices, perhaps with additional failures.

Eric Schlosser, author of “Command and Control,” a highly regarded 2013 book on the ICBM and nuclear risk, said there is little doubt that the Pentagon needs to update the nuclear missile force’s basic infrastructure.

“But that’s a short-term solution,” he said in an interview. “The bigger question is: How many land-based missiles do we need in the 21st century? How should they be deployed, and do we need them at all?”

Schlosser and others have expressed concern about morale problems in the force — an issue the Air Force had been slow to acknowledge even after the AP wrote last year about an unpublished RAND Corp. study that found evidence of “burnout” and hopelessness among missile crews and other members of the ICBM workforce.

Paul Bracken, a Yale University professor and author of “The Second Nuclear Age,” says he finds it unsettling to read about neglect of the ICBM force and the turmoil in the ranks of those who operate the missiles.

“If things are so bad, if for some reason we did want to fire an individual nuclear weapon, could we? Would the weapon take off?” he asked in an interview this month with the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. “With all of the problems in our nuclear force, it seems to me that there’d be some real doubts. You really wouldn’t want to use one of these weapons, because you don’t know what is going to happen.”

Bracken added that in the event of a massive nuclear attack by Russia, “I’m sure we could retaliate — we’ve got enough weaponry at our disposal. If we fire enough of them in a mass counterstrike, some are bound to work.”

Evidence of what some would call the Air Force’s willful disregard for its nuclear force is not hard to find. Michelle Spencer, for one, documented it in a little-noticed research paper she wrote for the Air Force in 2012. Her study team found examples of Air Force decisions to deemphasize nuclear training and education.

“At times the signs were clear that expertise and culture had declined to the point that the (nuclear) enterprise was in danger of catastrophic failure,” she wrote.

Spencer put particular emphasis on nuclear expertise — how to expand it, how to maintain it and how to reward it.

“Without answers to these fundamental questions, the Air Force nuclear enterprise remains on the same trajectory as it has been for the last two decades – in ever-increasing decline,” she wrote, adding that at some point it may be unable to sustain a nuclear mission that is supposed to be central to U.S. defense strategy.
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Babylon The Great No Longer King Of The Sea (Revelation 13:1)

Welcome to America’s Nuclear Nightmare

Nuclear weapons will come to loom larger—and perhaps much larger—than they have since the Cold War over U.S. and Chinese military planning.
FOR ALL the focus on maritime disputes in the South and East China Seas, there is an even greater peril in Asia that deserves attention. It is the rising salience of nuclear weapons in the region. China’s military buildup—in particular its growing capabilities to blunt America’s ability to project effective force in the western Pacific—is threatening to change the military balance in the area. This will lead to a cascade of strategic shifts that will make nuclear weapons more central in both American and Chinese national-security plans, while increasing the danger that other regional states will seek nuclear arsenals of their own. Like it or not, nuclear weapons in Asia are back.

For seventy years, the United States has militarily dominated maritime Asia. During this era, U.S. forces could, generally speaking, defeat any challenger in the waters of the western Pacific or in the skies over them. Washington established this preeminence and has retained it in the service of a strategy motivated both by parochial interests such as protecting American territory and commerce as well as by more high-minded aspirations to foster the growth and development of prosperous, liberal societies within the region. Military primacy has been the crucial underwriter, the predicate of broader American strategy.

This primacy is now coming into question. China’s advancing “anti-access/area-denial” (A2/AD) capabilities as well as its expanding strike and power-projection capabilities will present a mounting challenge to the U.S. force posture in the Pacific region—and thus to America’s strategy for the Asia-Pacific as a whole. Beijing appears to be seeking to create a zone in the western Pacific within which the military power of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) will be able to ensure that Chinese strategic interests are held paramount—in effect, to supplant the United States as the military primate in the region. The oft-cited DF-21D “carrier-killer” ballistic missile is only one small facet of this much broader Chinese effort, which encompasses the fielding of a whole network that integrates a range of increasingly high-quality platforms, weapons, sensors, and command, control and communications systems. Because of this effort, U.S. forces attempting to operate in maritime Asia will now have to struggle for dominance rather than simply assume it.

Indeed, anxiety about the relative military balance between the United States and China is building among the defense officials charged with monitoring it. As Frank Kendall, the Pentagon official with chief responsibility for developing and acquiring new military systems, wrote in a recent paper focused on the implications of China’s military buildup:

While the U.S. still has significant military advantages, U.S. superiority in some key warfare domains is at risk . . . U.S. Navy ships and western Pacific bases are vulnerable to missile strikes from missiles already in the inventory in China . . . The net impact is that China is developing a capability to push our operating areas farther from a potential fight, thereby reducing our offensive and defensive capacity . . . The Chinese are developing an integrated air defense system that puts U.S. air dominance in question, and in some regions, air superiority is challenged by 2020.

Kendall summarized his assessment with the judgment that

China is rapidly modernizing its forces and is developing and fielding strategically chosen capabilities that are designed to defeat power projection capabilities the U.S. depends upon. Technological superiority the U.S. demonstrated over 20 years ago, and which we have relied upon ever since, is being actively challenged.

Nor is Kendall an outlier in this assessment—rather, his view represents something like the evolving baseline understanding among defense officials and experts. Comparably informed and thoughtful defense leaders like Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work have said very similar things.

As a result, the United States is beginning to mount an effort to respond to China’s growing capabilities—for instance, through the Defense Department’s recently announced “Offset Strategy” initiative. The Pentagon rightly appears to be focused on maintaining American advantages in the effective projection of conventional military force even in the face of a resolute and highly capable opponent like Beijing. This goal stretches across procurement decisions, revisions to plans and doctrines, changes to deployment and basing, and attitudes toward the exploitation of technology. Outside commentators have tended to conflate this broad effort with the department’s laudable Air-Sea Battle initiative, which is clearly an important segment of the larger attempt to counter challenges to U.S. military superiority, but is still only a part of it. Ideally, this initiative will be successful and will allow the United States to maintain its traditional dominance in maritime Asia. But even if the Pentagon cannot wholly achieve this objective, maintaining even a partial edge in the military balance against China will give the United States valuable deterrent and coercive leverage in what will very likely be a fraught relationship with Beijing.

But achieving even this more modest aspiration is more a hope than a certainty. And the persistence of sequestration, the American political system’s unwillingness to decisively shift resources toward maintaining the military edge in Asia, and the abiding necessity or allure of involvement in other regions raise questions as to how reasonable this hope is. Thus, we cannot be sure how successful the United States will be in retaining its military edge in the region.

Babylon Not Even REMOTELY Prepared For A Nuclear Attack

US Not Fully Prepared for Nuclear Terrorist Attack

Pakistan's Nuclear Terrorism

Nuclear Terrorism
The U.S. government isn’t fully prepared to handle a nuclear terrorist attack or a large-scale natural catastrophe, lacks effective coordination, and in some cases is years away from ensuring adequate emergency shelter and medical treatment, congressional investigators have found.

The report by the nonpartisan Government Accountability Office, obtained by The Associated Press before its release, found that the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency, or FEMA, didn’t always keep track of disaster efforts by agencies, hampering the nation’s preparedness even after Superstorm Sandy in 2012. That storm hit a large swath of the eastern U.S., including New Jersey, New York and Pennsylvania, which received federal disaster money.

“FEMA is not aware of the full range of information,” according to the report. The investigation relied in part on internal documents from the Homeland Security Department, which oversees FEMA, including previously undisclosed details from a 2013 disaster plan that highlights needed improvements in the event of an attack from an improvised nuclear device.

The Government Accountability Office said it would still take one to five years to develop a strategy to determine whether people were exposed to unsafe levels of radiation and five to 10 years to plan for a full medical response. Guidance also was lacking as to communication among first responders and making shelters and other basic needs available.

Investigators said FEMA, which leads an interagency group in creating a disaster response plan, needs to set clear deadlines and estimated costs to ensure that agencies fulfill the goals.

It is one of several reports that the office plans in the coming months on the U.S. level of disaster readiness.

“This report makes clear that there are some areas of our country’s preparedness that need strengthening up,” said Sen. Bob Casey, who co-chairs the U.S. Senate Caucus on Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism.

As to natural catastrophes, the report said FEMA should take a bigger responsibility in leading a coordinated response, setting clear minimum standards for agencies and collecting regular status reports. It said the Energy Department did not effectively coordinate with state agencies and the private sector during Superstorm Sandy, which was blamed for at least 182 deaths and $65 billion in damage.

It also cited a lack of coordination among federal agencies in deciding whether to send law enforcement personnel to the affected region.

Jim Crumpacker of Homeland Security said the agency would work to put into place GAO recommendations by June but noted it did not have legal authority to compel other agencies to take action. “FEMA will continue to coordinate and collaborate with other federal departments and agencies,” Crumpacker wrote in a response included in the GAO report.

The report says 39 of 102 corrective actions identified by federal agencies after Superstorm Sandy remain undone, including improving emergency coordination with states, boosting training in the use of electronic medical records, and ensuring adequate transportation of injured victims.

Sen. Tom Carper, D-Del., who chairs the Senate Homeland Security Committee and will be the panel’s senior Democrat next year, said he was concerned about the findings and would work to make sure that agencies fix the lapses. “Whether a disaster is natural or man-made, large or small, our federal government needs to be prepared. This report makes it clear that federal agencies need to do a better job,” he said.