Even Congress Knows Iran Is Playing Games

353 US Reps to Kerry: Iran ‘Stonewalling’ on Nuke Detonator

Stunning bipartisan congressional letter focuses on Iran’s ‘refusal to fully cooperate’ with IAEA over Parchin.
Khan Diagram on Neutron Initiators

Khan Diagram on Neutron Initiators
In a stunning bi-partisan “Congressional Letter” from over 353 out of 435 U.S. congresspersons to US Secretary of State John Kerry, the 353 U.S. representatives issued a stark warning that, “As you wrote in the Washington Post earlier this summer, if Iran’s nuclear program is truly peaceful, “it’s not a hard proposition to prove. The only reasonable conclusion for its stonewalling of international investigators is that Tehran does indeed have much to hide.”

The Congressional Letter’s signatories included almost all of both parties’ leaderships, and was greatly aided by Republican Congressman Peter J. Roskam (R-IL-06) of Illinois, a stalwart, and tireless, advocate of Israel as a vital strategic asset of the United States.

In a June 30, 2014, Washington Post opinion-piece entitled “Iranian nuclear deal still is possible, but time is running out,” Secretary Kerry had exhorted Iran to prove it “nuclear program is truly peaceful.”

The Congressional Letter, dated October 1, 2014, focused on Iran’s “refusal to fully cooperate” with the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) concerning the “possible military dimensions” of Iran’s program first outlined by the IAEA in November 2011. The Congressional Letter to Sec. Kerry also stated, “As you know, the IAEA has sought information on the ‘potential military dimensions’ of the Iranian nuclear program, in particular information about Iran’s extensive research and development of a nuclear explosive device.”

This Congressional warning follows a similar warning from Israel Intelligence Minister Yuval Steinitz, who issued a statement last week that emphasized that “credible sources” alleged that “internal neutron sources such as uranium were used in nuclear implosion tests at [Iran’s] Parchin.”

Steinitz’ Iranian “nuclear detonator” allegations center on the fact that Iran, after close to three years, has failed to explain to the IAEA allegations in the IAEA’s November 2011 report annex, which stated in paragraph 55 that the IAEA “has information from a Member State [likely Pakistan – ML] that Iran has undertaken work to manufacture small capsules suitable as containers of a component containing nuclear material”, and that “Iran may also have experimented with such components in order to assess their performance in generating neutrons.”

Such a device for “generating neutrons” is called a “neutron initiator” (See A.Q. Khan graphic immediately above). Neutron initiators are one of the key components to an “implosion” type of nuclear bombs. Implosion nuclear bombs can use as their bomb “core” either highly-enriched Uranium (U235), or weapons’ grade plutonium.

As is illustrated by A. Q. Khan, the “godfather of the Pakistani nuclear-bomb,” “Neutron initiators” act like “lighter fluid” to an implosion nuclear-bomb nuclear-core, and set off the first burst of the implosion nuclear chain-reaction.

Iran’s alleged testing of such a “nuclear initiators” has been unexplained by Iran to date. Heightening fears that such Iranian testing would prove Iran’s nuclear weapons’ intentions is the fact that “neutron initiators” have no dual purpose. This means there is no “civilian” non-weapons’ purpose to “neutron initiators” which could help Iran explain away Iran’s testing of such a device. Since, there is other non-nuclear dual use, the sole purpose of testing such a neutron initiator would be for the constructing and/or designing of a nuclear bomb.

As for the 353 U.S. Representatives’ immediate concerns, their letter closed ominously by stating:
“As you have written, there is a ‘discrepancy…between Iran’s professed intent with respect to its nuclear program and the actual content of that program to date.’ We agree with your assessment that “these issues cannot be dismissed; they must be addressed by the Iranians if a comprehensive solution is to be reached.”

Australian Horn Abandons Nuclear Safegaurds

Australia may abandon nuclear safeguards in India uranium deal

Australian the Nuclear Horn

Australian the Nuclear Horn
Friday 3 October 2014 8:42AM
The government’s deal last month on nuclear co-operation with India, who are not a signatory to Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, suggests the Abbott Government may be abandoning Australia’s uranium safeguard conditions.

The terms of the agreement have been set by India and the country’s government has refused to provide reports on Australian uranium exports, which could be a contravention of Australia’s usual safeguard standards.

The Persian Nuclear Chess Game

The enemy of my enemy is my enemy

Israel Hayom

Chess: An Iranian Invention

Chess: An Iranian Invention
The idea that the enemy of my enemy is my potential ally underlies the 2014 Western policy toward Iran, the enemy of Islamic State. It underlay U.S. policy toward Iraq’s Saddam Hussein — the enemy of Iran — until his occupation of Kuwait on Aug. 2, 1990.
The reckless policy toward Iraq in 1990 triggered a conventional conflict, a $1.25 trillion cost to the U.S. taxpayer, 4,500 U.S. military fatalities, a surge of anti-U.S. Islamic terrorism, and a dramatic destabilization of the Persian Gulf. The misguided characterization of Iran could produce a nuclear conflict, a mega-trillion dollar cost to the U.S. taxpayer, an unprecedented level of fatalities, a tidal wave of global anti-U.S Islamic terrorism, and tectonic eruptions of insanity throughout the globe.
During 1989-1990, upon the conclusion of the Iraq-Iran war, the U.S. administration portrayed Iraq’s Saddam Hussein — the enemy of America’s enemy, Iran — as a potential ally, enhancing Baghdad’s strategic capabilities through an intelligence-sharing agreement, supplies of sensitive dual-use systems and the extension of $5 billion loan guarantees. Instead of constraining Saddam’s regional maneuverability and inherent, violent, megalomaniac expansionism, the U.S. administration chose to ignore Saddam’s core, imperialistic, rogue, radical, anti-U.S. ideology, which triggered the Iraq-Iran war.
The larger, historical, ideological, complex context was overtaken by a narrowly and simplistically designed policy du jour. The recklessness of “the enemy of my enemy is my potential ally” was underlined by an intense U.S.-Iraq diplomatic traffic. For example, Saddam’s meeting with Ambassador April Glaspie on July 25, 1990, which convinced Saddam that he could invade Kuwait with impunity.
The victory of wishful thinking over reality was also the basis for Israel’s 1993 policy toward the PLO — the enemy of Hamas — which was gullibly expected to align itself with Israel’s war on Palestinian terrorism, in return for the unprecedented Israeli territorial concessions of the Oslo process. Instead, since 1993, Israel has been a victim of an unprecedented wave of PLO/Hamas anti-Israel terrorism, reinforced by daily hate education and incitement in Mahmoud Abbas’ schools, mosques and media, as well as a surge of terrorism from 2000-2003, the 2006 Hamas takeover of Gaza and the 2008-2009, 2012 and 2014 wars against Palestinian terrorism in Gaza.
The assumption that “the enemy of my enemy is potentially my friend” underestimates the following endemic, unique features of Iran’s ayatollahs and mullahs: the compulsive, core, Islamic, supremacist, megalomaniac, anti-infidel, anti-U.S. ideology; the perception of the U.S. as the “Great Satan” and the chief obstacle to an imperial Islamic Iran; the intimate military ties with America’s enemies and adversaries; the sponsorship of global anti-U.S. jihadist terrorism, including in Iraq and Afghanistan; a 30-year track record of non-compliance and deceit in their negotiation with the West; Iranian President Hassan Rouhani’s key role in misleading the West; the clear and present danger posed by a nuclear Iran to the survival of Saudi Arabia and other pro-U.S. oil-producing Arab regimes and to global and homeland security, national security and economy; the impact of Iran’s occupation of Iraq’s Shiite section upon the stability of the Gulf; the egregious violations of human rights by Iran’s minority, tyrannical, ruthless regime which sent 500,000 children to clear minefields during the Iraq-Iran War; and the ineffectiveness of sanctions, and any diplomatic option, when applied to rogue regimes, bent on domination, and the rejection of peaceful coexistence.
“The enemy of my enemy is my potential ally” worldview has been nurtured by the same foreign policy establishments that have systematically misread the Middle East: misjudging the rise of Islamic State; overestimating the will of the U.S.’s Arab allies to fight and the capabilities of Iraq’s military; underestimating the developments in Syria; welcoming the Arab tsunami as an “Arab Spring” transitioning toward democracy; crowning the Palestinian issue as the core cause of the Middle East turbulence and the crown jewel of Arab policy-making; encouraging the toppling of pro-U.S. Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and the rise of the anti-U.S. Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood terror organization; giving Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sissi the cold shoulder; jumpstarting the 2006 Hamas takeover of Gaza; legitimizing Yasser Arafat and Mahmoud Abbas in 1988 and embracing them as a messengers of peace in 1993; underestimating Palestinian/Iranian hate education as the most effective manufacturing line of terrorism and the most authentic reflection of the respective leadership; courting Saddam Hussein in 1990; punishing Israel for destroying Iraq’s nuclear reactor in 1981, which spared the U.S. a nuclear confrontation in 1991; the abandonment of the pro-U.S. Shah of Iran, and welcoming the rise of anti-U.S. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini; initial opposition to Prime Minister Begin’s 1977 direct peace negotiations with Egypt, and so on.
The deficient threat assessment of a nuclear Iran has crowned Teheran’s ayatollahs and mullahs as the top beneficiaries of the confrontation with Islamic State, rewarding them with what they want most: additional time required to obtain nuclear capabilities.
Reality checks and common sense indicate that the U.S. does not have a potential ally in the battle between Iran and Islamic State. Both are sworn enemies (amenable to tactical, provisional negotiations and truces) bent on Islamic supremacy, terrorism and “Death to America.”